ACADEMICA

INTRODUCTION

D ATES OF COMPOSITION AND REVISION.—In Cicero's letters to Atticus written during the summer of 45 B.C., when he was in retirement from public life (see p. xi), there are many references to his work on this treatise. Writing from Astura on May 13, and alluding to the death of his daughter, he says: 'Ego hic duo magna συντάγματα absolvi; nullo enim alio modo a miseria quasi aberrare possum' (Att. xii. 45. 1). On May 29, he writes from Tuseulum (Att. xiii. 32. 3): 'Torquatus Romaest; misi ut tibi daretur. Catulum et Lucullum ut opinor antea; his libris nova prohoemia sunt addita quibus eorum uterque laudatur.' Here 'Torquatus' means the first two books of De Finibus, and 'Catulus' the first and 'Lucullus' the second book of Academica in its first shape; so it is the latter treatise, and not De Finibus I. and II., that is probably referred to by the modest expression in the preceding quotation 'two big compilations.' We infer that Academica in its first form was so far finished by the latter half of May that a copy was sent to Atticus, new prefices being added a little later. Cicero refers to the treatise
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as Ἱλλαμ Ἀκαδημικὴν σύνταξιν (Att. xiii. 6. 1), but the two volumes were actually named Catulus and Lucullus, after the leading interlocutors in each. Hortensius also figured in Catulus, and Cicero in both.

But Cicero was not satisfied with his work as it stood, and began at once to revise it, improving the style and making the treatment more concise; he also divided the two volumes into four. He writes of these alterations with great satisfaction (Att. xiii. 13. 1, June 26): 'ex duobus libris contuli in quattuor: grandiores sunt omnino quam erant illi, sed tamen multa detracta.' Also (Att. xiii. 12. 3) Atticus seems to have suggested that a literary compliment was due to Varro, who had promised to dedicate an important work to Cicero (this was his De Lingua Latina); and Cicero writes that although two years had passed without Varro’s having got on with the work (‘adsiduo cursu cubitum nullum processerit’), he has decided to transfer to him the dedication of Academica, and to postpone paying a compliment to Catulus, Lucullus and Hortensius, ‘hominem nobilem illi quidem sed nullo modo philosophi’ (ibid.), in fact, well known, not indeed for άπαιδευστία (want of education), but for ἀτρυφία (lack of special training) in these subjects (Att. xiii. 13. 1).

CONTENTS.—In Cicero’s encyclopaedia of philosophy Academica is the article on Epistemology, the theory of knowledge. In his earlier draft of the work, in Book I., Catulus, the scepticism of Carneades (Middle Academy) and his doctrine of ‘probability’ were 400
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expounded by Catulus; Hortensius countered with the dogmatism of Antiochus (Old Academy), and Cicero put the case of Philo (Middle Academy), that 'probability' is consistent with Platonism. In Book II., Lucullus, Lucullus defended the cause of Antiochus by attacking Scepticism, and then Scepticism was defended by Cicero. In the second edition Cicero and Varro were the sole interlocutors; Cicero championed the Middle Academy as well as the New, and the Old Academy was assigned to Varro.

It is to this second edition that Cicero refers in his letters in all allusions to the work after the alteration was made; its title was now Academica, though he also describes it as 'Academici libri.' But he seems not to have succeeded in entirely suppressing the first edition; and by a curious accident the second half of the first edition has come down to us, while of the second edition only the first quarter and a few fragments of the remainder have survived. We therefore have only three quarters of the whole work, and only one quarter of it in the form finally authorized by the writer. Some modern editors have designated the extant part of Edition I. 'Academica Priora' and that of Edition II. 'Academica Posteriors,' but so far as I know the significance intended to be conveyed by the adjectives in those titles has no classical authority.

The position can be most clearly exhibited in tabular form; the parts of the editions that are not now extant and the names of the speakers in those parts are printed in italics:
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Dramatis Personae.—Q. Lutatius Catulus, a distinguished leader of the aristocracy, was consul with Lepidus in 78 B.C., when he resisted his colleague’s efforts to abrogate the acts of Sulla, and next year defeated him in the battle of the Milvian Bridge. He opposed the conferment of extraordinary powers on Pompey in 67 and 66, and was censor with Crassus in 65. He died in 60. There is no evidence that he was interested in philosophy. In the dialogue he professes merely to put forward the views of his father, the famous colleague of Marius. The elder Catulus was a man of great culture and learning, but Cicero could not introduce him into the dialogue for reasons of chronology: he died in 87, committing suicide to escape the proscription of Marius.

L. Licinius Lucullus (c. 110–57 B.C.) was also a
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supporter of Sulla, and was famous as the conqueror of Mithridates. He was superseded in his command by Pompey in 66, and gradually withdrew from public life. He had amassed great wealth on his Asiatic campaigns, and was famous for the splendour of his establishments. He had literary tastes and was a generous patron of letters.

Q. Hortensius (114–50 B.C.) made a career and a fortune by his oratorical ability. An adherent of Sulla and the aristocratic party, he was consul in 69; but in the previous year the trial of Verres for peculation in Sicily had transferred the primacy in oratory from Verres' defender, Hortensius, to his prosecutor, Cicero. Hortensius was an opponent of Pompey, and on Pompey's coalition with Crassus and Caesar in 60 he retired from politics.

M. Terentius Varro (116–28 B.C.) was the most learned of scholars and the most encyclopaedic of writers. His works included agriculture, grammar, religious and political antiquities, biography, philosophy, geography and law; some parts of his books on the first two subjects alone survive. He also had a public career; he held naval command against the pirates and against Mithridates, and he supported Pompey in the civil war, but after Pharsalia Caesar forgave him, and employed his talents in collecting books for a great public library.

The Imaginary Date of the dialogues in the first edition falls between 63 B.C., the year of Cicero's consulship (alluded to Ac. ii. 62), and 60, when Catulus died. The scene of the first conversation (now lost) was the sea-side villa of Catulus at Cumae, west of Naples; that of the second (our Academica II.), a day later, is Hortensius's villa at Bauli, a little
place on the Gulf of Puteoli (Pozzuoli), just east of Cumae. In the second edition the scene is laid at Varro's villa near the Lucrine Lake, the enclosed recess of the Gulf of Puteoli. The imaginary date is near the actual time of composition in 45 B.C. ('nuper, 'Ac. i. 1).

Sources of Academica.—Cicero frequently states that his arguments for dogmatism are those of his old teacher, Antiochus of Ascalon; and it is pretty clear that he merely transcribed them from some book or books of this authority. For dramatic effect, at Ac. ii. 11 f. he makes Lucullus profess to be producing arguments from his recollection of discussions in which Antiochus had taken part; but there is no doubt that actually he is writing with a book of Antiochus in front of him, probably Sosus (see Ac. ii. 12 note), a dialogue in which Antiochus combated his old teacher Philo.

The arguments in defence of scepticism come partly from a work of Philo twice referred to, though not by its name (Ac. i. 13, ii. 11): this doubtless supplied Cicero with the historical justification of the New Academy which concludes Book I., and probably also with the historical references with which he begins his speech that ends the work (Ac. ii. 66–78). The destructive arguments that these follow are very likely taken from Clitomachus, who succeeded Carneades as head of the New Academy in 129 B.C. The constructive doctrines of Carneades that come next are drawn from two works of Clitomachus mentioned by their names (ii. 98, 103); and the historical passage that concludes is doubtless also from Clitomachus, who wrote a book Περὶ Ἀἱρέσεων (Diogenes Laertius ii. 92).
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MANUSCRIPTS.—Scholars range the mss. of Academica I. in two families, derived from two archetypes of the twelfth century or older. Of the former family, one ms., 'codex Puteanus,' Parisinus 6331 (which contains De Finibus also), is placed by recent critics in the twelfth century, and several mss. related to it belong to the fourteenth or fifteenth century. Of the latter family, all are fourteenth or fifteenth century. In the present edition only a few specially interesting variants are given, the readings of Puteanus being quoted as P, but the other mss. not being distinguished.

Academica II. is contained in the same mss. as De Natura Deorum, for which see p. xviii.

Editions.—J. S. Reid's edition of 1884 (London) is a most valuable resource; it contains an exhaustive introduction and commentary.

The newest text is that of Plasberg (Teubner, Leipzig, 1922). In this the evidence for the text is fully set out; also the preface gives in full all the passages in Cicero's Letters that refer to Academica, and a valuable study of the relation between Cicero's two editions.

Literary students will also be grateful to Mr. Plasberg for two quotations that grace the back of his title-page—one from Pliny (Nat. Hist. xxxi. 6) which shows that Cicero actually named his villa at Puteoli (Pozzuoli) 'Academia,' and the other from Copernicus, writing to Pope Paul III. in 1543 and saying that the earliest suggestion which he had seen that the earth is in motion was a statement that he quotes from Cicero (viz. Ac. ii. 123).

H. R.

1932.
CICERO, AD FAMILIARES, IX. viii.

Cicero Varroni

1 Et si munus flagitare, quamvis quis ostenderit, ne populus quidem solet nisi concitatus, tamen ego exspectatione promissi tui moveor ut admoneam te, non ut flagitem. Misi autem ad te quattuor admonitores non nimis verecundos—nisti enim profecto os huius adolescentioris Academiae—ex ea igitur media excitatos misi, qui metuo ne te forte flagitent, ego autem mandavi ut rogarent. Exspectabam omnino iam diu, meque sustinebam ne ad te prius ipse quid scriberem quam aliquid accepisem, ut possem te remunerari quam simillimo munere. Sed cum tu tardius faceres, id est (ut ego interpretor) diligentius, teneri non potui quin coniunctionem studiorum amorisque nostri quo posse litterarum genere declararem. Feci igitur sermonem inter nos habitum in

\[c \textit{Munus} \text{ denotes specially a gladiatorial show.}\]
\[b \text{ Varro had promised to dedicate to Cicero his treatise}\]
\[\textit{De Lingua Latina}, at which he was now working.}\]
\[c \text{ The four volumes of}\ \textit{Academica}, second edition, of which the first volume forms}\]
\[\text{Book I. of the extant text.}\]
\[d \text{ This hints at the } \text{‘young-mannishness’ and self-assertion}\]
\[\text{of the New Academy.}\]

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Even the public, unless stirred up to do so, does not as a rule actually demand a gift, although somebody has held out an offer of one; yet in my case eagerness for the present that you promised prompts me to send you, not a demand, but a reminder. But the four emissaries that I am sending to remind you are not excessively modest ones—for no doubt you are acquainted with the 'cheek' of this junior Academy—well, it is from the very heart of that School that my messengers have been summoned; and I am afraid that they may perhaps present a demand to you, although my instructions to them are to make a request. Anyway I have now been a long time waiting and keeping myself from writing anything to you on my side before I had received something from you, so as to have the opportunity of making you as nearly as possible a repayment in kind. But as you have been acting rather slowly, that is (as I construe it) rather carefully, I have been unable to keep myself from making public, in such literary form as was within my powers, the community of studies and of affection that unites us. I have accordingly composed a dialogue, held between us at my place at

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Cumano, cum esset una Pomponius; tibi dedi partes Antiochinas, quas a te probari intellexisse mihi videbar, mihi sumpsi Philonis. Puto fore ut cum legeris mirere nos id locutos esse inter nos quod numquam locuti sumus; sed nosti morem dialogorum. Posthaec autem, mi Varro, quam plurima si videtur et de nobis inter nos; sero fortasse, sed superiorum temporum fortuna rei publicae causam sustineat, haec ipsi praestare debemus. Atque utinam quietis temporibus atque aliquo si non bono at saltem certo statu civitatis haec inter nos studia exercere possemus! quamquam tum quidem vel aliae quaepiam rationes honestas nobis et curas et actiones darent; nunc autem quid est sine his cur vivere velimus? mihi vero cum his ipsis vix, his autem detractis ne vix quidem. Sed haec coram et saepius. Migrationem et emptionem feliciter evenire volo, tuumque in ea re consilium probo. Cura ut valeas.

a What Cicero refers to is not recorded.
ACADEMICA: DEDICATORY LETTER

Cumae, with Pomponius as one of the party; I have cast you for the part of champion of Antiochus, whose doctrine I think I have understood you to approve of, while I have taken the rôle of Philo myself. When you read it I fancy you will be surprised at our holding a conversation that never actually took place; but you know the convention as to dialogues. On some later occasion, my dear Varro, we will if you think fit have a very full talk together about our personal affairs as well; too late, perhaps, but let the destiny of the commonwealth bear the responsibility for the days that are past, it is our duty to answer for the present. And would that we had the power to carry on these joint studies in a period of tranquillity, and with the affairs of state settled in some definite if not satisfactory manner! although in that case indeed perhaps certain other interests would afford us honourable subjects of thought and honourable fields of action; whereas now without our present studies what reason have we to wish to be alive? For my own part, even with them scarcely any, but if they be taken from me, not even scarcely! But we will discuss this when we meet, and repeatedly. I hope the move and the sale are turning out a success: I approve of your policy in that business. Good-bye.
ACADEMICA
LIBER PRIMUS
(EDITIO POSTERIOR)

I. In Cumano nuper cum mecum Atticus noster esset, nuntiatum est nobis a M. Varrone venisse eum Roma pridie vesperi et nisi de via fessus esset continuo ad nos venturum fuisse. Quod cum audissetis, nullam moram interponendam putavimus quin videremus hominem nobiscum et studiis eisdem et vetustate amicitiae coniunctum; itaque confestim ad eum ire perrexitimus, paulumque cum ab eius villa abessemus ipsum ad nos venientem vidimus; atque illum complexi ut mos amicorum est, satis eum longo intervallo ad suam villam reduximus. Hic paucis primo atque ea percontantibus nobis ecquid forte Roma novi; tum Atticus "Omitte ista, quae nec percontari nec audire sine molestia possimus, quaeso," inquit, "et quaerere potius ecquid ipse novi; silent enim diutius Musae Varronis quam solemnt, nec tamen

1 ab inseruit Wesenberg.
2 tum inseruit Reid.

* This Book as we have it belongs to the second edition of Cicero's work, and is therefore entitled Academica Posteriora by some editors.

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I. My friend Atticus was staying with me lately at my country-place at Cumae, when a message came to us from Marcus Varro’s house that he had arrived from Rome on the evening of the day before, and if not fatigued from the journey intended to come straight on to us. On hearing this, we thought that no obstacle must intervene to delay our seeing a person united to us by identity of studies as well as by old friendship; so we hastily set out to go to him, and were only a short distance from his country-house when we saw him coming towards us in person. We gave our Varro a friend’s embrace, and after a fairly long interval we escorted him back to his own house. Here there was first a little conversation, and that arising out of my asking whether Rome happened to have been doing anything new; and then Atticus said, “Do pray drop those subjects, about which we can neither ask questions nor hear the answers without distress; inquire of him instead whether he himself has done anything new. For Varro’s Muses have kept silent for a longer time than they used, but all the same my belief is that your
CICERO

istum cessare sed celare quae scribat existimo.”

“Minime vero,” inquit ille, “intemperantis enim
arbitror esse scribere quod occultari velit; sed habeo
opus magnum in manibus, idque1 iam pridem; ad
hunc enim ipsum”—me autem dicebat—“quaedam institui, quae et sunt magna sane et limantur
a me politius.” Et ego “Ista quidem” inquam
“Varro, iam diu exspectans non audeo tamen flagi-
tare; audivi enim e Libone nostro (cuius nosti
studium)—nihil enim eum eius modi celare possumus
—non te ea intermittere sed accuratius tractare nec
de manibus umquam deponere. Illud autem mihi
ante hoc tempus numquam in mentem venit a te
requirere, sed nunc postea quam sum ingressus res
ea quas tecum simul didici mandare monumentis,
philosophiamque veterem illam a Socrate ortam
Latinis litteris illustrare, quaeo quid sit cur cum
multa scribas hoc genus praetermittas, praeertim
cum et ipse in eo excellas et id studium totaque ea
res longe ceteris et studiis et artibus antecedat.”

II. Tum ille: “Rem a me saepe deliberatam et
multum agitatam requiris; itaque non haesitans re-
spondebo sed ea dicam quae mihi sunt in promptu,
quod ista ipsa de re multum, ut dixi, et diu cogitavi.

1 idque Christ: que vel quae codd.

* Varro’s De Lingua Latina, see Introduction p. 400.
friend is not taking a holiday but is hiding what he writes.” “Oh no, certainly not,” said Varro, “for I think that to put in writing what one wants to be kept hidden is sheer recklessness; but I have got a big task in hand, and have had for a long time: I have begun on a work—a dedicated to our friend here himself”—meaning me—“which is a big thing I can assure you, and which is getting a good deal of touching up and polishing at my hands.” At this I said, “As to that work of yours, Varro, I have been waiting for it a long time now, but all the same I don’t venture to demand it; for I have heard (since we cannot hide anything of that kind) from our friend Libo, an enthusiastic student as you know, that you are not leaving it off, but are giving it increased attention, and never lay it out of your hands. However, there is a question that it has never occurred to me to put to you before the present moment, but now, after I have embarked on the task of placing upon record the doctrines that I have learnt in common with you, and of expounding in Latin literary form the famous old system of philosophy that took its rise from Socrates, I do put the question why, though you write a great deal, you pass over this class of subject, especially when you yourself are distinguished in it, and also when this interest and this whole subject far outstrip all other interests and other sciences?”

II. “The question that you ask,” rejoined Varro, “is one which I have often pondered and considered deeply. And so I will not beat about the bush in my reply, but will say what at once occurs to me, because I have, as I said, thought much and long upon the very point that you raise. For as I saw that...
CICERO

Nam cum philosophiam viderem diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimavi si qui de nostris eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca potius quam nostra lecturos; sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curature quae sine eruditione Graeca intellegi non possunt; itaque ea nolui scribere quae nec indocti intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent.

5 Vides autem (eadem enim ipse didicisti) non posse nos Amafini aut Rabiri similes esse, qui nulla arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis vulgari sermone disputant, nihil definiunt, nihil partientur, nihil apta interrogatione concludunt, nullam denique artem esse nec dicendi nec disserendi putant. Nos autem praecessit dialecticorum et oratorum etiam, quoniam utramque vim virtutem esse nostri putant, sic parentes ut legibus, verbis quoque novis cogimur uti, quae docti, ut dixi, a Graecis petere malent, indocti ne a nobis quidem accipient, ut frustra omnis suscipiatur labor.

6 Iam vero physica, si Epicurum, id est si Democritum probarem, possem scribere ita plane ut Amafinius; quid est enim magnum, cum causas rerum efficien-

\[a\] Epicurean writers with a large sale; their works are now entirely lost. Epicurus himself decried the use of technical language in philosophy. The speaker here touches on the three accepted departments of philosophy in their established order, Logic, Physics, Ethics, which study respectively the questions, how we know the facts of the world, what those facts are, and consequently what conduct will secure our welfare? ‘Physics’ for the ancients has not the limited sense that the term bears now, but denotes the whole of Natural Science, including Biology, which is indeed specially suggested by the term, as \textit{φυσική} often means ‘to grow,’ of a living organism.

\[b\] \textit{Interrogatio} is a synonym for \textit{ratio}, and renders \textit{ἐρώτημα},
philosophy had been most carefully expounded in Greek treatises, I judged that any persons from our nation that felt an interest in the subject, if they were learned in the teachings of the Greeks, would sooner read Greek writings than ours, and if on the other hand they shrank from the sciences and systems of the Greeks, they would not care even for philosophy, which cannot be understood without Greek learning: and therefore I was unwilling to write what the unlearned would not be able to understand and the learned would not take the trouble to read.

But you are aware (for you have passed through the same course of study yourself) that we Academics cannot be like Amafinius or Rabirius, a who discuss matters that lie open to the view in ordinary language, without employing any technicality and entirely dispensing with definition and division and neat syllogistic proof, b and who in fact believe that no science of rhetoric or logic exists. But we for our part while obeying the rules of the logicians and of the orators also as if they were laws, for our school considers each of these faculties a merit, are compelled to employ novel terms as well, for which the learned, as I said, will prefer to go to the Greeks, while the unlearned will not accept them even from us, so that all our toil will be undertaken in vain. Then as for natural philosophy, if I accepted the system of Epicurus, that is of Democritus, I could write about it as lucidly as Amafinius; for when once you have abolished causation, in the sense of efficient causes,

properly denoting an argument developed in a series of questions, but also used for any form of proof, ἀπὸ-δεικτος. Concludere = συναλλαγῆςενθαλη, denoting logical inference, and specially deduction.
tium sustuleris, de corpusculorum (ita enim appellat atomos) concursione fortuita loqui? Nostra tu physica osti, quae cum contineantur ex effectione et ex materia ea quam fingit et format effectio, adhibenda etiam geometria est; quam quibusnam quisquam enuntiare verbis aut quem ad intellegendum poterit adducere? Haec ipsa de vita et moribus et de expetendis fugiendisque rebus illi simpliciter, pecudis enim et hominis idem bonum esse censent, apud nostros autem non ignoras quae sit et quanta subtilis: sive enim Zenonem sequare, magnum est efficere ut quis intellegat quid sit illud verum et simplex bonum quod non possit ab honestate seiungi, quod bonum quale sit omnino negat Epicurus se sine voluptatibus sensum moventibus ne suspicari quidem; si vero Academiam veterem persequamur, quam nos, ut scis, probamus, quam erit illa acute explicanda nobis! quam argute, quam obscure etiam contra Stoicos disserendum! Totum igitur illud philosophiae studium mihi quidem ipse sumo et ad vitae constantiam quantum possum et ad delectationem animi, nec ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est, maius aut melius a dis datum munus homini. Sed meos amicos in quibus id est studium in Graeciam mitto, id est, ad Graecos ire iubeo, ut ex fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consectentur; quae

1 efficiences Lambinus.
2 lacunam ante haec codd.: <ecce> haec Reid.
3 autem Lambinus: enim codd.
4 se inseruit Lambinus.
5 ne suspicari quidem Durand: nec suspicari codd.
6 id inseruit Durand.
7 ex Halm: ea a codd.

i.e., (with arithmetic) the whole of mathematics so far as then discovered.  

