Self-Constitution: Being Myself, Doing Actions - Course Presentation (and ex ante syllabus)

Self-Constitution: Being Myself, Doing Actions
In modern and contemporary philosophy, the property of being self-constituting confers special metaphysical,semantic aand epistemic, and normative status. 
Metaphysically, it is a property of individuation and identity which does not depend on any external condition, a propety of absoluteness. Semantically and epistemically it is the property of determining its own conditions of reference and truth so that they entail rational cognitive accessibility. Normatively it is the property of determining its own reasons and to secure their satisfaction or lack of satisfaction in reality. Hegel, Kant, and Pragmatism are the epitome of this broad philosophical orientation.
I want to discuss self-constitution in relation to two domains of philosophical theory in which it seems to find a particularly imporrtant application: (a) the first person and personal identity and (b) reasons and the doing of actions.
(a) There seeems to be no other way of individuating the sense and reference of first-personal thoughts but in terms of what these very thoughts express and denote. The first person is self-referential in a way that implies self-constitution: the referent of “I” is who is using it and the sense of “I” is determned by such reference (rather than the other way around). Insofar as to be a person entails the possibility of firrst-personal thinking, the condition of beeing a person is also self-constituting. Therefore, in the domain of personhood, first-personal self-constitution has also metaphysical import.
(b) Action is also a compelling nstance of self-constitution. In this case, we should proceed from metaphysics: any event or state which counts as an action is  necessarily acted or done; its nature and reality of action is self-constituted, it does itself and does itself as action. This claim can be extended to agency and to reasons for actions; therefore, self-constitution is a mark of the domain of practice also with regard to its subjects and to its normativiy.
The course will deal with the concept of self-constituion in general and with how such concept is exemplified in the two domains of the first person and of agency and actions. Attention will be dedicated to certain deep and serious difficulties that arise when the concept of self-consstituting subjectivity is addressed from the viewpoint of normativity: how can self-constituing subjects and their properties be assessed in terms of whether they are as they ought to be?
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1953
S. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 1982
(On the general problems of self-constitution.)
I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1787
G. Frege, Thought, 1918
E. Anscombe, The First Person, 1975
De Gaynesford, I, 2008
(On self-constituting first person and personal identity.)
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 1787
E. Anscombe, Intention, 1957
C. Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 2008
(On self-constituting agency and actions.)

Data inizio: 
Venerdì, 17 Settembre, 2021
Data fine: 
Sabato, 17 Settembre, 2022

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