Timaeus 47 b.
what is there remarkable in talking about the accidental collision of minute bodies—that is his name for atoms? The natural science of my school you know; being a system that combines the efficient force and the matter which is fashioned and shaped by the efficient force, it must also bring in geometry; but what terminology, pray, will anybody have to use in explaining geometry, or whom will he be able to bring to understand it? Even this department of ethics and the subject of moral choice and avoidance that school handles quite simply, for it frankly identifies the good of man with the good of cattle, but what a vast amount of what minute precision the teachers of our school display is not unknown to you. For if one is a follower of Zeno, it is a great task to make anybody understand the meaning of the real and simple good that is inseparable from morality, because Epicurus entirely denies that he can even guess what sort of a thing good is without pleasures that excite the sense; but if we should follow the lead of the Old Academy, the school that I as you know approve, how acutely we shall have to expound that system! How subtly, how profoundly even, we shall have to argue against the Stoics! Accordingly for my own part I adopt the great pursuit of philosophy in its entirety both (so far as I am able) as a guiding principle of life and as an intellectual pleasure, and I agree with the dictum of Plato that no greater and better gift has been bestowed by the gods upon mankind. But my friends who possess an interest in this study I send to Greece, that is, I bid them go to the Greeks, so that they may draw from the fountain-heads rather than seek out mere rivulets; while doctrines which nobody had
autem nemo adhuc docuerat nec erat unde studiosi scire possent, ea quantum potui (nihil enim magnopere meorum miror) feci ut essent nota nostris; a Graecis enim peti non poterant ac post L. Aelii nostri occasum ne a Latinis quidem. Et tamen in illis veteribus nostris quae Menippum imitati, non interpretati, quadam hilaritate conspersimus, multa admixta ex intima philosophia, multa dicta dialectice; quae cum facilius minus docti intellexerent iucunditate quadam ad legendum invitatii in laudationibus, in his ipsis antiquitatum prooemiis philosophis scribere voluimus, si modo consecuti sumus.”

III. Tum ego, “Sunt,” inquam, “ista, Varro; nam nos in nostra urbe peregrinantis errantisque tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum reduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando qui et ubi essemus agnosceere. Tu aetatem patriae, tu discriptiones temporum, tu sacrorum iura, tu sacerdotum, tu domesticam, tu bellicam disciplinam, tu sedem regionum, locorum, tu omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum nomina, genera, officia, causas apereuisti, plurimumque idem poetis nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et verbis attulisti, atque ipse varium et elegans omni fere numero poëma fecisti, philosophiamque multis locis

1 cum Reid: quo codd.
2 hic interponit lacunam Casaubon.
3 sacerdotum <munera> Lambinus.

a Only fragments are extant of Varro’s Menippean Satires. Menippus was a Cynic philosopher and satirist living at Gadara in the middle of the second century B.C.
b i.e., Ethics, see p. 414 note a.
been teaching up till now, and for which there was nobody available from whom those interested could learn them, I have done as much as lay in my power (for I have no great admiration for any of my own achievements) to make them known to our fellow-countrymen; for these doctrines could not be obtained from the Greeks, nor from the Latins either since the demise of our countryman Lucius Aelius. And nevertheless in those old writers of our country whom in my imitation a (it is not a translation) of Menippus I treated with a certain amount of ridicule, there is a copious admixture of elements derived from the inmost depths of philosophy, b and many utterances in good logical form; and though in my funeral orations these were more easily intelligible to less learned readers if they were tempted to peruse them by a certain attractiveness of style, when we come to the prefaces to my Antiquities, in these my aim was, if only I attained it, to write for philosophers."

III. "What you say, Varro, is true," I rejoined, "for we were wandering and straying about like visitors in our own city, and your books led us, so to speak, right home, and enabled us at last to realize who and where we were. You have revealed the age of our native city, the chronology of its history, the laws of its religion and its priesthood, its civil and its military institutions, the topography of its districts and its sites, the terminology, classification and moral and rational basis of all our religious and secular institutions, and you have likewise shed a flood of light upon our poets and generally on Latin literature and the Latin language, and you have yourself composed graceful poetry of various styles in almost every metre, and have sketched an outline of philosophy
incohasti, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum. 10
Causam autem probabilem tu quidem adfers, aut
enim Graeca legere malent qui erunt eruditi, aut ne
haec quidem qui illa nesciunt; sed da mihi nunc—
satisne probas? Immo vero et haec qui illa non
poterunt et qui Graeca poterunt non contemnent sua.
Quid enim causae est cur poētas Latinos Graecis
litteris eruditi legant, philosophos non legant? An
quia delectat Ennius, Pacuvius, Attius, multi alii, qui
non verba sed vim Graecorum expresserunt poētarum?
Quanto magis philosophi delectabunt, si, ut illi
Aeschylum, Sophoclem, Euripidem, sic hi Platonem
imitentur, Aristotelem, Theophrastum? Oratores
quidem laudari video, si qui e nostris Hyperidem sint
11 aut Demosthenem imitati. Ego autem (dicam enim
ut res est), dum me ambitio, dum honores, dum
causae, dum rei publicae non solum cura sed quaedam
etiam procuratio multis officiis implicatum et con-
strictum tenebat, haec inclusa habebam, et ne obsole-
scerent renovabam cum licebat legendo; nunc vero
et fortunae gravissimo percussus vulnere et admini-
stratione rei publicae liberatus doloris medicinam a
philosophia peto et oti oblectionem hanc honestissi-

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*CICERO*

*The death of his daughter Tullia.*
ACADEMICA, I. iii.

in many departments that is enough to stimulate the student though not enough to complete his instruction. But though it is true that the case you bring forward has some probability, as accomplished students on the one hand will prefer to read the Greek writings, and on the other hand people who do not know those will not read these either, still, tell me now—do you quite prove your point? The truth rather is that both those who cannot read the Greek books will read these and those who can read the Greek will not overlook the works of their own nation. For what reason is there why accomplished Grecians should read Latin poets and not read Latin philosophers? Is it because they get pleasure from Ennius, Pacuvius, Accius and many others, who have reproduced not the words but the meaning of the Greek poets? How much more pleasure will they get from philosophers, if these imitate Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus in the same way as those poets imitated Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides? At all events I see that any of our orators that have imitated Hyperides or Demosthenes are praised. But for my own part (for I will speak frankly), so long as I was held entangled and fettered by the multifarious duties of ambition, office, litigation, political interests and even some political responsibility, I used to keep these studies within close bounds, and relied merely on reading, when I had the opportunity, to revive them and prevent their fading away; but now that I have been smitten by a grievously heavy blow of fortune and also released from taking part in the government of the country, I seek from philosophy a cure for my grief and I deem this to be the most honourable mode of amusing my leisure.
mam iudico. Aut enim huic aetati hoc maxime aptum est, aut iis rebus si quas dignas laude gessimus hoc in primis consentaneum, aut etiam ad nostros eives erudiendos nihil utilius, aut si haec ita non sunt, nihil aliud video quod agere possimus. Brutus quidem noster, excellens omni genere laudis, sic philosophiam Latinis litteris persequitur nihil ut iisdem de rebus Graeca desideres,¹ et eandem quidem sententiam sequitur quam tu, nam Aristum Athenis audivit aliquamdiu, cuius tu fratrem Antiochum. Quam ob rem da, quaeo, te huic etiam generi litterarum.”


¹ Aldus: Graecia desideret codd.
² Academiam Bentley: illam Madvig: iam codd.
³ ea inseruit Reid.

ᵃ Succeeded Antiochus as head of the Old Academy.
ᵇ i.e., from Atticus.

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For this occupation is the one most suited to my age; or it is the one more in harmony than any other with such praiseworthy achievements as I can claim; or else it is the most useful means of educating our fellow-citizens also; or, if these things are not the case, I see no other occupation that is within our power. At all events our friend Brutus, who is eminent for every kind of distinction, is so successful an exponent of philosophy in a Latin dress that one could not feel the least need for Greek writings on the same subjects, and indeed he is an adherent of the same doctrine as yourself, as for a considerable time he heard the lectures of Aristus at Athens, whose brother Antiochus you attended. Pray therefore devote yourself to this field of literature also."

"I will deal with your point," he rejoined, "although I shall require your assistance. But what is this news that I hear about yourself?"

"What about, exactly?" said I. "That you have abandoned the Old Academy, and are dealing with the New." "What then?" I said. "Is our friend Antiochus to have had more liberty to return from the new school to the old, than we are to have to move out of the old one into the new? Why, there is no question that the newest theories are always most correct and free from error; although Philo, Antiochus's master, a great man as you yourself judge him, makes an assertion in his books which we used also to hear from his own lips,—he says that there are not two Academies, and proves that those who thought so were mistaken." "What you say is true," said he, "but I think that you are not unacquainted with what Antiochus wrote to combat those statements of Philo." "On the contrary, I should like..."
CICERO

Academiam, a qua absum iam diu, renovari a te, nisi molestum est, velim; et simul adsidamus," inquam, "si videtur." "Sane istud quidem," inquit, "sum enim admodum infirmus; sed videamus idemne Attico placeat fieri a me quod te velle video." "Mihi vero," ille, "quid est enim quod malim quam ex Antiocho iam pridem audita recordari, et simul videre satisne ea commode dici possint Latine?" Quae cum essent dicta, in conspectu consedimus omnes.²

15 Tum Varro ita exorsus est: "Socrates mihi videotur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi occupatipuerunt, avocosavisse philosophiam et ad vitam communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitis omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quaereret, caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum. Hic in omnibus fere sermonibus qui ab iis qui illum audierunt perscripti varie copioseque sunt ita disputat ut nihil adfirmet ipse, refellat alios, nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque praestare ceteris quod illi quae nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil scire, id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum

¹ sint codd. plerique: delet edd. plerique.
² omnes delet Reid (metri tollendi causa).
you, if you do not mind, to recapitulate the arguments to which you refer, and also the whole theory of the Old Academy, with which I have been out of touch for a long while now; and at the same time," I said, "let us if you please sit down for our talk." "Let us sit down by all means," he said, "for I am in rather weak health. But let us see whether Atticus would like me to undertake the same task that I see you want me to." "To be sure I should," said Atticus, "for what could I like better than to recall to memory the doctrines that I heard long ago from Antiochus, and at the same time to see if they can be satisfactorily expressed in Latin?" After these remarks we took our seats in full view of one another.

15 Then Varro began as follows: "It is my view, and it is universally agreed, that Socrates was the first person who summoned philosophy away from mysteries veiled in concealment by nature herself, upon which all philosophers before him had been engaged, and led it to the subject of ordinary life, in order to investigate the virtues and vices, and good and evil generally, and to realize that heavenly matters are either remote from our knowledge or else, however fully known, have nothing to do with the good life. The method of discussion pursued by Socrates in almost all the dialogues so diversely and so fully recorded by his hearers is to affirm nothing himself but to refute others, to assert that he knows nothing except the fact of his own ignorance, and that he surpassed all other people in that they think they know things that they do not know but he himself thinks he knows nothing, and that he believed this to have been the reason why Apollo declared him to be the
esse dictum quod haec esset una omnis sapientia, non arbitrari se scire quod nesciat. Quae cum diceret constanter et in ea sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tamen in virtute laudanda et in hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum libris maximeque Platonis intellegi potest. Platonis autem auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est, Academicorum et Peripateticorum, qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant; nam cum Speusippum sororis filium Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset, duos autem praestantissimo studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Calchedonium et Aristotelem Stagiriten, qui erant cum Aristotele Peripatetici dicti sunt quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem quia Platonis instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasiun, coetus erant et sermones habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. Sed utrique Platonis ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt et eam quidem plenam ac refer-tam, illam autem Socraticam dubitanter de omnibus rebus et nulla adfirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt. Ita facta est, quod minime Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae. Quae quidem erat

1 hominis Lambinus.  
2 Gruter: tam codd.  
3 quia ? Reid: qui a, qui codd.  
4 Baiter: dubitantem, dubitationem codd.
wisest of all men, because all wisdom consists solely in not thinking that you know what you do not know. He used to say this regularly, and remained firm in this opinion, yet nevertheless the whole of his discourses were spent in praising virtue and in exhorting mankind to the zealous pursuit of virtue, as can be gathered from the books of members of the Socratic school, and particularly from those of Plato. But originating with Plato, a thinker of manifold variety and fertility, there was established a philosophy that, though it had two appellations, was really a single uniform system, that of the Academic and the Peripatetic schools, which while agreeing in doctrine differed in name; for Plato left his sister's son Speusippus as 'heir' to his system, but two pupils of outstanding zeal and learning, Xenocrates, a native of Calchedon, and Aristotle, a native of Stagira; and accordingly the associates of Aristotle were called the Peripatetics, because they used to debate while walking in the Lyceum, while the others, because they carried on Plato's practice of assembling and conversing in the Academy, which is another gymnasium, got their appellation from the name of the place. But both schools drew plentiful supplies from Plato's abundance, and both framed a definitely formulated rule of doctrine, and this fully and copiously set forth, whereas they abandoned the famous Socratic custom of discussing everything in a doubting manner and without the admission of any positive statement. Thus was produced something that Socrates had been in the habit of reproving entirely, a definite science of philosophy, with a regular arrangement of subjects and a formulated system of doctrine. At the outset it is true this was
primo duobus, ut dixi, nominibus una, nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem Academiam differebat: abundantia quadam ingenii praestabat, ut mihi quidem videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio.

V. "Sed quid ago?" inquit "aut sumne sanus qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi non sus Minervam, ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet." Tum Atticus, "Tu vero," inquit, "perge, Varro; valde enim amo nostra atque nostros, meque ista delectant cum Latine dicuntur et isto modo." "Quid me," inquam, " putas, qui philosophiam iam professus sim populo nostro exhibiturum?" "Pergamus igitur," inquit, "quoniam placet. Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio triplex, una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum, quid falsum, quid rectum in oratione pravumve, quid consentiens, quid repugnans esset iudicando. Ac primum illam partem bene vivendi a natura petebant eique parent dum esse dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum esse illud summum bonum quo omnia referrentur, constituebantque extremum esse rerum expetendarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et corpore et vita.

1 verum et codd. plurimi: verum sit Reid.
2 repugnans esset Müller: repugnet codd.
3 repetebant Reid.

a A proverb of Greek origin; the story on which it was based does not seem to be recorded. Theocritus has it in a rather different form, ὅσ ποτ᾽ Ἀθηναίον ἐρν ἡρισεν (5. 23), suggesting perhaps a challenge to a competition in music.

b i.e., the original Academy.

c Vita denotes ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά, 'external goods.'
a single system with two names, as I said, for there
was no difference between the Peripatetics and the
Old Academy of those days. Aristotle excelled, as I
at all events think, in a certain copiousness of in-
tellect, but both schools drew from the same source,
and both made the same classification of things as
desirable and to be avoided.

V. "But what am I about?" he said, "am I quite
all there, who teach these things to you? Even if it
is not a case of the proverbial pig teaching Minerva, a
anyway whoever teaches Minerva is doing a silly
thing." "Do pray go on, Varro," rejoined Atticus,
"for I love our literature and our fellow-countrymen
profoundly, and I delight in the doctrines of your
school when set forth in Latin and as you are setting
them forth." "What do you suppose that I feel
about it," said I, "seeing that I have already offered
myself as an exponent of philosophy to our nation?"
"Well then, let us proceed," said he, "as we are
agreed. There already existed, then, a threefold
scheme of philosophy inherited from Plato: one
division dealt with conduct and morals, the second
with the secrets of nature, the third with dialectic
and with judgement of truth and falsehood, correct-
ness and incorrectness, consistency and inconsistency,
in rhetorical discourse. And for the first of these
sections, the one dealing with the right conduct
of life, they b went for a starting-point to nature, and
declared that her orders must be followed, and that
the chief good which is the ultimate aim of all things
is to be sought in nature and in nature only; and
they laid it down that to have attained complete
accordance with nature in mind, body and estate c
is the limit of things desirable and the End of goods.
Corporis autem alia ponebant esse in toto, alia in partibus, valetudinem vires pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem sensus integros et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus celeritatem, vim in manibus, claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam vocum impressionem. Animi autem quae essent ad comprehendendam virtutem idonea, eaque ab eis in naturam et mores dividebantur: naturae celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam dabant, quorum utrumque mentis esset proprium et ingenii, morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi consuetudinem, quam partim adsiduitate exercitationis, partim ratione formabant, in quibus erat ipsa philosophia. In qua quod incohatum est neque absolutum progressio quaedam ad virtutem appellatur, quod autem absolutum, id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturae omniumque rerum quas in animis ponunt una res optima. Ergo haec animorum. Vitae autem (id enim erat tertium) adiuncta esse dicebant quae ad virtutis usum valerent. Nam virtus in animi bonis et in corporis cernitur et in quibusdam quae non tam naturae quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt. Hominem esse censebant quasi partem quandam civitatis et universi generis humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum hominibus humana quadam societate. Ac de summo quidem atque naturali bono sic agunt;
Among goods of the body they laid it down that some resided in the whole frame and others in the parts: health, strength and beauty were goods of the whole, goods of the parts were sound senses and the particular excellences of the parts severally, for instance speed in the feet, power in the hands, clearness in the voice, and also an even and distinct articulation of sounds as a quality of the tongue. Goodness of the mind consisted in the qualities conducive to the comprehension of virtue; these they divided into gifts of nature and features of the moral character—quickness of apprehension and memory they assigned to nature, each of them being a mental and intellectual property, while to the moral character they deemed to belong the interests or 'habit' which they moulded partly by diligent practice and partly by reason, practice and reason being the domain of philosophy itself. In this philosophy a commencement not carried to completion is called 'progress' towards virtue, but the completed course is virtue, which is the 'consummation' of nature, and is the most supremely excellent of all the faculties of the mind as they define them. This then is their account of the mind. To 'estate'—that was the third division—they said belonged certain properties that influenced the exercise of virtue. For virtue is displayed in connexion with the goods of the mind and those of the body, and with some that are the attributes not so much of nature as of happiness. Man they deemed to be, so to say, a 'part' of the state and of the human race as a whole, and they held that a man was conjoined with his fellow-men by the 'partnership of humanity.' And this being their treatment of the supreme good as bestowed by
CICERO

cetera autem pertinere ad id putant aut adaugendum aut tuendum,1 ut divitias, ut opes, ut gloriam, ut gratiam. Ita tripartita ab iis inducitur ratio bonorum.

VI. "Atque haec illa sunt tria genera quae putant plerique Peripateticos dicere. Id quidem non falso, est enim haec partitio illorum; illud imprudenter, si alios esse Academicos qui tum2 appellarentur, alios Peripateticos arbitrantur. Communis haec ratio et utrisque hic bonorum finis videbatur, adipisci quae essent prima natura quaeque ipsa per sese expetenda, aut omnia aut maxima; ea sunt autem maxima quae in ipso animo atque in ipsa virtute versantur. Itaque omnis illa antiqua philosophia sensit in una virtute esse positam beatam vitam, nec tamen beatissimam nisi adiungerentur et corporis et cetera quae supra dicta sunt ad virtutis usum idonea. Ex hac descriptione agendi quoque aliquid in vita et offici ipsius initium reperiebatur, quod erat in conservatione earum rerum quas natura praescriberet. Hinc gigne-batur fuga desidiae voluptatumque contemptio, ex quo laborum dolorumque susceptio multorum magnorumque recti honestique causa et earum rerum quae erant congruentes cum descriptione naturae, unde et amicitia exsistebat et iustitia atque aequitas, eaeque et voluptatibus et multis vitae commodis anteponebantur. Haec quidem fuit apud eos morum institutio et eius partis quam primam posui forma atque descriptio."

De natura autem (id enim sequebatur) ita dice-

1 Lambinus: tenendum codd.
2 Reid: dum codd.

* A dual rendering of τὸ καλὸν.

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nature, all other goods they considered to be factors contributing either to its increase or to its protection, for instance wealth, resources, fame, influence. Thus they introduced a triple classification of goods.

VI. "And this corresponds with the three classes of goods which most people think to be intended by the Peripatetics. This is indeed correct, for this classification is theirs, but it is a mistake if people suppose that the Academics quoted above and the Peripatetics were different schools. This theory was common to both, and both held that the end of goods was to acquire either all or the greatest of the things that are by nature primary, and are intrinsically worthy of desire; and the greatest of these are the ones which have their being in the mind itself and in virtue itself. Accordingly the whole of the great philosophy of antiquity held that happiness lies in virtue alone, yet that happiness is not supreme without the addition of the goods of the body and all the other goods suitable for the employment of virtue that were specified above. From this scheme they used also to arrive at a first principle of conduct in life and of duty itself, which principle lay in safeguarding the things that nature prescribed. Hence sprang the duty of avoiding idleness and of disregarding pleasures, leading on to the undergoing of many great toils and pains for the sake of the right and noble, and of the objects in harmony with the plan marked out by nature, from which sprang friendship, and also justice and fairness; and these they rated higher than pleasures and an abundance of the good things of life. This then was their system of ethics, the plan and outline of the department that I placed first.

"The subject of nature (for that came next) they
bant ut eam dividere in res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens, ex qua 1 efficeretur aliquid. In eo quod efficeret vim esse censebant, in eo autem quod efficeretur materiam quandam; in utroque tamen utrumque, neque enim materiam ipsum cohaerere potuisse si nulla vi contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia (nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse cogatur). Sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quandam nominabant—dabitis enim profecto ut in rebus inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi faciunt a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, utamur verbis interdum inauditis.”

25 VII. “Nos vero,” inquit Atticus; “quin etiam Graecis licebit utare cum voles, si te Latina forte deficient.” “Bene sane facis; sed enitar ut Latine loquar, nisi in huiusce modi verbis, ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut physicam aut dialecticam appellam, quibus ut aliiis multis consuetudo iam utitur pro Latinis. Qualitates igitur appellavi quas ποιότητας Graeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est

1 ex qua Turnebus: eaque codd.: ex eaque Mdv.

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a The two ἀρχαί, ποιητική and παθητική. Quasi marks huic se praebens as a translation of the latter.

b Quandam apologizes for the use of materia, ‘timber,’ as a philosophical term to translate ἐλη.

c This clause explains the preceding clause only and is traceable ultimately to Timaeus 52 ἐφ᾽ ἀρχαῖοι ἀναγκαίοι εἰναὶ τοῦ τοῦ ἀπαν ἐν τινὶ τῶπει. Apparently Antiochus with Plato identified matter and space.

d i.e., organized matter, materia being matter as yet unformed.

e Cicero apologizes for coining the word qualitas to render ποιότης, ‘what-sort-ness,’ a term coined by Plato, Theaetetus, 189 a; the Latin abstract noun, like the Greek, is used for the concrete, ‘a thing of a certain quality,’ an object possessing certain properties.
ACADEMICA, I. vi.—vii.
dealt with by the method of dividing nature into two
principles,¹ the one the active, and the other the
‘passive,’ on which the active operated and out of
which an entity was created. The active principle
they deemed to constitute force, the one acted on,
a sort of ‘material’ ²; yet they held that each of
the two was present in the combination of both, for
matter could not have formed a concrete whole by
itself with no force to hold it together, nor yet force
without some matter (for nothing exists that is not
necessarily somewhere ₪). But when they got to the
product of both force and matter, they called this
‘body,’ ³ and, if I may use the term, ‘quality’ ⁴—as
we are dealing with unusual subjects you will
of course allow us occasionally to employ words
never heard before, as do the Greeks themselves,
who have now been handling these topics for a long
time.”

25 VII. “To be sure we will,” said Atticus; “indeed
you shall be permitted to employ even Greek words
if Latin ones happen to fail you.” “That is certainly
kind of you, but I will do my best to talk Latin,
except in the case of words of the sort now in
question, so as to employ the term ‘philosophy’ or
‘rhetoric’ or ‘physics’ ⁵ or ‘dialectic,’ ⁶ which like
many others are now habitually used as Latin words.
I have therefore given the name of ‘qualities’ to the
things that the Greeks call poiotētes; even among
the Greeks it is not a word in ordinary use, but

¹ i.e., the whole of natural science, of which physics in the
modern sense is a part.
² i.e., logic (including both formal logic and epistemology
or the theory of knowledge, cf. ii. 142); λογική included both
dialekτική and ῥητορική. Cf. § 30 n.

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vulgi verbum sed philosophorum; atque id in multis. Dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt publica, suis utuntur; et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium, aut enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda. Quod si Graeci faciunt qui in his rebus tot iam saecula versantur, quanto id magis nobis concedendum est qui haec nunc primum 26 tractare conamur?" "Tu vero," inquam, "Varro, bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus si eos non modo copia rerum auxeris, ut fecisti, sed etiam verborum." "Audebimus ergo," inquit, "novis verbis uti te auctore si necesse erit. Earum igitur qualitatum sunt aliae principes, aliae ex his orae. Principes sunt uni us modi et simplices; ex his autem variae orae sunt et quasi multiformes. Itaque aer (hoc quoque utimur iam pro Latino) et ignis et aqua et terra prima sunt; ex his autem orae animantium formae earumque rerum quae gignuntur e terra. Ergo illa initia et (ut e Graeco vertam) elementa dicuntur; e quibus aer et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliqua partes accipiendo et quasi patiendo, aquam dico et terram. Quintum genus, e quo essent astræ mentisque, singulare eorumque quattuor quae supra dixi dissimile Aristoteles quoddam esse

1 ut efficisti codd. fere omnes: uti fecisti Klotz.  
2 Halm: enim codd.  
3 reliqua Halm.

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a i.e., 'qualified objects,' classes of things, abstract for concrete, cf. § 24.  
b πολυειδῆς.  
c A literal translation of φυτᾶ— the vegetable kingdom.  
d ἄρχαι.  
e στοιχεῖα.  
f Halm's emendation gives 'and the remaining elements . . . the receptive and passive rôle.' But cf. Tusc. i. 40 'terram et mare . . . reliquae dueae partes.'
ACADEMICA, I. vii.

belongs to the philosophers, and this is the case with many terms. But the dialecticians' vocabulary is none of it the popular language, they use words of their own; and indeed this is a feature shared by almost all the sciences: either new names have to be coined for new things, or names taken from other things have to be used metaphorically. This being the practice of the Greeks, who have now been engaged in these studies for so many generations, how much more ought it to be allowed to us, who are now attempting to handle these subjects for the first time!" "Indeed, Varro," said I, "I think you will actually be doing a service to your fellow-countrymen if you not only enlarge their store of facts, as you have done, but of words also." "Then on your authority we will venture to employ new words, if we have to. Well then, those qualities\(^a\) are of two sorts, primary and derivative. Things of primary quality are homogeneous and simple; those derived from them are varied and 'multiform.'\(^b\) Accordingly air (this word also we now use as Latin) and fire and water and earth are primary; while their derivatives are the species of living creatures and of the things that grow out of the earth.\(^c\) Therefore those things are termed first principles\(^d\) and (to translate from the Greek) elements\(^e\); and among them air and fire have motive and efficient force, and the remaining divisions, I mean water and earth, receptive and 'passive' capacity.\(^f\) Aristotle deemed that there existed a certain fifth sort of element,\(^g\) in a class by itself and unlike the four that I have mentioned above, which was the source of the stars and of thinking

\(^{a}\) This \(\pi\epsilon\mu\pi\tau\eta\ \omega\sigma\iota\alpha,\ quinta\ essentia,\) has floated down to us in the word 'quintessence.'
rebatur. Sed subiectam putant omnibus sineulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius) materiam quandam, e qua omnia expressa atque efficta sint, quae una omnia accipere possit omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte, atque etiam interire, non in nihilum sed in suas partes, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum sit nihil omnino in rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat; quae autem moveantur, omnia intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi possint. Et cum ita moveatur illa vis quam qualitatem esse diximus et cum sic ul tuo citroque versetur, et materiam ipsam totam penitus commutari putant et illa efficie quae appellant qualia, et quibus in omni natura coherente et continuata cum omnibus suis partibus unum effectum esse mundum, extra quem nulla pars materiae sit nullumque corpus, partes autem esse mundi omnia quae insint in eo quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit quae sit eadem sempiterna (nihil enim valentius esse a quo intereat); quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi, eandumque esse mentem sapientiamque perfectam, quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum quae sint ei subiectae quasi prudentiam quandam, procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris ea quae pertineant ad homines; quam inter-

a i.e., spaces of void or vacuum that are between the solids and enable them to move.

b See § 25 n. The Stoics asserted that everything real has two components, the active and the passive, force and matter, and they expressed the former as ‘quality’; but they emphasized their materialism by sometimes speaking of the qualifying force as a current of air.

c ποιά.

d Natura = οὐσία = ὅλη, cf. ii. 118.

e Cf. N.D. ii. 22, 75, 85.
ACADEMICA, I. vii.

27 minds. But they hold that underlying all things is a substance called 'matter,' entirely formless and devoid of all 'quality' (for let us make this word more familiar and manageable by handling), and that out of it all things have been formed and produced, so that this matter can in its totality receive all things and undergo every sort of transformation throughout every part of it, and in fact even suffer dissolution, not into nothingness but into its own parts, which are capable of infinite section and division, since there exists nothing whatever in the nature of things that is an absolute least, incapable of division; but that all things that are in motion move by means of interspaces, these likewise being infinitely divisible. And since the force that we have called 'quality' moves in this manner and since it thus vibrates to and fro, they think that the whole of matter also is itself in a state of complete change throughout, and is made into the things which they term 'qualified,' out of which in the concrete whole of substance, a continuum united with all its parts, has been produced one world, outside of which there is no portion of matter and no body, while all the things that are in the world are parts of it, held together by a sentient being, in which perfect reason, is immanent, and which is immutable and eternal since nothing stronger exists to cause it to perish; and this force they say is the soul of the world, and is also perfect intelligence and wisdom, which they entitle God, and is a sort of 'providence' knowing the things that fall within its province, governing especially the heavenly bodies, and then those things on earth that concern mankind; and this force they

\[ Eadem \text{ denotes self-identity.} \]

\[ \pi\rho\nu\omicron\alpha. \]
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dum eandem necessitatem appellant, quia nihil aliter possit\(^1\) atque ab ea constitutum sit inter\(^2\) quasi fatalem et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni; non numquam quidem eandem fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa ac necopinata nobis propter obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum.

30 VIII. "Tertia deinde philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in disserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus, tamen non esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus: mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem; solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. Hanc illi \(i\delta\epsilon\alpha\nu\) appellant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possimus dicere. Sensus autem omnes hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur nec percipere ullo modo res uillas quae subiectae sensibus viderentur, quod aut ita essent parvae ut sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et concitatae ut nihil umquam unum esset\(^3\) constans, ne idem quidem, quia continent laberentur et fluierent omnia; itaque hanc omnem partem rerum opinabilem appellabant. Scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in animi notionibus atque rationibus; qua de causa definitiones rerum probabat et has ad omnia de quibus disceptabatur adhibebant. Verborum etiam explicatio probabatur, id est, qua de causa quaeque essent ita nominata, quam \(\epsilon\tau\mu\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\iota\alpha\nu\) appellabant; post

\(^1\) \(<\text{esse}>\) possit? \(\text{ed.}\)
\(^2\) inter: \(\text{evenire Turnebus.}\)
\(^3\) esset \(<\text{et}>\) \(\text{edd.}\), esset \(<\text{aut}>\) \(\text{Reid.}\)

\(\alpha\) \(\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\nu\alpha\gamma\kappa\alpha\sigma\mu\epsilon\nu\eta\nu\ \tau\iota\nu\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\ i\alpha\ \\alpha\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\beta\alpha\tau\omega\nu\ \sigma\upsilon\mu\pi\lambda\omicron\omicron\eta\nu.\)

\(b\) A dual rendering of \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\kappa\iota\), or perhaps of \(\delta\iota\alpha\lambda\epsilon\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\iota\). See § 27 n.

\(c\) \(\text{i.e., definition of res, things, not of words.}\)

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also sometimes call Necessity, because nothing can happen otherwise than has been ordained by it under a 'fated and unchangeable concatenation of everlasting order'\(^a\); although they sometimes also term it Fortune, because many of its operations are unforeseen and unexpected by us on account of their obscurity and our ignorance of causes.

30 VIII. "Then the third part of philosophy, consisting in reason and in discussion,\(^b\) was treated by them both as follows. The criterion of truth arose indeed from the senses, yet was not in the senses: the judge of things was, they held, the mind—they thought that it alone deserves credence, because it alone perceives that which is eternally simple and uniform and true to its own quality. This thing they call the Idea, a name already given it by Plato; we can correctly term it form. All the senses on the other hand they deemed to be dull and sluggish, and entirely unperceptive of all the things supposed to fall within the province of the senses, which were either so small as to be imperceptible by sense, or in such a violent state of motion that no single thing was ever stationary, nor even remained the same thing, because all things were in continual ebb and flow; accordingly all this portion of things they called the object of opinion. Knowledge on the other hand they deemed to exist nowhere except in the notions and reasonings of the mind; and consequently they approved the method of defining things, and applied this ‘real definition’\(^c\) to all the subjects that they discussed. They also gave approval to derivation of words, that is, the statement of the reason why each class of things bears the name that it does—the subject termed by them etymology.
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argumentis quibusdam¹ et quasi rerum notis ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad concludendum id quod explanari volebant; in quo² tradebatur omnis dialec-
ticae disciplina, id est, orationis ratione conclusae; huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria vis dicendi adhibebatur, explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae.


IX. “Aristoteles⁵ primus species quas paulo ante dixi labefactavit, quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, ut in iis quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et ita moratus ut probitatem quandam prae se et ingenuitatem ferat, vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae; spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere. Nam Strato eius auditor, quamquam fuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est, qui cum maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et Xenocrates, qui

¹ quibusdam delendum? (om. codd. nonnulli).
² Manutius: qua codd.
³ prima forma Reid: prima codd.: forma Mdv.
⁴ Davies: disputationes codd.
⁵ Aristoteles igitur cod. unus.

ᵃ Quasi marks notis as an explanation of argumentis used to translate σύμβολα. ᵇ ἀντιστροφον.
and then they used derivations as 'tokens' or so to say marks of things, as guides for arriving at proofs or conclusions as to anything of which they desired an explanation; and under this head was imparted their whole doctrine of Dialectic, that is, speech cast in the form of logical argument; to this as a 'counterpart' was added the faculty of Rhetoric, which sets out a continuous speech adapted to the purpose of persuasion.

"This was their primary system, inherited from Plato; and if you wish I will expound the modifications of it that have reached me." "Of course we wish it," said I, "if I may reply for Atticus as well." "And you reply correctly," said Atticus, "for he is giving a brilliant exposition of the doctrine of the Peripatetics and the Old Academy."

IX. "Aristotle was the first to undermine the Forms of which I spoke a little while before, which had been so marvellously embodied in the system of Plato, who spoke of them as containing an element of divinity. Theophrastus, who has a charming style and also a certain conspicuous uprightness and nobility of character, in a way made an even more violent breach in the authority of the old doctrine; for he robbed virtue of her beauty and weakened her strength by denying that the happy life is placed in her alone. As for his pupil Strato, although he had a penetrating intellect nevertheless he must be kept altogether separate from that school; he abandoned the most essential part of philosophy, which consists in ethics, to devote himself entirely to research in natural science, and even in this he differed very widely from his friends. On the other hand Speusippus and Xenocrates, the first inheritors of the system

X. “Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat qui ut Theophrastus nervos virtutis inciderit, sed contra qui omnia quae ad beatam vitam pertinenter in una virtute poneret nec quidquam aliud numeraret in bonis, idque appellaret honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum. Cetera autem etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat,\(^1\) alia naturae esse\(^2\) contraria; his ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat. Quae autem secundum naturam essent, ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione dignanda docebat, contraque contraria, neutra autem in mediis relinquebat. In quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti, sed quae essent sumenda,\(^3\) ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris: quae pluris ea praeposita appellantabat, reiecta autem quae minoris. Atque ut haec non tam rebus quam vocabulis commutaverat, sic inter recte

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\(^1\) Lambinus: docebat codd.  
\(^2\) [esse] Ernesti.  
\(^3\) sumenda: media Davies: <non> sumenda? ed.

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\(^a\) τὸ καλὸν.  
\(^b\) Sumenda is carelessly put for neutra—unless indeed the text should be corrected by inserting “not to be chosen.”  
\(^c\) i.e., of minus value, in grades of undesirability: this inaccuracy occurs in the Greek authorities.
and authority of Plato, and after them Polemo and Crates, and also Crantor, gathered in the one fold of the Academy, were assiduous defenders of the doctrines that they had received from their predecessors.

Finally, Polemo had had diligent pupils in Zeno and Arcesilas, but Zeno, who was Arcesilas’s senior in age and an extremely subtle dialectician and very acute thinker, instituted a reform of the system. This remodelled doctrine also I will expound, if you approve, as it used to be expounded by Antiochus.” “I do approve,” said I, “and Pomponius, as you see, indicates his agreement.”

X. “Well, Zeno was by no means the man ever to hamstring virtue, as Theophrastus had done, but on the contrary to make it his practice to place all the constituents of happiness in virtue alone, and to include nothing else in the category of Good, entitling virtue ‘the noble,’ a which denoted a sort of uniform, unique and solitary good. All other things, he said, were neither good nor bad, but nevertheless some of them were in accordance with nature and others contrary to nature; also among these he counted another interposed or ‘intermediate’ class of things. He taught that things in accordance with nature were to be chosen and estimated as having a certain value, and their opposites the opposite, while things that were neither he left in the ‘intermediate’ class. These he declared to possess no motive force whatever, but among things to be chosen b some were to be deemed of more value and others of less c: the more valuable he termed ‘preferred,’ the less valuable, ‘rejected.’ And just as with these he had made an alteration of terminology rather than of substance,
factum atque peccatum officium et contra officium media locabat quaedam, recte facta sola in bonis [actionibus] ponens, prave, id est peccata, in malis; officia autem servata praetermissaque media putabat, ut dixi. Cumque superiores non omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent sed quasdam virtutes natura aut more perfectas, hic omnes in ratione ponerebat; cumque illi ea genera virtutum quaes supra dixi seintugi posse arbitrarantur, hic nec id ullo modo fieri posse disserebat nec virtutis usum modo, ut superiores, sed ipsum habitum per se esse praeciprarum, nec tamen virtutem cuiquam adesse quin ea semper uteretur. Cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non tollerent, naturaque et condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et efferri laetitia dicerent, sed ea contraherent in angustumque deducerent, hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem; cumque eas perturbationes antiqui naturales esse dicerent et rationis expertes, aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem adsentiebatur, nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum matrem esse arbitrabatur immoderatam quandam intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus.

XI. "De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum ut in quattuor initii rerum illis quintam hanc Naturam ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur non

1 ed. 2 autem Lambinus: autem et codd.

* Officium is Cicero's rendering of καθήκον, 'a suitable act,' formally right in the circumstances, whatever the motive of the agent.
* i.e., καλὸν.
* So, in a later theology, faith is manifested in works.
* Morbus is a translation of πάθος.
* i.e., the elements.
* See § 26.
so between a right action and a sin he placed appropriate action⁴ and action violating propriety as things intermediate, classing only actions rightly done as goods and actions wrongly done, that is sins, as evils, whereas the observance or neglect of appropriate acts he deemed intermediate, as I said. And whereas his predecessors said that not all virtue resides in the reason, but that certain virtues are perfected by nature or by habit, he placed all the virtues in reason; and whereas they thought that the kinds of virtues that I have stated above can be classed apart, he argued that this is absolutely impossible, and that not merely the exercise of virtue, as his predecessors held, but the mere state of virtue is in itself a splendid thing,⁵ although no body possesses virtue without continuously exercising it.⁶ Also whereas they did not remove emotion out of humanity altogether, and said that sorrow and desire and fear and delight were natural, but curbed them and narrowed their range, Zeno held that the wise man was devoid of all these ‘diseases’⁷; and whereas the older generation said that these emotions were natural and non-rational, and placed desire and reason in different regions of the mind, he did not agree with these doctrines either, for he thought that even the emotions were voluntary and were experienced owing to a judgement of opinion, and he held that the mother of all the emotions was a sort of intemperance and lack of moderation. These more or less were his ethical doctrines.

XI. “His views as to the natural substances were as follows. First, in dealing with the four recognized primary elements he did not add this fifth substance which his predecessors deemed to be the source of
adhiberet; statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam quae quidque gigneret, etiam¹ mentem atque sensus. Discrepabat etiam ab iisdem quod nullo modo arbitrabatur quidquam effici posse ab ea quae expers esset corporis, cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse dixerant, nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeret posse esse non corpus. Plurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit: in qua primum de sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quaedam quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus (quam ille φαντασίαν, nos visum appellemus licet, et teneamus hoc quidem verbum, erit enim utendum in reliquo sermone saepius),—sed ad haec quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus adsensionem adiungit animorum quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam.

Visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem sed iis solum quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur; id autem visum cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile—feretis haec?" "Nos vero," inquit; "quonam enim alio modo κατά-
λήπτον diceres?" "Sed cum acceptum iam et appro-
batum esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem iis rebus quae manu prenderentur—ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis (nova enim dice-
bat) usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprensuum, id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita erat comprensuum ut

¹ Reid: et codd.

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¹ i.e., a combination of external impression or presentation and internal assent; but the sentence is interrupted by a parenthesis.
² ἐνάργεια, see ii. 18 n.
³ Comprehensio is used for comprehensum, as κατάληψις was for καταληπτική φαντασία. See ii. 145.
sensation and of intellect; for he laid it down that the natural substance that was the parent of all things, even of the senses and the mind, was itself fire. He also differed from the same thinkers in holding that an incorporeal substance, such as Xenocrates and the older thinkers also had pronounced the mind to be, was incapable of any activity, whereas anything capable of acting, or being acted upon in any way could not be incorporeal. In the third department of philosophy he made a number of changes. Here first of all he made some new pronouncements about sensation itself, which he held to be a combination\(^a\) of a sort of impact offered from outside (which he called *phantasia* and we may call a presentation, and let us retain this term at all events, for we shall have to employ it several times in the remainder of my discourse),—well, to these presentations received by the senses he joins the act of mental assent which he makes out to reside within us and to be a voluntary act. He held that not all presentations are trustworthy but only those that have a ‘manifestation,’\(^b\) peculiar to themselves, of the objects presented; and a trustworthy presentation, being perceived as such by its own intrinsic nature, he termed ‘graspable’—will you endure these coinages?" “Indeed we will,” said Atticus, “for how else could you express ‘*catalepton*’?” “But after it had been received and accepted as true, he termed it a ‘grasp,’\(^c\) resembling objects gripped in the hand—and in fact he had derived the actual term from manual prehension, nobody before having used the word in such a sense, and he also used a number of new terms (for his doctrines were new). Well, a thing grasped by sensation he called itself a sensation, and a sensation so firmly grasped as to be
convelli ratione non posset, scientiam, sin aliter, inscientiam nominabat, ex qua exsisteret etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falsò incognitoque com-
munis. Sed inter scientiam et inscientiam com-
prehensionem illam quam dixi collocabat, eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat sed solum ei\textsuperscript{1} credendum esse dicebat. E quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod, ut supra dixi, comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis videbatur, non quod omnia quae essent in re comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinquueret, quodque natura quasi normam scientiae et prin-
cipium sui dedisset unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur, e quibus non principia solum sed latiores quaedam ad rationem inveniendam viae aperirentur.\textsuperscript{2} Errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinationem et suspicionem, et uno nomine omnia quae essent aliena firmae et constantis adsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque removebat. At-
que in his fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensio-
que Zenonis a superioribus.”

XII. Quae cum dixisset, “Breviter sane minime-
que obscure exposita est,” inquam, “a te, Varro, et veteris Academiae ratio et Stoicorum; verum esse autem arbitror, ut Antiocho nostro familiari placebat, correctionem veteris Academiae potius quam novam aliquam disciplinam putandum.” Tum Varro, “Tuæ sunt nunc partes,” inquit, “qui ab antiquorum ratione desciscis et ea quae ab Arcesila novata sunt probas,

\begin{enumerate}
\item [\textsuperscript{1}] solum ei \textit{Christ}: soli codd.
\item [\textsuperscript{2}] \textit{Davies}: reperiuntur codd.
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{a} The mss. give ‘that it alone was credible.’
\textsuperscript{b} A translation of \textit{γνώμων or καρών}.
irremovable by reasoning he termed knowledge, but a sensation not so grasped he termed ignorance, and this was the source also of opinion, an unstable impression akin to falsehood and ignorance. But as a stage between knowledge and ignorance he placed that 'grasp' of which I have spoken, and he reckoned it neither as a right nor as a wrong impression, but said that it was only a 'credible.' On the strength of this he deemed the senses also trustworthy, because, as I said above, he held that a grasp achieved by the senses was both true and trustworthy, not because it grasped all the properties of the thing, but because it let go nothing that was capable of being its object, and because nature had bestowed as it were a 'measuring-rod' of knowledge and a first principle of itself from which subsequently notions of things could be impressed upon the mind, out of which not first principles only but certain broader roads to the discovery of reasoned truth were opened up. On the other hand error, rashness, ignorance, opinion, suspicion, and in a word all the things alien to firm and steady assent, Zeno set apart from virtue and wisdom. And it is on these points more or less that all Zeno's departure and disagreement from the doctrine of his predecessors turned."

When he had said this, I remarked: "You have certainly given a short and very lucid exposition of the theory both of the Old Academy and of the Stoics; though I think it to be true, as our friend Antiochus used to hold, that the Stoic theory should be deemed a correction of the Old Academy rather than actually a new system." "It is now your role," rejoined Varro, "as a seceder from the theory of the older period and a supporter of the innovations.
docere quod et qua de causa discidium factum sit, ut videamus satisne ista sit iusta defectio." Tum ego, "Cum Zenone," inquam, "ut accepirimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi, ut mihi quidem videtur, sed earum rerum obscuritate quae ad confessionem Ignorationis ad-
duxerant Socratem et iam ante Socratem Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnes paene veteres, qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt, angustos sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia curri-
cula vitae, et, ut Democritus, in profundo veritatem esse demersam, opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri, nihil veritati relinqui, deinceps omnia tenebris circum-
fusa esse dixerunt. Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia latere cense-
bat in occulto, neque esse quidquam quod cerni aut intellegi posset; quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare quemquam neque adsen-
sione approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu continere temperatam, quae tum esset insignis cum aut falsa aut incognita res approbaretur, neque hoc quidquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et perceive-
tioni adsensionem approbationemque praecurrere. Huic rationi quod erat consentaneum faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias disserens in eam plerosque deducret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in

1 in eam Madvig: dies iam codd. (de sua unus).

\[\text{\textsuperscript{a}}\] \textsuperscript{a} \varepsilon \upsilon \beta_{\upsilon} \theta_{\upsilon} \eta \alpha\lambda\nu\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha \text{ Diog. L. ix. 72.}

\[\text{\textsuperscript{b}}\] \textsuperscript{b} We do not even know that nothing can be known: \textit{cf.} ii. 73.

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of Arcesilas, to explain the nature and the reason of the rupture that took place, so as to enable us to see
whether the secession was fully justified." "It was
together with Zeno, so we have been told," I replied,
entirely with Zeno, so we have been told," I replied,
entirely with Zeno, so we have been told," I replied,
that Arcesilas set on foot his battle, not from
obstinacy or desire for victory, as it seems to me at all
events, but because of the obscurity of the facts that
had led Socrates to a confession of ignorance, as also
previously his predecessors Democritus, Anaxagoras,
Empedocles, and almost all the old philosophers, who
utterly denied all possibility of cognition or perception
or knowledge, and maintained that the senses are
limited, the mind feeble, the span of life short,
and that truth (in Democritus's phrase) is sunk in
an abyss, a opinion and custom are all-prevailing, no
place is left for truth, all things successively are
wrapped in darkness. Accordingly Arcesilas said
that there is nothing that can be known, not even
that residuum of knowledge that Socrates had left
himself—the truth of this very dictum b: so hidden
in obscurity did he believe that everything lies, nor
is there anything that can be perceived or un-
understood, and for these reasons, he said, no one must
make any positive statement or affirmation or give
the approval of his assent to any proposition, and a
man must always restrain his rashness and hold it
back from every slip, as it would be glaring rashness
to give assent either to a falsehood or to something
not certainly known, and nothing is more disgrace-
ful than for assent and approval to outstrip know-
ledge and perception. His practice was consistent
with this theory—he led most of his hearers to accept
it by arguing against the opinions of all men, so
that when equally weighty reasons were found on

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partibus momenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte adsensio sustineretur. Hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur, siquidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil adfirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur, nihil certi dicitur; sed tamen illa quam exposuisti vetus, haec nova nominetur; quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit, in eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae partis ignarus et, ut cognovi ex iis qui illum audierant maximeque ex Epicureo Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret, unum tamen praeter ceteros mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate. . . .”

* See ii. 16.

* The contemporary of Cicero, who heard him at Athens.
opposite sides on the same subject, it was easier to withhold assent from either side. They call this school the New Academy,—to me it seems old, at all events if we count Plato a member of the Old Academy, in whose books nothing is stated positively and there is much arguing both pro and contra, all things are inquired into and no certain statement is made; but nevertheless let the Academy that you expounded be named the Old and this one the New; and right down to Carneades, who was fourth in succession from Arcesilas, it continued to remain true to the same theory of Arcesilas. Carneades however was acquainted with every department of philosophy, and as I have learnt from his actual hearers, and especially from the Epicurean Zeno, who though disagreeing very much with Carneades, nevertheless had an exceptional admiration for him, he possessed an incredible facility...."
FRAGMENTA EDITIONIS POSTERIORIS

LIBRI I


LIBRI II


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FRAGMENTS, SECOND EDITION

From Book I

1. *Digladiari* has been used in the sense of 'to disagree,' 'dissent': it is derived from 'swords.' Cicero, *Academica*, Bk. I.: 'But why is Mnesarchus resentful? Why does Antipater cross swords with Carneades in so many volumes?'

2. (Under concinnare.) The same author in *Academica* Bk. I.: 'With whom by reason of the similarity of the word he seemed to himself to be completely in harmony...'

From Book II

3. The view that *aequor* is derived from *aequum*, 'level,' is supported by Cicero, *Academica*, Book II.: 'What seems so level as the sea? This is actually the reason why the word for it in poetry is *aequor*.'

4. *Adamare.* 'For those who have fallen in love with office too late gain admission to it with difficulty, and cannot be enough in favour with the multitude.'

5. *Exponere* meaning 'to show examples of good': 'To crush avarice, to put away crime, to exhibit one's own life for the young to imitate.'

6. *Hebes,* 'dull,' used in the sense of 'dark,' or
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Libri III

12. Non. p. 65. Digladiari . . . idem tertio: Digladiari autem semper et depugnare in facinorosis et audacibus quis non cum miserrimum tum etiam stultissimum dixerit?


else ‘blunt’: ‘Well, what are the outlines of the moon? Can you say? The horns of the moon both when rising and setting sometimes seem duller, sometimes sharper.’

7. *Purpurascit.* ‘What, is not the sea blue? But when its water is struck by oars it purples, and indeed a sort of dye and stain having come to the water’s...’

8. *Perpendicula* and *normae.* ‘Yet if we believed that, we should not require plumblines or rods or rulers.’

9. *Siccum* means ‘dried up,’ devoid of moisture. ... *Siccum* also means ‘sober,’ not a soaker. ‘We notice a different complexion in grown-up people and the young, in invalids and the healthy, in the dry and in wine-bibbers.’

10. *Urinantur.* ‘For whenever we stoop like men making water, we see nothing above us or only quite dimly.’

11. *Alabaster.* ‘People who think even a scent-bottle full of perfume a stinking thing.’

**From Book III**

12. *Digladiari.* ... Cicero also writes in Book III: ‘But to be always crossing swords and fighting to the end among criminals and desperadoes—who would not call this a most pitiable and also a most foolish occupation?’

13. *Exultare* means ‘to jump out.’ ‘And just as we are now sitting by the Lucrine Lake and see the little fishes jumping out of the water...’

14. *Ingeneraretur* in the sense of ‘might be born in.’ ‘That in man alone among all this variety of
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homini ut soli cupiditas ingeneraretur cognitionis et scientiae!


LIBRORUM INCERTORUM


19. Augustin. c. Academicos ii. 26 Talia, inquit Academicus, mihi videntur omnia quae probabilia vel veri similia putavi nominanda ; quae tu si alio nomine vis vocare, nihil repugno, satis enim mihi est te iam bene accepisse quid dicam, id est, quibus rebus haec nomina imponam : non enim vocabulorum opificem sed rerum inquisitorem decet esse sapientem.

20. August. c. Acad. iii. 15 sq. Est in libris Ciceronis quos in huius causae patrocinium scripsit locus quidam, ut mihi videtur, mira urbanitate conditus, ut non nullis

a Malleo, Reid’s conjecture for the unknown word malcho of the mss.

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living creatures might be born a desire for learning and knowledge.'

15. *Vindicare* 'to draw,' 'to set free.' 'Let him show some capacity, let him champion himself into freedom.'

16. Cicero . . . who in his third Academic volume has these words: 'Whereas if those who have pursued a devious path in life were allowed, like travellers who had wandered from the road, to remedy their mistake by repenting, the correction of recklessness would be easier.'

17. Varro in his third book dedicated to Cicero uses *fixum*, and Cicero in *Academica*, Book III. 'adfixed on the work with a hammer.'

**Fragments of uncertain Context**

18. These are your own words, (Cicero): 'To me however we seem not only blind to wisdom but dull and blunted even towards things that are in some measure visible.'

19. 'Such,' says the Academic speaker, 'seem to me to be all the things that I have thought fit to entitle "probable" or possessed of verisimilitude; if you want to call them by another name I make no objection, for it satisfies me that you have already well grasped my meaning, that is, the things to which I assign these names: since it becomes the wise man to be not a manufacturer of words but a researcher into things.'

20. The books of Cicero that he wrote to champion this cause contain a certain passage that seems to me to have a remarkably witty flavour, while some people
autem, etiam firmitate roboratus. Difficile est prorsus ut quemquam non moveat quod ibi dictum est, Academico sapienti ab omnibus ceterarum sectarum qui sibi sapientes videntur secundas partes dari, cum primas sibi quemque vindicare necesse sit; ex quo posse probabiliter confici eum recte primum esse suo iudicio qui omnium ceterorum iudicio sit secundus.

21. August. c. Acad. iii. 20. 43 Ait enim (Cicero) illis morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam nec eam cuiquam nisi qui secum ad senectutem usque vixissent aperire consuesse.

22. August. de civ. Dei vi. 2 Denique et ipse Tullius huic (M. Varroni) tale testimonium perhibet ut in libris Academicis dicat eam quae ibi versatur disputationem se habuisse cum M. Varrone, homine, inquit, omnium facile acutissimo et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo.
think it actually a powerful and strong piece of writing. Indeed it is hard to see how anybody could fail to be impressed by what is said there, that 'the Wise Man of the Academy is given the second rôle by all the adherents of the other schools that seem wise in their own eyes, though of course they each claim the first part for themselves; and that from this the probable inference may be drawn that, since he is second by everybody else's verdict, his own verdict is right in placing him first.'

[There follows a page of imaginary dialogue between Zeno, Epicurus and an Academic, which some editors print as a verbatim quotation from Cicero; but the style makes this unlikely, and it is not introduced as a quotation, as is the passage above.]

21. For he (Cicero) says that they 'had a habit of concealing their opinion, and did not usually disclose it to anybody except those that had lived with them right up to old age.'

22. Finally Tully himself also bears such witness to this man (Marcus Varro) as to say in Academica that the discussion there set out took place between himself and Marcus Varro, 'a person who was easily the most penetrating of all men, and without any doubt extremely learned.'
I. Magnum ingenium L. Luculli magnumque optimarum artium studium, tum omnis liberalis et digna homine nobili ab eo percepta doctrina, quibus temporibus florere in foro maxime potuit caruit omnino rebus urbanis. Ut enim admodum adulescens cum fratre pari pietate et industria praedito paternas inimicitias magna cum gloria est persecutus, in Asiam quaestor profectus ibi permultos annos admirabili quadam laude provinciae praeuit; deinde absens factus aedilis, continuo praetor (licebat enim celerius legis praemio), post in Africam, inde ad consulatum, quem ita gessit ut diligentiam admirarentur omnes, ingenium agnoscerent. Post ad Mithridaticum bellum missus a senatu non modo opinionem vicit omnium quae de virtute eius erat sed etiam gloriam superiorum; idque eo fuit mirabilius quod ab eo laus

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* This Book belongs to the first edition of the work (in which it was dedicated to Lucullus and entitled by his name), and it is therefore designated Academica Priora by some editors.

* The elder Lucullus had been tried and found guilty of misconduct when commanding in the slave-war in Sicily, 103 B.C. His sons (in accordance with the Roman sentiment of filial duty) did their best to ruin his prosecutor Servillius.

* Probably Sulla, when re-enacting the old lex annalis by his lex de magistratibus, inserted a clause exempting his own officers as a special privilege, to reward their services.

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BOOK II. a LUCULLUS

ANTIOCHUS'S ATTACK ON SCEPTICISM EXPOUNDED AND ANSWERED

1 I. The great talents of Lucius Lucullus and his great devotion to the best sciences, with all his acquisitions in that liberal learning which becomes a person of high station, were entirely cut off from public life at Rome in the period when he might have won the greatest distinction at the bar. For when as quite a youth, in co-operation with a brother possessed of equal filial affection and devotion, he had carried on with great distinction the personal feuds of his father, b he went out as quaestor to Asia, and there for a great many years presided over the province with quite remarkable credit; then in his absence he was elected aedile, and next praetor (since by a statutory grant c this was permitted before the usual time); later he was appointed to Africa, and then to the consulship, which he so administered as to win universal admiration for his devotion to duty and universal recognition of his ability. Later the senate commissioned him to the war with Mithridates, d in which he not only surpassed everybody's previous estimation of his valour but even the glory of his predecessors; and this was the more remark-

a The third Mithridatic War, beginning 74 B.C., when Lucullus was consul.
imperatoria non admodum exspectabatur qui adulescentiam in forensi opera, quaesturae dii turnum tempus Murena bellum in Ponto gerente in Asia pace consumpserat. Sed incredibilis quaedam ingenii magnitudo non desideravit indocilem usus disciplinam. Itaque cum totum iter et navigationem consumpsisset partim in percontando a peritis, partim in rebus gestis legendis, in Asiam factus imperator venit, cum esset Roma profectus rei militaris rudis. Habuit enim divinam quandam memoriam rerum, verborum maiorem Hortensius, sed quo plus in negotiis gerendis res quam verba prosunt, hoc erat memoria illa praestantior; quam fuisse in Themistocle, quem facile Graeciae principem ponimus, singularem ferunt, qui quidem etiam pollicenti cuidam se artem ei memoriae quae tum primum proferebatur traditurum respondisse dicitur oblivisci se malle discere—credo quod haeret bant in memoria quaecumque audierat et viderat. Tali ingenio praeditus Lucullus adiunxerat etiam illam quam Themistocles spreverat disciplinam, itaque, ut litteris consignamus quae monumentis mandare volumus, sic ille in animo res insculptas habebat. Tantus ergo imperator in omni genere belli fuit, proeliiis, oppugnationibus, navalibus pugnis, totiusque belli instrumento et adparatu, ut ille rex post Alexandrum maxumus hunc a se maiorem ducem cognitum quam quemquam eorum quos legisset

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a The second Mithridatic War, 83–82 B.C.

b i.e., the training provided by experience and not by study.

c The lyric poet Simonides of Ceos (556–467 B.C.), the inventor of the system.

d Mithridates the Great (120–63 B.C.), king of Pontus.

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able because military distinction was not particularly anticipated from one who had spent his youth in practice at the bar, and the long period of his quaestorship peacefully in Asia, while Murena was carrying on the war in Pontus. But intellectual gifts that even surpassed belief had no need of the unschooled training that is given by experience. Accordingly after spending the whole of his journey by land and sea partly in cross-questioning those who were experts and partly in reading military history, he arrived in Asia a made general, although he had started from Rome a tiro in military matters. For he had a memory for facts that was positively inspired, although Hortensius had a better memory for words, but Lucullus's memory was the more valuable, inasmuch as in the conduct of business facts are of more assistance than words; and this form of memory is recorded as having been present in a remarkable degree in Themistocles, whom we rank as easily the greatest man of Greece, and of whom the story is told that when somebody offered to impart to him the memoria technica that was then first coming into vogue, he replied that he would sooner learn to forget—no doubt this was because whatever he heard or saw remained fixed in his memory. Gifted with such natural endowments, Lucullus had also added the training which Themistocles had despised, and thus he kept facts engraved on his mind just as we enshrine in writing things that we desire to record. Consequently he was so great a commander in every class of warfare, battles, sieges, sea-fights, and in the entire field of military equipment and commissariat, that the greatest king since the time of Alexander admitted that he had discovered Lucullus to be a greater general than any
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fateretur. In eodem tanta prudentia fuit in constitendi temperandisque civitatibus, tanta aequitas, ut hodie stet Asia Luculli institutis servandis et quasi vestigiis persequendis. Sed etsi magna cum utilitate rei publicae, tamen diutius quam vellem tanta vis virtutis atque ingeni peregrinata afuit ab oculis et fori et curiae. Quin etiam cum victor a Mithridatico bello revertisset, inimicorum calumnia triennio tardius quam debuerat triumphavit; nos enim consules introduximus paene in urbem currum clarissimi viri; cuius mihi consilium et auctoritas quid tum in maximis rebus profuissent\(^1\) dicerem nisi de me ipso dicendum esset, quod hoc tempore non est necesse; itaque privabo potius illum debito testimonio quam id cum mea laude communicem.

II. Sed quae populari gloria decorari in Lucullo debuerunt, ea fere sunt et Graecis litteris celebrata et Latinis. Nos autem illa externa cum multis, haec interiora cum paucis ex ipso saepe cognovimus; maiore enim studio Lucullus cum omni litterarum generi tum philosophiae deditus fuit quam qui illum ignorabant arbitrabantur, nec vero ineunte aetate solum sed et pro quaestore aliquot annos et in ipso bello, in quo ita magna rei militaris esse occupatio solet ut non multum imperatori sub ipsis pellibus otii relinquatur. Cum autem e philosophis ingenio

\(^1\) profuisset codd. fere omnes.

\(^a\) At the end of 67 B.C.

\(^b\) Cicero is doubtless thinking chiefly of the suppression of the revolutionary conspiracy led by Catiline.

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of those that he had read of. He also possessed so much wisdom and justice in the work of establishing and reforming governments that Asia to-day continues to observe the institutions and follow in the footsteps of Lucullus. But although greatly to the advantage of the state, nevertheless those vast powers of character and of intellect were absent abroad, out of the sight of both the law-courts and the senate, for a longer time than I could have wished. Moreover when he returned to victorious from the Mithridatic War, the chicanery of his enemies postponed his triumph three years later than it ought to have taken place; for it was I as consul who virtually led into the city the chariot of this glorious hero, of the value to me of whose advice and influence at that period in the most important affairs I might speak if it did not involve speaking about myself, which at this time is not necessary; and so I will rob him of the tribute due to him rather than combine it with my own praise.

II. However, the things in Lucullus's career that deserved the honour of a national celebration have fairly well won their tribute of fame in both Greek and Latin records. But my knowledge of these facts about his public life I share with many persons; the following more private details I have often learnt from himself in company with few others—for Lucullus was more ardently devoted both to letters of all sorts and to philosophy than persons who did not know him supposed, and indeed not only at an early age but also for some years during his praetorship, and even on active service, when military duties are usually so engrossing as to leave a commander not much leisure when actually under canvas. But as Philo's pupil Antiochus was deemed
scientiaque putaretur Antiochus Philonis auditor excellere, eum secum et quaestor habuit et post aliquot annos imperator, quique esset ea memoria quam ante dixi, ea saepe audiendo facile cognovit quae vel semel audita meminisse potuisset. Delectabatur autem miriifice lectione librorum de quibus audiebat.¹

5 Ac vereor interdum ne talium personarum cum amplificare velim minuam etiam gloriam. Sunt enim multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras, plures qui philosophiam; reliqui² etiam si haec non improbant,³ tamen earum rerum disputationem principibus civitatis non ita decoram putant.⁴ Ego autem cum Graecas litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim, P. autem Africani historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili quam ante censuram obiit Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum Graecarum nec philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro. Restat ut iis respondeam qui sermonibus eius modi nolint personas tam graves inligari. Quasi vero clarorum virorum aut tacitos congressus esse oporteat aut ludicros sermones aut rerum conloquia leviorum! Etenim si quodam in libro vere est a nobis philosophia laudata, profecto eius tractatio optimo atque amplissimo quoque dignissima est, nec quid-

¹ audierat Ernesti. ² reliqui qui codd. multi. ³ ed. : improbent codd. ⁴ putent codd. fere omnes.

¹ To the kings of Egypt and Asia in alliance with Rome, 144 B.C. Scipio Africanus Minor was censor 142 B.C. ² Cicero’s Hortensius.
the chief among philosophers for intellect and learning, he kept him in his company both when quaestor and when a few years later he became general, and having the powerful memory that I have spoken of already he easily learnt from frequent repetition doctrines that he would have been quite capable of learning from a single hearing. Moreover, he took a marvellous delight in reading the books about which Antiochus used to discourse to him.

5 And I am sometimes afraid lest in regard to men of this character my desire to magnify their fame may actually diminish it. For there are many people who have no love for Greek literature at all, and more who have none for philosophy; while the residue even if they do not disapprove of these studies nevertheless think that the discussion of such topics is not specially becoming for great statesmen. But for my own part, as I have been told that Marcus Cato learnt Greek literature in his old age, while history states that Publius Africanus, on the famous embassy on which he went before his censorship, had Panaetius as absolutely the sole member of his staff, I need not look any further for someone to support the claims either of Greek literature or of philosophy.

6 It remains for me to reply to the critics who are unwilling to have public characters of such dignity entangled in conversations of this nature. As if sooth persons of distinction ought to hold their meetings in silence, or else engage in frivolous conversation or discussion on lighter topics! In fact, if there is truth in the praise of philosophy that occupies a certain volume of mine, it is obvious that its pursuit is supremely worthy of all persons of the highest character and eminence, and the only precaution that
quam aliud videndum est nobis quos populus Romanus hoc in gradu conlocavit nisi ne quid privatis studiis de opera publica detrahamus. Quodsi cum fungi munere debebamus non modo operam nostram numquam a populari coetu removimus sed ne litteram quidem ullam fecimus nisi forensem, quis reprendet otium nostrum, qui in eo non modo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus sed etiam ut plurimis prosimus enitimur? Gloriam vero non modo non minui sed etiam augeri arbitramur eorum quorum ad popularis illustriisque laudes has etiam minus 7 notas minusque pervolgatas adiungimus. Sunt etiam qui negent in iis qui in nostris libris disputent fuisse earum rerum de quibus disputatur scientiam: qui mihi videntur non solum vivis sed etiam mortuis invidere.

III. Restat unum genus reprehensorum quibus Academiae ratio non probatur. Quod gravius ferre mus si quisquam ullam disciplinam philosophiae probaret praeter eam quam ipse sequeretur. Nos autem quoniam contra omnes dicere quae\(^1\) videntur solemus, non possimus quin ali\(a\) nobis dissentiant recusare: quamquam nostra quidem causa facilis est, qui verum invenire sine uUa contentione volumus idque summa cura studioque conquirimus. Etsi enim omnis cognitio multis est obstructa difficultatibus, eaque est et in ipsis rebus obscuritas et in iudiciis nostris infirmitas.

\(^1\) dicere quae \textit{Reid}: qui dicere quae \textit{codd.}, qui scire sibi \textit{Cant}.

\(a\) \textit{i.e., the dramatis personae} of the dialogues that follow.  
\(b\) \textit{Cf.} 'preach Christ of contention,' \textit{Philippians} i. 16, and \textit{Hebrews} i. 3, \textit{Thessalonians} ii. 2.
ACADEMICA, II. (Lucullus), ii.—iii.

need be observed by us whom the Roman nation has placed in this rank is to prevent our private studies from encroaching at all upon our public interest. But if at the time when we had official duties to perform we not only never removed our interest from the national assembly but never even put pen to paper save on matters of public business, who will criticize our leisure, if therein we not only are reluctant to allow ourselves to grow dull and slack but also strive to be of service to the greatest number of men? At the same time in our judgement we are not merely not diminishing but actually increasing the fame of those persons to whose public and distinguished glories we also append these less known and less well advertised claims to distinction. There are also people who declare that the personages who debate in our books did not really possess a knowledge of the subjects debated; but these critics to my eye appear to be jealous of the dead as well as of the living.

III. There remains one class of adverse critics who do not approve the Academic system of philosophy. This would trouble us more if anybody approved any set of doctrines except the one of which he himself was a follower. But for our part, since it is our habit to put forward our views in conflict with all schools, we cannot refuse to allow others to differ from us; although we at all events have an easy brief to argue, who desire to discover the truth without any contention, and who pursue it with the fullest diligence and devotion. For even though many difficulties hinder every branch of knowledge, and both the subjects themselves and our faculties of judgment involve such a lack of certainty that the most
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ut non sine causa antiquissimi et doctissimi invenire se posse quod cuperent diffisi sint, tamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos studium exquirendi defatigati relinquemus; neque nostrae disputationes quidquam aliud agunt nisi ut in utramque partem dicendo eliciant et tamquam exprimant aliquid quod aut verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat. Nec inter nos et eos qui se scire arbitrantur quidquam interest nisi quod illi non dubitant quin ea vera sint quae defendunt, nos probabilia multa habemus, quae sequi facile, adfirmare vix possumus; hoc autem libriores et solutiores sumus quod integra nobis est iudicandi potestas nec ut omnia quae praescripta a quibusdam et quasi imperata sint defendamus necessitate ulla cogimur. Nam ceteri primum ante tenentur adstricti quam quid esset optimum iudicare potuerunt, deinde infirmissimo tempore aetatis aut obsecuti amico cuipiam aut una aliquius quem primum audierunt oratione capti de rebus incognitis iudicant, et ad quamcumque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delati ad eam tamquam ad saxum adhaerescunt. Nam quod dicunt omnino se credere ei quem iudicent fuisse sapientem, probarem si id ipsum rudes et indociti iudicare potuissent (statuere enim qui sit sapiens vel maxime videtur esse sapientis); sed, ut potuerint, potuerunt omnibus rebus auditis, cognitis etiam re-

\[1\] potuerint inseruit Lambinus.

\[a\] Expriment, a metaphor from sculpture: no doubt the word properly denoted the preliminary model in clay.
ancient and learned thinkers had good reason for distrusting their ability to discover what they desired, nevertheless they did not give up, nor yet will we abandon in exhaustion our zeal for research; and the sole object of our discussions is by arguing on both sides to draw out and give shape to some result that may be either true or the nearest possible approximation to the truth. Nor is there any difference between ourselves and those who think that they have positive knowledge except that they have no doubt that their tenets are true, whereas we hold many doctrines as probable, which we can easily act upon but can scarcely advance as certain; yet we are more free and untrammeled in that we possess our power of judgement uncurtailed, and are bound by no compulsion to support all the dogmas laid down for us almost as edicts by certain masters. For all other people in the first place are held in close bondage placed upon them before they were able to judge what doctrine was the best, and secondly they form judgements about matters as to which they know nothing at the most incompetent period of life, either under the guidance of some friend or under the influence of a single harangue from the first lecturer that they attended, and clinging as to a rock to whatever theory they are carried to by stress of weather. For as to their assertion that the teacher whom they judge to have been a wise man commands their absolute trust, I would agree to this if to make that judgement could actually have lain within the power of unlearned novices (for to decide who is a wise man seems to be a task that specially requires a wise man to undertake it); but granting that it lay within their power, it was only possible for them after hear-
liquorum sententiis, iudicaverunt autem re semel audita atque\textsuperscript{1} ad unius se auctoritatem contulerunt. Sed nescio quo modo plerique errare malunt eamque sententiam quam adamarerunt pugnacissime defendere quam sine pertinacia quid constantissime dicatur exquirere.

Quibus de rebus et alias saepe nobis multa quae-sita et disputata sunt et quondam in Hortensii villa quae est ad Baulos, cum eo Catulus et Lucullus nosque ipsi postridie venissemus quam apud Catulum fuissesmus. Quo quidem etiam maturius venimus quod erat constitutum, si ventus esset, Lucullo in Neapolitanum, mihi in Pompeianum navigare. Cum igitur pauc\textsuperscript{1} in xysto locuti essemus, tum eodem in spatio consedimus.

IV. Hic Catulus, "Etsi heri," inquit, "id quod quaerebatur paene explicatum est, ut tota fere quaestio tractata videatur, tamen exspecto ea quae tepollicitus es, Luculle, ab Antiocho audita dicturum."

"Equidem," inquit Hortensius, "feci plus quam vellem, totam enim rem Lucullo integram servatam oportuit. Et tamen fortasse servata est; a me enim ea quae in promptu erant dicta sunt, a Lucullo autem reconditora desidero." Tum ille, "Non sane," inquit, "Hortensi, conturbat me exspectatio tua, etsi nihil

\textsuperscript{1} atque inseruit Lambinus.

\textsuperscript{a} i.e., the colonnade or xystus in which they had been strolling.
ing all the facts and ascertaining the views of all the other schools as well, whereas they gave their verdict after a single hearing of the case, and enrolled themselves under the authority of a single master. But somehow or other most men prefer to go wrong, and to defend tooth and nail the system for which they have come to feel an affection, rather than to lay aside obstinacy and seek for the doctrine that is most consistent.

Beside many other occasions on which we have engaged in long investigations and discussions of these subjects, there was one at Hortensius's country-house at Bauli, Catulus, Lucullus and we ourselves having come there on the day after we had been at Catulus's. We had in fact arrived there rather early because Lucullus had the intention of sailing to his place at Naples and I to mine at Pompei, if there was a wind. So after a little talk in the colonnade, we then sat down on a seat in the same walk.a

IV. Here Catulus said, "It is true that our inquiry of yesterday was almost fully cleared up, so that nearly the whole of the subject now appears to have been handled; but nevertheless I am waiting with interest for you, Lucullus, to fulfil your promise of telling us the doctrines that you heard from Antiochus." "For my part," said Hortensius, "I could wish that I had not gone so far, for the whole subject ought to have been reserved in its entirety for Lucullus. And yet perhaps it has been reserved, for it was the more obvious points that were expounded by me, whereas I look to Lucullus to give us the more abstruse doctrines." "Your expectancy, Hortensius," rejoined Lucullus, "does not, it is true, upset me, although there is nothing that so much
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est iis qui placere volunt tam adversarium, sed quia non laboro quam valde ea quae dico probaturus sim, eo minus conturbor; dicam enim nec mea nec ea in quibus, si non fuerint, non vinci me malim quam vincere. Sed mehercule, ut quidem nunc se causa habet, etsi hesterno sermone labefactata est, mihi tamen videtur esse verissima. Agam igitur sicut Antiochus agebat (nota enim mihi res est, nam et vacuo animo illum audiebam et magno studio, eadem de re etiam saepius), ut etiam maiorem exspectationem mei faciam quam modo fecit Hortensius.”

Cum ita esset exorsus, ad audiendum animos ereximus; at ille “Cum Alexandriæ pro quaestore” inquit “essem, fuit Antiochus mecum, et erat iam antea Alexandriæ familiaris Antiochi Heraclitus Tyrius, qui et Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat, homo sane in ista philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur, probatus et nobilis; cum quo Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam, sed utrumque leniter. Et quidem isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo est, tum erant adlati Alexandriam tumque primum in Antiochi manus venerant: et homo natura lenissimus (nihil enim poterat fieri illo mitius) stomachari tamen coepit. Mirabar, nec enim umquam ante videram; at ille

a Lucullus was sent by Sulla to Alexandria, 87-86 B.C., to try to raise a fleet.

b i.e., by Cicero.
handicaps people desirous of winning approval, but I am less upset because I do not mind how far I am successful in gaining assent for the views that I expound; for the doctrines that I am going to state are not my own, nor are they ones about which, if they are unsound, I should not wish rather to be refuted than to carry the day. But I protest that even though my case was shaken by yesterday's discussion, it nevertheless appears to me to be profoundly true—at least as it stands at present. I will therefore adopt what used to be the procedure of Antiochus (for I am familiar with the subject, since I used to hear him with undistracted attention and with great interest, even more than once on the same topic), so as to cause even more to be expected of me than 11 Hortensius did just now." On his beginning in this strain we aroused our attention to listen to him; whereupon he proceeded: "When I was deputy-quaeator at Alexandria, Antiochus was in my company, and Antiochus's friend, the Tyrian Heraclitus, was at Alexandria already; he had been for many years a pupil of both Clitomachus and Philo, and was undoubtedly a person of standing and distinction in the school of philosophy in question, which after having been almost abandoned is now being revived; I often used to hear Antiochus arguing with Heraclitus, both however in a gentle manner. And indeed those two volumes of Philo mentioned yesterday by Catulus had then reached Alexandria and had then for the first time come into Antiochus's hands; whereupon though by nature one of the gentlest of people (in fact nothing could have been kinder than he was) he nevertheless began to lose his temper. This surprised me, as I had never seen
Heracliti memoriam implorans quaeerere ex eo vide-renturne illa Philonis aut ea num vel e Philone vel exullo Academico audivisset aliquando. Negabat; Philonis tamen scriptum agnosebat, nec id quidem dubitari poterat, nam aderant mei familiares, doci homines, P. et C. Selii et Tetrilius Rogus qui se illa audivisset Romae de Philone et ab eo ipso illos duos libros dicerent descriptisse. Tum et illa dixit Antiochus quae heri Catulus commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni\(^1\) et alia plura, nec se tenuit quin contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet qui Sosus inscribitur. Tum igitur cum et Heraclitum studiose audirem contra Antiochum disserentem et item Antiochum contra Academicos, dedi Antiocho operam diligentius, ut causam ex eo totam cognoscerem. Itaque complures dies adhibito Heraclito doctis-que compluribus et in iis Antiochi fratre Aristo et praefera Aristone et Dione, quibus ille secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat, multum temporis in ista una disputatione consumpsimus. Sed ea pars quae contra Philonem erat praetermittenda est, minus enim acer est adversarius is qui ista quae sunt heri defensa negat Academicos omnino dicere; etsi


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* i.e., the New Academy, as § 12 fin.

b These persons are otherwise unknown.

c i.e., at the beginning of the lost Book I. of the first edition of Academica; in the second edition the topic was transferred to Cicero and occupied the lost Book II.

d Sosus, like Antiochus a native of Ascalon, seems to have gone over from the Academy to Stoicism.

* i.e., when a copy is made, that is the name written on it.

f See i. 12 n.

* i.e., by Catulus, in the lost Book I. of the first edition,
him do so before; but he kept appealing to Heraclitus's recollection and asking him whether he really thought that those doctrines were Philo's, or whether he had ever heard them either from Philo or from any member of the Academy.\(^a\) Heraclitus always answered No; but still he recognized it as a work of Philo's, and indeed this could not be doubted, for my learned friends Publius and Gaius Selius and Tetrilius Rogus\(^b\) were there to say that they had heard these doctrines from Philo at Rome and had copied down the two books in question from Philo's own manuscript. Then Antiochus put forward the views that yesterday Catulus told us\(^c\) had been put forward in regard to Philo by his father, and also a number of others, and did not restrain himself even from publishing a book against his own teacher,\(^d\) the book to which is given\(^e\) the title of Sosus. On this occasion therefore when I heard both Heraclitus earnestly arguing against Antiochus and also Antiochus against the Academics, I gave my attention more closely to Antiochus, in order to learn from him his whole case. Accordingly when we had for quite a number of days had Heraclitus with us and quite a number of other learned men, among them Antiochus's brother Aristus,\(^f\) and also Aristo and Dio, to whom he used to assign the greatest authority next to his brother, we spent a great deal of time in this single discussion. But we must pass over the part of it that was directed against Philo, for he is a less keen opponent who declares that those doctrines maintained yesterday\(^g\) are not the doctrines of the Academy at all; for though what he says is which bore his name; the subject was given to Cicero in the lost Book II. of the second edition (see p. 406).
enim mentitur, tamen est adversarius lenior. Ad Arcesilan Carneademque veniamus.”

V. Quae cum dixisset, sic rursus exorsus est: “Primum mihi videmini”—me autem[nomine]\(^1\) appellabat—“cum veteres physicos nominatis, facere idem quod seditiosi cives solent cum aliquos ex antiquis claros viros proferunt quos dicant fuisse populares ut eorum ipsi similes esse videantur. Repetunt enim a\(^2\) P. Valerio qui exactis regibus primo anno consul fuit, commemorant reliquos qui leges populares de provocationibus tulerint cum consules essent; tum ad hos notiores, C. Flaminium qui legem agrariam aliquot annis ante secundum Punicum bellum tribunus plebis tulerit invito senatu et postea bis consul factus sit, L. Cassium, Q. Pompeium; illi quidem etiam P. Africanum referre in eundem numerum solent. Duos vero sapientissimos et clarissimos fratres P. Crassum et P. Scaevolam aiunt Ti. Graccho auctores legum fuisse, alterum quidem (ut videmus) palam, alterum (ut suspicantur) obscurius. Addunt etiam C. Marium, et de hoc quidem nihil mentiuntur. Horum nominibus tot virorum atque tantorum expositis eorum se institutum sequi dicunt. Similiter vos, cum perturbare ut illi rem publicam sic vos philosophiam bene iam constitutam velitis, Empedoclen, Anaxagoran, Democritum, Parmeniden, Xenophonem, Platonem

\(^1\) [nomine] ed.

\(^2\) enim a Reid: iam aut iam a codd.
not true, he is a milder adversary. Let us come to Arcesilas and Carneades.”

13 V. When he had said this he started again as follows: “In the first place I feel that you gentlemen”—it was to me that he was actually speaking,—“when you cite the names of the old natural philosophers, are doing just what citizens raising a sedition usually do, when they quote some famous personages of antiquity as having been of the people’s party, so as to make themselves appear to resemble them. For they go back to Publius Valerius who was consul in the first year after the expulsion of the kings, and they quote all the other persons who when consuls carried popular legislation about processes of appeal; then they come to the better known cases of Gaius Flaminius, who when tribune of the plebs some years before the second Punic War carried an agrarian law against the will of the senate and afterwards twice became consul, and of Lucius Cassius and Quintus Pompeius; indeed these people have a way of including even Publius Africanus in the same list. But they say that the two very wise and distinguished brothers Publius Crassus and Publius Scaevola were supporters of the laws of Tiberius Gracchus, the former (as we read) openly, the latter (as they suspect) more covertly. They also add Gaius Marius, and about him at all events they say nothing that is untrue. After parading all this list of names of men of such distinction they declare that they themselves are following the principle set up by them. Similarly your school, whenever you want to upset an already well-established system of philosophy just as they did a political system, quote Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides,
etiam et Socratem profertis. Sed neque Saturninus, ut nostrum inimicum potissimum nominem, simile quidquam habuit veterum illorum, nec Arcesilae calumnia conferenda est cum Democriti verecundia. Et tamen isti physici raro admodum, cum haerent aliquo loco, exclamant quasi mente incitati—Empe-
docles quidem ut interdum mihi furere videatur—abstrusa esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernere, nihil omnino quale sit posse reperire; maiorem autem partem mihi quidem omnes isti videntur nimis etiam quaedam adfirmare, plusque profiteri se scire quam 15 sciant. Quodsi illi tum in novis rebus quasi modo nascentes haesitaverunt, nihilne tot saeculis, summis ingeniis, maximis studiis explicatum putamus? nonne cum iam philosophorum disciplinae gravis-
simae constitissent, tum exortus est, ut in optima re publica Ti. Gracchus qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas qui constitutam philosophiam everteret, et in eorum auctoritate delitesceret qui negavissent quidquam sciri aut percipi posse? Quorum e numero tollendus est et Plato et Socrates—alter quia reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam, Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus differentes, re congruentes, a quibus Stoici ipsi verbis magis quam sententiiis dis-

a i.e., to put Arcesilas in a list of philosophers that includes Democritus is like classing a modern demagogue with the democratic statesmen of history. Saturninus, the colleague of Marius, finally went beyond him, and was killed by the mob.
Xenophanes, and even Plato and Socrates. But neither had Saturninus—to cite in particular the name of the enemy of my family—any feature resembling those men of old, nor can the chicanery of Arcesilas be compared with the modesty of Democritus. And nevertheless your natural philosophers do rather rarely, when brought to a standstill at some topic, cry out in an excited sort of manner—Empecocles indeed in a way that sometimes makes me think him raving—saying that all things are hidden and that we perceive nothing, discern nothing, are utterly unable to discover the real nature of anything; although for the most part all your school seem to me at all events to be only too confident in some of their assertions and to profess to know more than they really do. But if those old thinkers found themselves floundering like babies just born in a new world, do we imagine that all these generations and these consummate intellects and elaborate investigations have not succeeded in making anything clearer? Is it not the case that, just as in the noblest of states Tiberius Gracchus arose to disturb the atmosphere of peace, so when the most authoritative schools of philosophy had now come to a standstill, then there arose Arcesilas to overthrow the established philosophy, and to lurk behind the authority of those whom he asserted to have denied the possibility of all knowledge and perception? From the list of these we must remove both Plato and Socrates—the former because he left behind him a most consummate system of thought, the Peripatetic School and the Academy, which have different names but agree in substance, and from which the Stoics themselves disagreed more in terms.
senserunt; Socrates autem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat iis quos volebat refellere; ita cum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est ea dissimulatione quam Graeci εἰρωνείαν vocant; quam ait etiam in Africano fuisse Fannius, idque propterea vitiosum in illo non putandum quod idem fuerit in Socrate.

16 VI. "Sed fuerint illa vetera, si voltis, incognita: nihilne est igitur actum quod investigata sunt postea- quam Arcesilas, Zenoni (ut putatur) obtrectans nihil novi reperienti sed emendanti superiores immutatione verborum, dum huius definitiones labefactare volt conatus est clarissimis rebus tenebras obducere? Cuius primo non admodum probata ratio, quamquam floruit cum acumine ingenii tum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi, proxime a Lacyde solo retenta est, post autem confecta a Carneade, qui est quartus ab Arcesila, audivit enim Hegesinum qui Euandrum audierat Lacydi discipulum, cum Arcesilae Lacydes fuisset. Sed ipse Carneades diu tenuit, nam nona-ginta vixit annos, et qui illum audierant admodum floruerunt, e quibus industriae plurimum in Clitomacho fuit (declarat multitudo librorum), ingenii non minus in Hagnone, in Charmada eloquentiae,

1 veteribus Bentley.
2 in Hagnone Christ: in hac nonne (et alia) codd.: in Aeschine Davies.

* Little or nothing is known of this philosopher or of the others mentioned in this section.
than in opinions. As for Socrates, he used to depreciate himself in discussion and to assign greater weight to those whom he wished to refute; thus, as he said something other than what he thought, he was fond of regularly employing the practice of dissembling that the Greeks call irony, which Fannius says was also a feature of Africanus, and one not to be deemed a fault in him, for the reason that Socrates had the same habit.

16 VI. "But let us grant if you wish that those ancient doctrines represented no real knowledge; has nothing then been achieved by their having been under examination ever since the time when Arcesilas, criticizing Zeno (so it is supposed) as making no new discoveries but only correcting his predecessors by verbal alterations, in his desire to undermine Zeno's definitions attempted to cover with darkness matters that were exceedingly clear? His system was at first not very much accepted, although he was distinguished both by acuteness of intellect and by a certain admirable charm of style, and at the first stage it was preserved by Lacydes only, but afterwards it was completed by Carneades, who is the fourth in line from Arcesilas, having attended the courses of Hegesinus who had attended Evander, the pupil of Lacydes as Lacydes had been the pupil of Arcesilas. But Carneades himself held the school for a long time, for he lived to be ninety, and those who had been his pupils were of considerable eminence, Clitomachus being the one among them most distinguished for industry (as is proved by the large number of his books), though there was an equal amount of talent in Hagnon, of eloquence in Charmades, and of charm in Melanthius
in Melanthio Rhodio suavitatis. Bene autem nosse 17 Carneaden Stratoniceus Metrodorus putabatur. Iam Clitomacho Philo vester operam multos annos dedit; Philone autem vivo patrocinium Academiae non defuit. Sed quod nos facere nunc ingredimur ut contra Academicos disseramus, id quidam e philosophis et ii quidem non mediocres faciundum omnino non putabant, nec vero esse ullam rationem disputare cum iis qui nihil probarent, Antipatrumque Stoicum qui multus in eo fuisset reprehendebant; nec definiri aiebant necesse esse quid esset cognitio aut perpectio aut (si verbum e verbo volumus) comprehensio, quam κατάληψιν illi vocant, eosque qui persuadere vellent esse aliquid quod comprehendi et perci pi posset inscienter facere dicebant, propterea quod nihil esset clarius ἐναργεία (ut Graeci, perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus, fabricemurque si opus erit verba, ne hic sibi”—me appellabat iocans—“hoc licere putet soli): sed tamen orationem nullam putabant inlustriorem ipsa evidentia reperiri posse, nec ea quae tam clara essent dehinienda censebant. Alii autem negabant se pro hac evidentia quidquam priores fuisse dicturos, sed ad ea quae contra dice rentur dici oportere putabant, ne qui fallerentur. 18 Plerique tamen et definitiones ipsarum etiam eviden-

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a See i. 41 n.
b A general term denoting things that are self-evident and do not require proof, used as a technical term by Zeno to denote the characteristic of κατάληπτική φαντασία.
of Rhodes. But the Metrodorus who was a pupil of Stratonicus was believed to have been well acquainted with Carneades. Again Philo of your school for many years gave his attention to Clitomachus; and while Philo lived the Academy did not lack advocacy. But the undertaking upon which we are now entering, the refutation of the Academics, was entirely ruled out by some of the philosophers, and those indeed men of no inconsiderable standing, and they held that there was really no sense in arguing with thinkers who sanctioned nothing as proved, and they criticized the Stoic Antipater for spending much time in this; and they also asserted that there was no need to define the essential nature of knowledge or perception or (if we wish to give a literal translation) 'mental grasp,' the Stoic term catalépsis, and maintained that those who tried to prove that there is something that can be grasped and perceived were acting unscientifically, because there was nothing clearer than enargeia (as the Greeks call it: let us term it perspicuousness or evidentness, if you will, and let us manufacture terms if necessary, so as not to let our friend here—this was a jocular shot at me—'think that he has a monopoly of this licence): well, they thought that no argument could be discovered that was clearer than evidentness itself, and they deemed that truths so manifest did not need defining. But others said that they would not have opened proceedings with any speech in defence of this evidentness, but held that the proper course was for argument to be directed to answering the case for the prosecution, so that they might not be somehow taken in. Still a good many of them do not object to definitions even of evident things them-
tium rerum non improbant et rem idoneam de qua quaeratur et homines dignos quibuscum disseratur putant. Philo autem dum nova quaedam commovet quod ea sustinere vix poterat quae contra Academiorum pertinaciam dicebantur, et aperte mentitur, ut est reprehensus a patre Catulo, et, ut docuit Antiochus, in id ipsum se induit quod timebat. Cum enim ita negaret quidquam esse quod comprehendi posset (id enim volumus esse ἀκατάληπτον 1), si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, tale visum (iam enim hoc pro φαντασίᾳ verbum satis hesterno sermone trivimus), visum igitur impressum effictumque ex eo unde esset quale esse non posset ex eo unde non esset (id nos a Zenone definitum rectissime dicimus, qui enim potest quidquam comprehendi ut plane confidas perceptum id cognitumque esse, quod est tale quale vel falsum esse possit?)—hoc cum infirmat tollitque Philo, iudicium tollit incogniti et cogniti; ex quo efficitur nihil posse comprehendi—ita imprudens eo quo minime volt revolvitur. Quare omnis oratio contra Academiam ita 2 suscipitur a nobis ut retineamus eam

1 κατάληπτον edd. nonnulli.
2 ita inseruit ed.

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selves, and they think that any fact is a suitable matter for investigation and that human beings deserve to have their views discussed. But Philo, in raising certain revolutionary doctrines because he was scarcely able to withstand the usual arguments against the obstinacy of the Academics, manifestly propounds what is not true, as he was blamed for doing by the elder Catulus, and also, as Antiochus proved, himself slipped into the very position that he was afraid of. For when he thus maintained that there was nothing that could be grasped (that is the expression that we choose in rendering acatalēpton a), if that 'presentation' of which he spoke (for we have by this time sufficiently habituated ourselves by our yesterday's conversation to this rendering of phantasia) was, as Zeno defined it, a presentation impressed and moulded from the object from which it came in a form such as it could not have if it came from an object that was not the one that it actually did come from (we declare that this definition of Zeno's is absolutely correct, for how can anything be grasped in such a way as to make you absolutely confident that it has been perceived and known, if it has a form that could belong to it even if it were false?)—when Philo weakens and abolishes this, he abolishes the criterion between the unknowable and the knowable; which leads to the inference that nothing can be grasped—so incautiously does he come round to the position that he most wants to avoid. Therefore the whole defence of the case against the Academy is undertaken by us on the line of preserving the process of defini-

a To be accurately expressed, the sense requires the positive catalēpton.
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definitionem quam Philo voluit evertere; quam nisi obtinemus, percipi nihil posse concedimus.

19 VII. "Ordiamur igitur a sensibus, quorum ita clara iudicia et certa sunt ut si optio naturae nostrae detur et ab ea deus aliqui requirat contentane sit suis integris incorruptisque sensibus an postulet melius aliquid, non videam quid quae rerat amplius. Nec vero hoc loco exspectandum est dum de remo inflexo aut de collo columbae respondeam, non enim is sum qui quidquid videtur tale dicam esse quale videatur. Epicurus hoc viderit, et alia multa; meo autem iudicio ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et sani sunt ac valentes et omnia removentur quae obstant et impediunt. Itaque et lumen mutari saepe volumus et situs earum rerum quas intuemur et intervalla aut contrahimus aut diducimus multaque facimus usque eo dum aspectus ipse fidem faciat sui iudici. Quod idem fit in vocibus, in odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque 20 generis iudicium requirat acrius. Adhibita vero exercitacione et arte, ut oculi pictura teneantur, aures cantibus,\(^1\) quis est quin cernat quanta vis sit in sensibus? Quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia quae nos non videmus! quam multa quae nos fugiunt in cantu exaudiunt in eo genere exercitati, qui primo inflatu tibicinis Antiopam esse

\(^1\) ut . . . cantibus secl. Davies.

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\(^a\) i.e., an oar half in the water, as seen from the boat; this case of refraction and the changing colours of a pigeon’s neck were instances of apparent deception of the senses much used by the Sceptics; cf. § 79.

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tion which Philo wished to overthrow; and unless we succeed in upholding it, we admit that nothing can be perceived.

19 VII. "Let us begin therefore from the senses, whose verdicts are so clear and certain that if human nature were given the choice, and were interrogated by some god as to whether it was content with its own senses in a sound and undamaged state or demanded something better, I cannot see what more it could ask for. Nor indeed is it necessary to delay at this point while I answer about the case of the bent oar or the pigeon's neck, for I am not one to assert that every object seen is really such as it appears to be. Let Epicurus see to that, and a number of other matters; but in my judgement the senses contain the highest truth, given that they are sound and healthy and also that all obstacles and hindrances are removed. That is why we often desire a change of the light and of the position of the objects that we are observing, and diminish or enlarge their distances from us, and take various measures, until mere looking makes us trust the judgement that it forms. The same is done in the case of sounds and smell and taste, so that among us there is nobody who desiderates keener powers of judgement in the senses, each in its class. But when we add practice and artistic training, to make our eyes sensitive to painting and our ears to music, who is there who can fail to remark the power that the senses possess? How many things painters see in shadows and in the foreground which we do not see! how many things in music that escape us are caught by the hearing of persons trained in that department of art, who when the flute-player blows his first note say 'That is
aiunt aut Andromacham, cum id nos ne suspicemur quidem! Nihil necesse est de gustatu et odoratu loqui, in quibus intellegentia, etsi vitiosa, est quaedam tamen. Quid de tactu, et eo quidem quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris aut voluptatis, in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse iudicium quia sentiatur? Potestne igitur quisquam dicere inter eum qui doleat et inter eum qui in voluptate sit nihil interesse, aut ita qui sentiat non apertissime insaniat? Atqui qualia sunt haec quae sensibus percipi dicimus, talia secuntur ea quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur sed quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: 'Illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud, hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.' Animo iam haec tene- mus comprehensa, non sensibus. 'Ille' deinceps 'equus est, ille canis.' Cetera series deinde sequitur, maiora nectens, ut haec, quae quasi expletam rerum comprehensionem amplectuntur: 'Si homo est, animal est mortale, rationis particeps.' Quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec interlegi quidquam nec quaeri disputarive potest.  

21 Quodsi essent falsae notitiae (évvoías enim notitias appellare tu videbare)—si igitur essent hae falsae aut eius modi visis impressae qualia visa a falsis discerni

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a Plays of Pacuvius and Ennius respectively.

b i.e., in the dialogue of the day before, in the lost first edition of Book I.
Antiope’ or ‘Andromache,’ a when we have not even a suspicion of it! It is unnecessary to talk at all about the faculties of taste and smell, which possess a certain discernment, although it is of a defective sort. Why speak of touch, and indeed of the internal tactual sense, as the philosophers call it, perceptive of either pain or pleasure, the sole basis, as the Cyrenaics think, of our judgement of truth, caused by the mere process of sensation? Is it therefore possible for anybody to say that there is no difference between a person experiencing pain and a person experiencing pleasure, or would not the holder of this opinion be a manifest lunatic? But then whatever character belongs to these objects which we say are perceived by the senses must belong to that following set of objects which are said to be perceived not by actual sensation but by a sort of sensation, as for example: ‘Yonder thing is white, this thing is sweet, that one is melodious, this fragrant, this rough.’ This class of percepts consists of comprehensions grasped by our mind, not by our senses. Then ‘Yonder object is a horse, yonder a dog.’ Next follows the rest of the series linking on a chain of larger percepts, for instance the following, which embrace as it were a fully completed grasp of the objects: ‘If it is a human being, it is a rational mortal animal.’ From this class of percept are imprinted upon us our notions of things, without which all understanding and all investigation and discussion are impossible. But if false notions existed (I understood you to employ b ‘notions’ to render ennoiai)—well, if there were these false notions or notions imprinted on the mind by appearances of a kind that could not be distinguished from false ones,
non possent, quo tandem iis modo uteremur? quo modo autem quid cuique rei consentaneum esset, quid repugnaret, videremus? Memoriae quidem certe, quae non modo philosophiam sed omnem vitae usum omnesque artes una maxime continet, nihil omnino loci relinquitur. Quae potest enim esse memoria falsorum? aut quid quisquam meminit quod non animo comprehendit et tenet? ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat? Quam\(^1\) si subtraxeris, qui distingues artificem ab inscio? non enim fortuito hunc artificem dicemus esse, illum negabimus, sed cum alterum perpecta et comprehensa tenere videmus, alterum non itid. Cumque artium aliud eius modi genus sit ut tantum modo animo rem cernat, aluid ut moliatur aliquid et faciat, quo modo aut geometres cernere ea potest quae aut nulla sunt aut internosci a falsis non possunt, aut is qui fidibus utitur explere numeros et conficere versus? quod idem in similibus quoque artibus continget quorum omne opus est in faciendo atque agendo, quid enim est quod arte effici possit, nisi is qui artem tractabit multa percepit?

23 VIII. "Maxime vero virtutum cognitio confirmat percipi et comprehendi multa posse. In quibus solis inesse etiam scientiam dicimus (quam nos non comprehensionem modo rerum sed eam stabilem quoque et immutabilem esse censemus), itemque sapientiam,

\(^1\) quas Walker.

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\(\textit{Artifex}\) denotes the pursuer of an \textit{ars}, an organized body of knowledge, a science, whether theoretical or applied in practice. It includes here the musician (also regarded as a poet), but the practice of music seems to be envisaged as
how pray could we act on them? how moreover could we see what is consistent with any given fact and what inconsistent? At all events no place at all is left for memory, the one principal foundation not only of philosophy but of all the conduct of life and all the sciences. For how can there possibly be a memory of what is false? or what can anyone remember that he does not grasp and hold in his mind? But what science can there be that is not made up of not one nor two but many mental percepts? And if you take away science, how will you distinguish between the craftsman and the ignoramus? for we shall not pronounce one man to be a craftsman, and the other not, just casually, but when we see the one retain what he has perceived and grasped, and the other not. And as one class of sciences is of such a nature as only to envisage facts mentally, and another such as to do or to make something, how can the geometrician envisage things that are either non-existent or indistinguishable from fictitious things, or the player on the harp round off his rhythms and complete his verses? and the same result will also occur in the other crafts of the same class which are solely exercised in making and doing, for what can be effected by a craft unless its intending practitioner has accumulated many percepts?

23 VIII. "The greatest proof however of our capacity to perceive and grasp many things is afforded by the study of Ethics. Our percepts alone we actually pronounce to form the basis of knowledge (which in our view is not only a grasp of facts but a grasp that is also permanent and unchangeable), and likewise based on knowledge of its theory. At § 142 the craftsmen instanced are a painter and two sculptors.
artem vivendi, quae ipsa ex sese habeat constantiam. Ea autem constantia si nihil habeat percepti et cogniti, quaero unde nata sit aut quo modo. Quaero etiam, ille vir bonus qui statuit omnem cruciatum perferre, intolerabili dolore lacerari potius quam aut officium prodat aut fidem, cur has sibi tam graves leges imposuerit cum quam ob rem ita oporteret nihil haberet comprehensi, percepti, cogniti, constituì. Nullo igitur modo fieri potest ut quisquam tanti aestimet aequitatem et fidem ut eius conservandae causa nullum supplicium recuset, nisi iis rebus ad-sensus sit quae falsae esse non possint. Ipsa vero sapientia si se ignorabit sapientia sit necne, quo modo primum obtinebit nomen sapientiae? deinde quo modo suscipere aliquam rem aut agere fìdenter audebit cum certi nihil erit quod sequatur? cum vero dubitabit quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum ignorans quo omnia referantur, qui poterit esse sapientia? Atque etiam illud perspicuum est, constitui necesse esse initium quod sapientia cum quid agere incipiat sequatur, idque initium esse naturae accommodatum. Nam aliter adpetitio (eam enim volumus esse ὥρμην), qua ad agendum impellimur et id adpetimus quod est visum, moveri non potest; illud autem quod movet prius oportet videri, eique credi, quod fieri non potest si id quod visum erit.
of wisdom, the science of living, which is its own source of consistency. But if this consistency had nothing that it grasped and knew, whence, I ask, or how would it be engendered? consider also the ideal good man, who has resolved to endure all torments and to be mangled by intolerable pain rather than betray either his duty or his promise—why, I ask, has he saddled himself with such burdensome rules as this when he had no grasp or perception or knowledge or certainty of any fact that furnished a reason why it was his duty to do so? It is therefore absolutely impossible that anybody should set so high a value upon equity and good faith as to refuse no torture for the sake of preserving it, unless he has given his assent to things that cannot possibly be false. As for wisdom herself, if she does not know whether she is wisdom or not, how in the first place will she make good her claim to the name of wisdom? next, how will she venture with confidence to plan or execute any undertaking when there will be nothing certain for her to act upon? indeed, when she will be hesitating in ignorance of what the final and ultimate good to which all things are to be referred really is, how can she possibly be wisdom? This other point moreover is manifest: there must be a first principle established for wisdom to follow when she embarks on any action, and this first principle must be consistent with nature; for otherwise appetition (our chosen equivalent for the term hormê), by which we are impelled to action and seek to get an object presented to our vision, cannot be set in motion; but the thing that sets it in motion must first of all be seen, and must be believed in, which cannot take place if an object seen will be indistinguishable from
CICERO

discerni non poterit a falso; quo modo autem moveri animus ad adpetendum potest si id quod videtur non percipitur accommodatum ne naturae sit an alienum? Itemque si quid officii sui sit non occurrit animo, nihil umquam omnino aget, ad nullam rem umquam impelletur, numquam movebitur; quodsi aliquid aliquando actuando actus est, necesse est id ei verum quod occurrit videri. Quod quod, si ista vera sunt, ratio omnis tollitur quasi quaedam lux lumenque vitae? tamenne in ista pravitate perstabitis? Nam quaerendi initium ratio attulit, quae perfect virtutem cum esset ipsa ratio confirmata quaerendo; quaestio autem est adpetitio cognitionis, quaestionisque finis inventio; at nemo inventit falsa, nec ea quae incerta permanent inventa esse possunt, sed cum ea quae quasi involuta fuerunt aperta sunt, tum inventa dicuntur—sic et initium quaerendi et exitus percpipiundi et comprehendendi tenetur. Argumenti conclusio, quae est Graece ἀπόδειξις, ita definitur: 'ratio quae ex rebus perceptis ad id quod non percpiebatur adducit.'

IX. "Quodsi omnia visa eius modi essent qualia isti dicunt, ut ea vel falsa esse possent neque ea posset ulla notio discernere, quo modo quemquam aut conclusisse aliquid aut invenisse diceremus, aut quae esset conclusi argumenti fides? Ipsa autem philosophia, quae rationibus procredi debet, quem

1 quod (= quaerendum, quaestio) ? ed.

a Cicero seems to be translating some such phrase as φίλας καὶ φίλους τοῦ βίου.

b The sense seems to require 'research which': for virtus, or its Stoic equivalent sapientia, as ratio perfecta cf. i. 20, ii. 30 fin.

c Involuta aperire is a translation of ἐκκαλύπτειν, denoting
a false one; but how can the mind be moved to
appetition if it does not perceive whether the object
seen is consistent with nature or foreign to it? And
moreover if it has not struck the mind what its
function is, it will never do anything at all, never be
driven towards any object, never make a movement;
whereas if it is at some time to do something, what
26 strikes it must seem to it to be true. What about
the total abolition of reason, 'life's dayspring and
source of light,' a that must take place if your
doctrines are true? will your school continue steadfast in such perversity all the same? For it is reason
that initiated research, reason b which has perfected
virtue, since reason herself is strengthened by pur-
suing research; but research is the appetition for
knowledge, and the aim of research is discovery;
yet nobody discovers what is false, and things that
remain continually uncertain cannot be discovered:
discovery means the 'opening up of things pre-
viously veiled' c—this is how the mind holds both
the commencement of research and the final act
of perceiving and grasping. Therefore this is the
definition of logical proof, in Greek apodeixis: 'a
process of reasoning that leads from things perceived
to something not previously perceived.'

IX. "In fact if all sense-presentations were of such
a kind as your school say they are, so that they could
possibly be false without any mental process being
able to distinguish them, how could we say that any-
body had proved or discovered anything, or what
trust could we put in logical proof? Philosophy her-
self must advance by argument—how will she find a

*And for philosophy, which
Carneades entirely
under-mined.*

a process of argument; the conclusion is seen to be contained
in the premises.
habebit exitum? Sapientiae vero quid futurum est? quae neque de se ipsa dubitare debet neque de suis decretis quae philosophi vocant ὃγματα, quorum nullum sine scelere prodi poterit; cum enim decretum proditur, lex veri rectique proditur, quo e vitio et amicitiarum proditiones et rerum publicarum nasci solent. Non potest igitur dubitari quin decretum nullum falsum possit esse sapientis, neque satis sit non esse falsum sed etiam stabile, fixum, ratum esse debit, quod movere nulla ratio queat; talia autem neque esse neque videri possunt eorum ratione qui illa visa e quibus omnia decreta sunt nata negant quicquam a falsis interesse. Ex hoc illud est natum quod postulabat Hortensius, ut id ipsum saltem perceptum a sapiente diceretis, nihil posse percipi. Sed Antipatro hoc idem postulant, cum diceret ei qui adfirmaret nihil posse percipi unum tamen illud dicere percipi posse consentaneum esse, ut alia non possent, Carneades acutius resistebat; nam tantum abesse dicebat ut id consentaneum esset, ut maxime etiam repugnaret: qui enim negaret quicquam esse quod perciperetur, eum nihil excipere; ita necesse esse ne id ipsum quidem, quod exceptum non esset, comprendi et percipiullo modo posse. Antiochus ad istum locum pressius videbatur accedere: quoniam enim id haberent Academici decretum (sentitis enim iam hoc me ὃγμα dicere), nihil posse percipi, non debere eos in suo decreto sicut in ceteris rebus

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* ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ἐπὶ λόγου Sextus, A. M. vii. 151. 502*
ACADEMICA, II. (Lucullus), ix.

way out? And what will happen to Wisdom? It is her duty not to doubt herself or her 'decisions,' which philosophers term *dogmata*, any of which it will be a crime to abandon; for the surrender of such a 'decision' is the betrayal of the moral law, and that sin is the common source of betrayals of friends and country. Therefore it cannot be doubted that no 'decision' of a wise man can be false, and that it is not sufficient for them not to be false but they must also be firmly settled and ratified, immovable by any argument; but such a character cannot belong or seem to belong to them on the theory of those who maintain that the sense-presentations from which all decisions spring differ in no way from false presentations. From this sprang the demand put forward by Hortensius, that your school should say that the wise man has perceived at least the mere fact that nothing can be perceived. But when Antipater used to make the same demand, and to say that one who asserted that nothing could be perceived might yet consistently say that this single fact could be perceived, namely that nothing else could, Carneades with greater acumen used to oppose him; he used to declare that this was so far from being consistent that it was actually grossly inconsistent: for the man who said there was nothing that was perceived made no exception, and so not even the impossibility of perception could itself be grasped and perceived in any way, because it had not been excepted. Antiochus used to seem to come more closely to grips with this position; he argued that because the Academics held it as a 'decision' (for you realize by now that I use that term to translate *dogma*) that nothing could be perceived, they were bound not to
fluctuare, praesertim cum in eo summa consistaret, hanc enim esse regulam totius philosophiae, constitutionem veri falsi, cogniti incogniti; quam rationem quoniam susciperent, docereque vellent quae visa accipi oporteret, quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum ex quo omne veri falsique iudicium esset percipere eos debuisse; etenim duo esse haece maxima in philosophia, iudicium veri et finem bonorum, nec sapientem posse esse qui aut cognoscendi esse initium ignoret aut extremum expetendi, ut aut unde proficiscatur aut quo perveniendum sit nesciat; haec autem habere dubia nec iis ita confidere ut moveri non possint¹ abhorrere a sapientia plurimum.² Hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum ut hoc unum saltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent. Sed de inconstantia totius illorum sententiae, si nulla sententia cuiusquam esse potest nihil adprobantis, sit ut³ opinor dictum satis. 30

X. “Sequitur disputatio copiosa illa quidem sed paulo abstrusior—habet enim aliquantum a physicis,—ut verear ne maiorem largiar ei qui contra dicturus est libertatem et licentiam, nam quid eum facturum putem de abditis rebus et obscuris qui lucem eripere conetur? Sed disputari poterat subtiliter quanto

¹ possess ? ed.
² <quam> plurimum ? ed.
³ sit ut : est Ernesti.

a i.e., in Antiochus’s Sosus, see § 12. Cf. § 38.
 b For this reproach against the Sceptics cf. §§ 38, 61, 109.
 c Cf. i. 19.
waver in their own 'decision' as they did in everything else, particularly when it was the keystone of their system, for this was the measuring-rod that applied to the whole of philosophy, the test of truth and falsehood, of knowledge and ignorance; and that since they adopted this method, and desired to teach what sense-presentations ought to be accepted and what rejected, they unquestionably ought to have perceived this decision itself, the basis of every criterion of truth and falsehood; for (he said) the two greatest things in philosophy were the criterion of truth and the end of goods, and no man could be a sage who was ignorant of the existence of either a beginning of the process of knowledge or an end of appetite, and who consequently did not know from what he was starting or at what he ought to arrive; but to be in doubt as to these matters and not to feel immovably sure of them was to be very widely remote from wisdom. On these lines therefore they ought to have been required rather to say that this one thing at least was perceived—the impossibility of perceiving anything. But about the inconsistency of the whole of their theory, if anybody holding no positive view at all can be said to have any theory, enough, as I think, may have been said.

30 X. "Next comes a discussion which though very fully developed is a little more recondite, for it contains a certain amount of matter derived from natural philosophy; so that I am afraid that I may be bestowing greater liberty and even licence upon the speaker who is to oppose me, for what can I suppose that one who is endeavouring to rob us of light will do about matters that are hidden in darkness? Still, it would have been possible to discuss in minute detail
quasi artificio natura fabricata esset primum animal omne, deinde hominem maxime, quae vis esset in sensibus, quem ad modum primo visa nos pellerent, deinde adpetitio ab his pulsa sequeretur, tum\(^1\) sensus ad res percipiendas intenderemus. Mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa\(^2\) sensus est, naturalem vim habet quam intendit ad ea quibus movetur. Itaque alia visa sic arripit ut iis statim utatur, alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur, cetera autem similitudinibus construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum \(\epsilon ννοίασ\), tum \(\piρολήψεις\) vocant. Eo cum accessit ratio argumentique conclusio rerumque innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio eorum omnium apparat et eadem ratio perfecta his gradibus ad sapientiam per-

31 venit. Ad rerum igitur scientiam vitaeque constantiam aptissima cum sit mens hominis, amplectitur maxime cognitionem et istam \(\kappaατάληψιν\), quam ut dixi verbum e verbo exprimentes comprehensionem dicemus, cum ipsam per se amat (nihil enim est ei veritatis luce dulcius), tum etiam propter usum. Quo-circa et sensibus utitur et artes efficit quasi sensus alteros et usque eo philosophiam ipsam corroborat ut virtutem efficiat, ex qua re una vita omnis apta sit.\(^3\) Ergo ii qui negant quicquam posse comprendi

\(^1\) tum \textit{ed.}: tum ut \textit{codd.}

\(^2\) ipse \textit{Ernesti.}

\(^3\) est \textit{Halm.}

\textit{Adpetitio} is Cicero's version of \(\dot{oμη}\), see § 24 n.
the amount of craftsmanship that nature has employed in the construction first of every animal, then most of all in man,—the power possessed by the senses, the way in which we are first struck by the sense-presentations, next follows appetition imparted by their impact, and then we direct the senses to perceive the objects. For the mind itself, which is the source of the sensations and even is itself sensation, has a natural force which it directs to the things by which it is moved. Accordingly some sense-presentations it seizes on so as to make use of them at once, others it as it were stores away, these being the source of memory, while all the rest it unites into systems by their mutual resemblances, and from these are formed the concepts of objects which the Greeks term sometimes ennoiai and sometimes prolēpseis. When thereto there has been added reason and logical proof and an innumerable multitude of facts, then comes the clear perception of all these things, and also this same reason having been by these stages made complete finally attains to wisdom. Since therefore the mind of man is supremely well adapted for the knowledge of things and for consistency of life, it embraces information very readily, and your catalēpsis, which as I said we will express by a literal translation as 'grasp,' is loved by the mind both for itself (for nothing is dearer to the mind than the light of truth) and also for the sake of its utility. Hence the mind employs the senses, and also creates the sciences as a second set of senses, and strengthens the structure of philosophy itself to the point where it may produce virtue, the sole source of the ordering of the whole of life. Therefore those who assert that nothing can be grasped deprive us of these things that are the very
haec ipsa eripiunt vel instrumenta vel ornamenta vitae, vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt funditus ipsumque animal orbant animo, ut difficile sit de temeritate eorum perinde ut causa postulat dicere.

32 "Nec vero satis constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium aut quid velint. Interdum enim cum adhibemus ad eos orationem eius modi, si ea quae disputentur vera sint, tum omnia fore incerta, respondent: 'Quid ergo istud ad nos? num nostra culpa est? naturam accusa, quae in profundo veritatem, ut ait Democritus, penitus abstruserit.' Alii autem elegantius, qui etiam queruntur quod eos insimulamus omnia incerta dicere, quamunque interset inter incertum et id quod percipi non possit docere conantur eaque distinguere. Cum his igitur agamus qui haec distinguunt, illos qui omnia sic incerta dicunt ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit quasi desperatos aliquos relinquamus. Volunt enim (et hoc quidem vel maxime vos animadvertebam moveri) probabile aliquid esse et quasi veri simile, eaque se uti regula et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac disserendo.

33 XI. "Quae ista regula est veri et falsi, si notionem veri et falsi, propterea quod ea non possunt internosci, nullam habemus? Nam si habemus, interesse oportet ut inter rectum et pravum sic inter verum et falsum: si nihil interest, nulla regula est, nec potest is cui est visio veri falsique communis ullum

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a The favourite charge of the Sceptics against the dogmatic schools.

b Cf. i. 44 n.

c Doubtless a reference to the exposition of Catulus at the beginning of the lost Book I. of the first edition.

d Quasi marks veri simile as an explanation of probabile used to translate πιθανὖν.
tools or equipment of life, or rather actually overthrow the whole of life from its foundations and deprive the animate creature itself of the mind that animates it, so that it is difficult to speak of their rashness entirely as the case requires.

"Nor indeed can I fully decide what their plan is or what they mean. For sometimes when we address them in this sort of language, 'If your contentions are true, then everything will be uncertain,' they reply, 'Well, what has that to do with us? surely it is not our fault; blame nature for having hidden truth quite away, in an abyss, as Democritus says.'

But others make a more elaborate answer, and actually complain because we charge them with saying that everything is uncertain, and they try to explain the difference between what is uncertain and what cannot be grasped, and to distinguish between them. Let us therefore deal with those who make this distinction, and leave on one side as a hopeless sort of persons the others who say that all things are as uncertain as whether the number of the stars is odd or even. For they hold (and this in fact, I noticed, excites your school extremely) that something is 'probable,' or as it were resembling the truth, and that this provides them with a canon of judgement both in the conduct of life and in philosophical investigation and discussion.

XI. "What is this canon of truth and falsehood, if we have no notion of truth and falsehood, for the reason that they are indistinguishable? For if we have a notion of them, there must be a difference between true and false, just as there is between right and wrong; if there is none, there is no canon, and the man who has a presentation of the true and the
habere iudicium aut ullam omnino veritatis notam. Nam cum dicunt hoc se unum tollere ut quicquam possit ita\(^1\) videri ut non eodem modo falsum etiam possit\(^2\) videri, cetera autem concedere, faciunt pueriliter. Quo enim omnia iudicantur sublato reliqua se negant tollere: ut si quis quem oculis privaverit, dicat ea quae cerni possent se ei non ademisse. Ut enim illa oculis modo agnoscuntur, sic reliqua visis, sed propria veri, non communi veri et falsi nota. Quam ob rem sive tu probablem\(^3\) visionem sive probablem et quae non impediatur, ut Carneades volebat, sive aliud quid proferes quod square, ad visum illud de quo agimus tibi erit revertendum. In eo autem, si\(^4\) erit communitas cum falso, nullum erit iudicium, quia proprium\(^5\) communi signo notari non potest; sin autem commune nihil erit, habeo quod volo, id enim quaero quod ita mihi videatur verum ut non possit item falsum videri. Simili in errore versantur cum convicio veritatis coacti perspicua a perceptis volunt distinguere, et conantur ostendere esse

\(^1\) ita <verum> Baiter.  
\(^2\) possit Laminus: possit ita codd.  
\(^3\) Faber: improbabilem codd.  
\(^4\) si <ei> ? Reid.  
\(^5\) proprium Halm: proprium in codd.

\(^a\) κοινὴ φαντασία τοῦ τε ἀληθοῦς καὶ ψεύδους, Sextus.  
\(^b\) Perhaps we should emend 'any true thing,' cf. § 34. The clause refers to the possibility that an hallucination, a visual image not corresponding to a real object, may exactly resemble a visual image presented by a real object.  
\(^c\) φαντασία πιθανῆ καὶ ἀπεριστάσιος, a sensation which (1) at first sight, without further inquiry, seems true, and also (2) when examined in relation to all the other sensations.
false that is common to both cannot have any criterion or any mark of truth at all. For when they say that they only remove the possibility of anything presenting an appearance of such a sort that a false thing could not present the same appearance, but that they allow everything else, they act childishly. Having abolished the means by which all things are judged, they say they do not abolish the remaining sources of knowledge; just as if anybody were to say that when he has deprived a man of his eyes he has not taken away from that man the possible objects of sight. For just as the objects of sight are recognized only by means of the eyes, so everything else is recognized by means of sense-presentations; but they are recognized by a mark that belongs specially to what is true, and is not common to the true and the false. Therefore if you bring forward 'probable presentation,' or 'probable and unhampered presentation,' as Carneades held, or something else, as a guide for you to follow, you will have to come back to the sense-presentation that we are dealing with. But if this has community with a false presentation, it will contain no standard of judgement, because a special property cannot be indicated by a common mark; while if on the contrary there is nothing in common between them, I have got what I want, for I am looking for a thing that may appear to me so true that it could not appear to me in the same way if it were false. They are involved in the same mistake when under stress of truth's upbraiding they desire to distinguish between things perceived and things perspicuous, and try to prove that there is such a thing as something perspicuous which although received at the same time (which might turn one's attention away from it, περισπικούς) is found to be consistent with them.
aliquid perspicui, verum illud quidem impressum in animo atque mente, neque tamen id percipi atque comprehendi posse. Quo enim modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliquid cum possit accidere ut id quod nigrum sit album esse videatur, aut quo modo ista aut perspicua dicemus aut impressa subtiliter cum sit incertum vere inaniterne moveatur? Ita neque color neque corpus nec veritas nec argumentum nec sensus neque perspicuum ullum relinquitur. Ex hoc illud iis usu venire solet ut quicquid dixerint a quibusdam interrogentur: 'Ergo istuc quidem percipis?' Sed qui ita interrogant, ab iis irridentur; non enim urgent ut coarguant neminem ulla de re posse contendere nec adseverare sine aliqua eius rei quam sibi quisque placere dicit certa et propria nota. Quod est igitur istuc vestrum probabile? Nam si quod cuique occurrit et primo quasi aspectu probabile videtur id confirmatur, quid eo levius? Sin ex circumspectione aliqua et accurata consideratione quod visum sit id se dicent sequi, tamen exitum non habebunt, primum quia iis visis inter quae nihil interest aequaliter omnibus abrogatur fides; deinde, cum dicant posse accidere sapienti ut cum omnia fecerit diligentissimeque circumspexerit exsistat aliquid quod et veri simile videatur et absit longissime a vero, ne si\(^1\) magnam partem quidem, ut solent

\(^1\) ne si *Mdv.*: si *codd.*
a true imprint on the mind and intellect is nevertheless incapable of being perceived and grasped. For how can you maintain that something is perspicuously white if it can possibly occur that a thing that is black may appear white, or how shall we pronounce the things in question either perspicuous or accurately imprinted if it is uncertain whether the mental experience is true or unfounded? In this way neither colour nor solidity nor truth nor argument nor sensation nor anything perspicuous is left. This is why it is their usual experience that, whatever they say, some people ask them 'Then anyway you do perceive that, do you?' But they laugh at those who put this question; for their effort is not aimed at proving that it cannot ever happen that a man may make a positive assertion about a thing without there being some definite and peculiar mark attached to the thing that he in particular professes to accept. What then is the probability that your school talk about? For if what a particular person happens to encounter, and almost at first glance thinks probable, is accepted as certain, what could be more frivolous than that? While if they assert that they follow a sense-presentation after some circumspection and careful consideration, nevertheless they will not find a way out, first because presentations that have no difference between them are all of them equally refused credence; secondly, when they say that it can happen to the wise man that after he has taken every precaution and explored the position most carefully something may yet arise that while appearing to resemble truth is really very far remote from truth, they will be unable to trust themselves, even if they advance at all events a large part of the way,
dicere, ad verum ipsum aut quam proxime accedant, confidere sibi poterunt. Ut enim confidant, notum iis esse debetur insigne veri, quo obscurato\textsuperscript{1} et oppresso quod tandem verum sibi videbuntur attingere? Quid autem tam absurde dici potest quam cum ita loquuntur, 'Est hoc quidem illius rei signum aut argumentum, et ea re id sequor, sed fieri potest ut id quod significatur aut falsum sit aut nihil sit omnino'? Sed de perceptione hactenus; si quis enim ea quae dicta sunt labefactare volet, facile etiam absentibus nobis veritas se ipsa defendet.

37 XII. "His satis cognitis quae iam explicata sunt, nunc de adsensione atque adprobatione, quam Graeci συγκατάθεσιν vocant, pauca dicemus—non quo non latus locus sit, sed paulo ante iacta sunt fundamenta. Nam cum vim quae esset in sensibus explicabamus, simul illud aperiatur, comprehendi multa et percipi sensibus, quod fieri sine adsensione non potest. Deinde cum inter inanimum et animal hoc maxime intersit quod animal agit aliquid (nihil enim agens ne cogitari quidem potest quale sit), aut ei sensus adimendus est aut ea quae est in nostra potestate sita reddenda adsensio. At vero animus quodam modo eripitur iis quos neque sentire neque adsentiri volunt; ut enim necesse est lancem in libra\textsuperscript{2} ponderibus im-

\textsuperscript{1} Lambinus: obscuro codd.  
\textsuperscript{2} Libram codd. nonnulli.

a i.e., different from what it seems.  
b i.e., the mental acceptance of a sensation as truly representing the object; cf. i. 40.  
\textsuperscript{c} § 20.
as they are in the habit of saying, towards the actual truth, or indeed come as near to it as possible. For to enable them to trust their judgement, it will be necessary for the characteristic mark of truth to be known to them, and if this be obscured and suppressed, what truth pray will they suppose that they attain to? What language moreover could be more absurd than their formula, 'It is true that this is a token or a proof of yonder object, and therefore I follow it, but it is possible that the object that it indicates may be either false or entirely non-existent'? But enough on the subject of perception; for if anybody desires to upset the doctrines stated, truth will easily conduct her own defence, even if we decline the brief.

XII. "Now that we are sufficiently acquainted with the matters already unfolded, let us say a few words on the subject of 'assent' or approval (termed in Greek *syncatathesis*)—not that it is not a wide topic, but the foundations have been laid a little time back. For while we were explaining the power residing in the senses, it was at the same time disclosed that many things are grasped and perceived by the senses, which cannot happen without the act of assent. Again, as the greatest difference between an inanimate and an animate object is that an animate object performs some action (for an entirely inactive animal is an utterly inconceivable thing), either it must be denied the possession of sensation or it must be assigned a faculty of assenting as a voluntary act. But on the other hand persons who refuse to exercise either sensation or assent are in a manner robbed of the mind itself; for as the scale of a balance must necessarily sink when weights are put in it, so the mind must necessarily yield to clear
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positis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere: nam quo modo non potest animal ullum non adpetere id quod accommodatum ad naturam adpareat (Graeci id oikeiovi appellant), sic non potest obiectam rem perspicuam non adprobare. Quamquam, si illa de quibus disputatum est vera sunt, nihil attinet de adsensione omnino loqui; qui enim quid percipit adsentitur statim. Sed haec etiam sequuntur, nec memoriam sine adsensione posse constare nec notitias rerum nec artes; idque quod maximum est, ut sit aliquid in nostra potestate, in eo qui rei nulli adsentietur non erit: ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis? Maxime autem absurdum vitia in ipsorum esse potestate neque peccare quemquam nisi adsensione, hoc idem in virtute non esse, cuius omnis constantia et firmitas ex iis rebus constat quibus adsensa est et quas adprobavit. Omninoque ante videri aliquid quam agamus necesse est eique quod visum sit adsentiatur.\(^1\) Quare qui aut visum aut adsensum tollit, is omnem actionem tollit e vita.

XIII. “Nunc ea videamus quae contra ab his disputari solent. Sed prius potestis totius eorum rationis quasi fundamenta cognoscere. Componunt igitur primum artem quandam de iis quae visa dicimus, eorumque et vim et genera definiunt, in his quale sit id quod percipi et comprehendi possit, totidem verbis quot Stoici. Deinde illa exponunt duo quae

\(^1\) adsentiamur Davies: adsentiri Labinus.

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* See § 30 n.  
\(^b\) See i. 32 n.  
\(^c\) Quasi marks a tentative rendering of themelioi as does quandam just below one of tēxνη φαντασίων; and apparently also quasi continet renders some other Greek technical term, perhaps svnēchev; cf. §§ 20, 107.  
\(^d\) Id . . . possit = tò katalηπτόν.
presentations: since just as no animal can refrain from seeking to get a thing that is presented to its view as suited to its nature (the Greeks term it oikeion), so the mind cannot refrain from giving approval to a clear object when presented to it. Nevertheless, assuming the truth of the positions discussed, all talk whatever about assent is beside the mark; for he who perceives anything assents immediately. But there also follow a the points that without assent memory, and mental concepts of objects, and sciences, are impossible; and most important of all, granting that some freedom of the will exists, none will exist in one who assents to nothing; where then is virtue, if nothing rests with ourselves?

And what is most absurd is that men's vices should be in their own power and that nobody should sin except with assent, but that the same should not be true in the case of virtue, whose sole consistency and strength is constituted by the things to which it has given its assent and so to say approval. b And speaking generally, before we act it is essential for us to experience some presentation, and for our assent to be given to the presentation; therefore one who abolishes either presentation or assent abolishes all action out of life.

XIII. Now let us examine the arguments usually advanced by this school on the other side. But before that, this is an opportunity for you to learn the 'foundations' c of their whole system. Well, they begin by constructing a 'science of presentations' (as we render the term), and define their nature and classes, and in particular the nature of that which can be perceived and grasped, d at as great a length as do the Stoics. Then they set out the two propositions

(5) The New Academy's theory expounded: true sensations are indistinguishable from false ones, so perception cannot be trusted.
quasi contineant omnem hanc quaestionem: quae ita videantur ut etiam alia eodem modo videri possint nec in iis quicquam intersit, non posse eorum alia percipi, alia non percipi; nihil interesse autem, non modo si omni ex parte eiusdem modi sint, sed etiam si discerni non possint. Quibus positis unius argumenti conclusione tota ab iis causa comprehenditur; composita autem ea conclusio sic est: 'Eorum quae videntur alia vera sunt, alia falsa; et quod falsum est id percipi non potest. Quod autem verum visum est id omne tale est ut eiusdem modi falsum etiam possit videri; et quae visa sunt\(^1\) eius modi ut in iis nihil intersit, non potest\(^2\) accidere et eorum alia percipi possint, alia non possint. Nullum igitur est visum quod percipi possit.' Quae autem sumunt ut concludant id quod volunt, ex his duo sibi putant concedi, neque enim quisquam repugnat: ea sunt haec, quae visa falsa sint, ea percipi non posse, et alterum, inter quae visa nihil intersit, ex iis non posse alia talia esse ut percipi possint, alia ut non possint. Reliqua vero multa et varia oratione defendunt, quae sunt item duo, unum, quae videantur, eorum alia vera esse, alia falsa, alterum, omne visum

\(^1\) edd.: sint codd.  \(^2\) edd.: posse codd.
that 'hold together' the whole of this investigation, namely, (1) when certain objects present an appearance of such a kind that other objects also could present the same appearance without there being any difference between these presentations, it is impossible that the one set of objects should be capable of being perceived and the other set not capable; but (2), not only in a case in which they are alike in every particular is there no difference between them, but also in a case in which they cannot be distinguished apart. Having set out these propositions, they include the whole issue within a single syllogistic argument; this argument is constructed as follows: 'Some presentations are true, others false; and what is false cannot be perceived. But a true presentation is invariably of such a sort that a false presentation also could be of exactly the same sort; and among presentations of such a sort that there is no difference between them, it cannot occur that some are capable of being perceived and others are not. Therefore there is no presentation that is capable of being perceived.'

Now of the propositions that they take as premisses from which to infer the desired conclusion, two they assume to be granted, and indeed nobody disputes them: these are, that false presentations cannot be perceived, and the second, that of presentations that have no difference between them it is impossible that some should be such as to be capable of being perceived and others such as to be incapable. But the remaining premisses they defend with a long and varied discourse, these also being two, one, that of the objects of presentations some are true, others false, and the other, that every presentation arising from a true object is
quod sit a vero tale esse quale etiam a falsō possit esse. Haec duo proposita non praetervolant, sed ita dilatat ut non mediocrum curam adhibeant et diligentiam; dividunt enim in partes, et eas quidem magnas, primum in sensus, deinde in ea quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt, tum perveniunt ad eam partem ut ne ratione quidem et coniectura ulla res percipi possit. Haec autem universa concidunt etiam minūtius; ut enim de sensibus hesterno sermone vidistis, item faciunt de reliquis, in singulisque rebus, quas in minima disperiant, volunt efficere iis omnibus quae visa sint veris adiuncta esse falsa quae a veris nihil differant; ea cum talia sint, non posse comprehendi.

XIV. "Hanc ego subtilitatem philosophia quidem dignissimam iudico sed ab eorum causa qui ita disserunt remotissimam. Definitiones enim et partitiones, et horum luminibus utens oratio, tum similitudines dissimilitudinesque et earum tenuis et acuta distinctio fidentium est hominum illa vera et firma et certa esse quae tutentur, non eorum qui clament nihil magis vera illa esse quam falsa. Quid enim agant si, cum aliquid definierint, roget eos quispiam num illa definitio possit in aliam rem transferri quamlubet? Si posse dixerint, quid dicere habeant cur illa vera definitio sit? si negaverint, fatendum sit, quoniam vel illa vera definitio transferri

\[\text{Lumina, a technical term of rhetoric, used to translate } \sigmaχ\acute{\iota}ματα.\]

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of such a nature that it could also arise from a false object. These two propositions they do not skim over, but develop with a considerable application of care and industry; they divide them into sections, and those of wide extent: first, sensations; next, inferences from sensations and from general experience, which they deem to lack clarity; then they come to the section proving the impossibility of perceiving anything even by means of reasoning and inference. These general propositions they cut up into still smaller divisions, employing the same method with all the other topics as you saw in yesterday’s discourse that they do with sensation, and aiming at proving in the case of each subject, minutely subdivided, that all true presentations are coupled with false ones in no way differing from the true, and that this being the nature of sense-presentations, to comprehend them is impossible.

XIV. “In my own judgement this minuteness although no doubt highly worthy of philosophy is at the same time absolutely remote from the position of the authors of this line of argument. For definitions and partitions, and language employing figures of this class, as also comparisons and distinctions and their subtle and minute classification, are the weapons of persons who are confident that the doctrines they are defending are true and established and certain, not of those who loudly proclaim that they are no more true than false. For what would they do if, when they have defined something, somebody were to ask them whether that particular definition can be carried over to any other thing you like? If they say it can, what proof could they put forward that the definition is true? if they say it cannot, they would have to
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non possit in falsum, quod ea definitione explicitur id percipi posse, quod minime illi volunt. Eadem
dici poterunt in omnibus partibus. Si enim dicent ea
de quibus disserent se dilucide perspicere, nec ulla
communione visorum impediri, comprendere ea se
posse fatebuntur. Sin autem negabunt vera visa a
falsis posse distinguiri, qui poterunt longius progridi?
occurretur enim sicut occursum est; nam concludi
argumentum non potest nisi iis quae ad concludendum
sumpta erunt ita probatis ut falsa eiusdem modi
nulla possint esse: ergo si rebus comprensis et
perceptis nisa et progressa ratio hoc efficiet, nihil
posse comprehendi, quid potest reperiri quod ipsum
sibi repugnet magis? Cumque ipsa natura accu-
ratae orationis hoc profiteatur, se aliquid patefac-
turam quod non appareat et quo id facilius adsequatur
adhibituram et sensus et ea quae perspicua sint,
qualis est istorum oratio qui omnia non tam esse
quam videri volunt? Maxime autem convincuntur
cum haec duo pro congruentibus sumunt tam vehe-
menter repugnantia, primum esse quaedam falsa
visa, quod cum volunt declarant quaedam esse vera,
deinde ibidem inter falsa visa et vera nihil interesse:

* i.e., a thing misconceived (not 'an unreal thing').

b Cf. § 34 init.
admit that, since even this true definition cannot be applied to a false object, the object explained by the definition can be perceived, and this they will not allow at any price. The same argument it will be possible to employ at every section of the discussion. For if they say that they can see through the matters that they are discussing with complete clearness, and are not hampered by any overlapping of presentations, they will confess that they can 'comprehend' them. But if they maintain that true presentations cannot be distinguished from false ones, how will they be able to advance any further? for they will be met as they were met before; since valid inference is not possible unless you accept the propositions taken as premisses as so fully proved that there cannot possibly be any false propositions that resemble them: therefore if a process of reasoning that has carried through its procedure on the basis of things grasped and perceived arrives at the conclusion that nothing can be grasped, what more self-destructive argument could be discovered? And when the very nature of accurate discourse professes the intention of revealing something that is not apparent, and of employing sensations and manifest presentations to facilitate the attainment of this result, what are we to make of the language of these thinkers who hold that everything does not so much exist as seem to exist? But they are most completely refuted when they assume as mutually consistent these two propositions that are so violently discrepant, first, that some presentations are false, a view that clearly implies that some are true, and then in the same breath that there is no difference between false presentations and true ones: but your first assump-
at primum sumpseras tamquam interesset—ita priori posterius, posteriori superius non iungitur.

\[45\] "Sed progrediamur longius et ita agamus ut nihil nobis adsentati esse videamur; quaeque ab his dicuntur sic persequamur ut nihil in praeteritis relinquamus. Primum igitur perspicuitas illa quam diximus satis magnam habet vim ut ipsa per sese ea quae sint nobis ita ut sint indicet. Sed tamen ut maneamus in perspicuis firmius et constantius, maiore quadam opus est vel arte vel diligentia ne ab iis quae clara sint ipsa per sese quasi praestigiis quibusdam et captionibus depellamur. Nam qui voluit subvenire erroribus Epicurus\(^1\) iis qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem, dixitque sapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate seiungere, nihil profecit, ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.

\[46\] XV. "Quam ob rem cum duae causae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus adversentur, auxilia totidem sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim primum quod parum defigunt animos et intendunt in ea quae perspicua sunt ut quanta luce ea circumfusa sint possint agnoscere; alterum est quod fallacibus et captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti atque decepti quidam, cum eas dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet igitur et ea quae pro perspicuitate responderi possunt in promptu habere,

\(^1\) [Epicurus] Bailer.

\(^a\) Quasi quibusdam mark praestigiis as a translation of σοφίαματα, paraphrased by captionibus.
tion implied that there is a difference—thus your major premiss and your minor are inconsistent with one another.

"But let us advance further and proceed in such a manner as not to appear to have been unduly partial to our own views; and let us go through the doctrines of these thinkers so thoroughly as to leave nothing passed over. First then what we have termed 'perspicuity' has sufficient force of itself to indicate to us things that are as they are. But nevertheless, so that we may abide by things that are perspicuous with more firmness and constancy, we require some further exercise of method or of attention to save ourselves from being dislodged by 'trickeries' and captious arguments from positions that are clear in themselves. For Epicurus who desired to come to the relief of the errors that appear to upset our power of knowing the truth, and who said that the separation of opinion from perspicuous truth was the function of the wise man, carried matters no further, for he entirely failed to do away with the error connected with mere opinion.

"Therefore inasmuch as things perspicuous and evident are encountered by two obstacles, it is necessary to array against them the same number of assistances. The first obstacle is that people do not fix and concentrate their minds on the perspicuous objects enough to be able to recognize in how much light they are enveloped; the second is that certain persons, being entrapped and taken in by fallacious and captious arguments, when they are unable to refute them abandon the truth. It is therefore necessary to have ready the counter-arguments, of which we have already spoken, that can be advanced in
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de quibus iam diximus, et esse armatos ut occurrere possumus interrogationibus eorum captionesque dis-47 cutere, quod deinceps facere constituì. Exponam igitur generatim argumenta eorum, quoniam ipsi etiam illi solent non confuse loqui. Primum conantur ostendere multa posse videri esse quae omnino nulla sint, cum animi inaniter moveantur eodem modo rebus iis quae nullae sint ut iis quae sint. Nam cum dicatis, inquiunt, visa quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea quae in somnis videantur quaeque oraculis, auspiciis, extis declarantur (haec enim aiunt probari Stoicis quos contra disputant), quaerunt quonam modo falsa visa quae sint ea deus efficere possit probabilia, quae autem plane proxime ad verum accedant efficere non possit, aut si ea quoque possit, cur, illa non possit quae perdifficiliter,1 internoscantur tamen, et si haec, 48 cur non inter quae nihil sit2 omnino. Deinde cum mens moveatur ipsa per sese, ut et ea declarant quae cogitatione depingimus et ea quae vel dormientibus vel furiosis videntur non numquam, veri simile est sic etiam mentem moveri ut non modo non internoscat vera illa visa sint anne falsa sed ut in iis nihil intersit omnino: ut si qui tremerent et exalbescerent vel ipsi per se motu mentis aliquo vel objecta terribili

1 perdifficiliter <internoscantur>? Reid.
2 intersit Müller.
ACADEMICA, II. (Lucullus), xv.

defence of perspicuity, and to be armed so that we may be able to meet their arguments and shatter their captions; and this I have decided on as my next step. I will therefore set out their arguments in classified form, since even they themselves make a practice of orderly exposition. They first attempt to show the possibility that many things may appear to exist that are absolutely non-existent, since the mind is deceptively affected by non-existent objects in the same manner as it is affected by real ones. For, they say, when your school asserts that some presentations are sent by the deity—dreams for example, and the revelations furnished by oracles, auspices and sacrifices (for they assert that the Stoics against whom they are arguing accept these manifestations)—how possibly, they ask, can the deity have the power to render false presentations probable and not have the power to render probable those which approximate absolutely most closely to the truth? or else, if he is able to render these also probable, why cannot he render probable those which are distinguishable, although only with extreme difficulty, from false presentations? and if these, why not those which do not differ from them at all? Then, since the mind is capable of entirely self-originated motion, as is manifest by our faculty of mental imagination and by the visions that sometimes appear to men either when asleep or mad, it is probable that the mind may also be set in motion in such a manner that not only it cannot distinguish whether the presentations in question are true or false but that there really is no difference at all between them: just as if people were to shiver and turn pale either of themselves as a result of some mental emotion or in consequence
re extrinsecus, nihil ut esset qui distinguereetur tremor
ille et pallor neque ut quicquam interesset inter
intestinum et oblatum. Postremo si nulla visa sunt
probabilia quae falsa sint, alia ratio est; sin autem
sunt, cur non etiam quae non facile internoscantur?
cur non ut plane nihil intersit? praesertim cum
ipsi dicatis sapientem in furore sustinere se ab omni
adsensu quia nulla in visis distinctio appareat.

49 XVI. "Ad has omnes visiones inanes Antiochus
quidem et permulta dicebat et erat de hac una re
unius diei disputatio; mihi autem non idem facien-
dum puto, sed ipsa capita dicenda. Et primum qui-
dem hoc reprehendendum quod captiosissimo genere
interrogationis utuntur, quod genus minime in philo-
sophia probari solet, cum aliquid minutatim et gra-
datim additur aut demitur. Soritas hoc vocant, quia
acervum efficiunt uno addito grano. Viciosum sane
et captiosum genus! Sic enim adscenditis: 'Si tale
visum obiectum est a deo dormienti ut probabile sit,
cur non etiam ut valde veri simile? cur deinde non
ut difficiliter a vero internoscatur? deinde ut ne
internoscatur quidem? postremo ut nihil inter hoc

a Apparently the technical term is jestingly used to de-
scribe the arguments just summarized.

b σωφρετής συλλογισμός, the conclusion of one syllogism
forming the major premiss of the next. Each step may
either add a small point, as in the example above, or sub-
tract one, as in the practical illustration of the fallacy that
gave it its name (ratio ruentis aerui, Horace): from a heap
of grain one grain at a time is taken away—at what point
does it cease to be a heap?
of encountering some terrifying external object, with nothing to distinguish between the two kinds of shivering and pallor, and without any difference between the internal state of feeling and the one that came from without. Lastly, if no false presentations at all are probable, it is another story; but if some are, why are not even those that are difficult to distinguish? why not those that are so much like true ones that there is absolutely no difference between them? especially as you yourselves say that the wise man when in a state of frenzy restrains himself from all assent because no distinction between presentations is visible to him.

49 XVI. "In answer to all these 'unfounded sense-presentations' a Antiochus indeed used to advance a great many arguments, and also he used to devote one whole day's debate to this single topic; but I do not think that I had better do the same, but state merely the heads of the argument. And as a first point one must criticize them for employing an exceedingly captious kind of argument, of a sort that is usually by no means approved of in philosophy—the method of proceeding by minute steps of gradual addition or withdrawal. They call this class of arguments soritae b because by adding a single grain at a time they make a heap. It is certainly an erroneous and captious kind of argument! for you go on mounting up in this way: 'If a presentation put by the deity before a man asleep is of such a character that it is probable, why not also of such a character that it is extremely like a true one? then, why not such that it can with difficulty be distinguished from a true one? then, that it cannot even be distinguished? finally, that there is no difference between the one and the other?"
et illud intersit? ’ Huc si perveneris me tibi primum quidque concedente, meum vitium fuerit; sin ipse tua sponte processeris, tuum. Quis enim tibi dederit aut omnia deum posse aut ita facturum esse si possit? quo modo autem sumis ut, si quid cui simile esse possit, sequatur ut etiam difficiliter internosci possit? deinde, ut ne internosci quidem? postremo, ut eadem sint? ut, si lupi canibus similes, eosdem dices ad extremum. Et quidem honestis similia sunt quaedam non honesta et bonis non bona et artificiosis minime artificiosa; quid dubitamus igitur adfirmare nihil inter haec interesse? Ne repugnantia quidem videmus? nihil est enim quod de suo genere in aliud genus transferri possit. At si efficeretur ut inter visa differentium generum nihil interesset, reperirentur quae et in suo genere essent et in alieno; quod fieri qui potest? Omnium deinde inanimum visorum una depulsio est, sive illa cogitatione informantur, quod fieri solere concedimus, sive in quiete sive per vinum sive per insaniam: nam ab omnibus eiusdem modi visis perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus. Quis enim, cum sibi fingit aliquid et cogitatione depingit, non simul ac se ipse com- movit atque ad se revocavit sentit quid intersit inter
If you reach this conclusion owing to my yielding to you each successive step, the fault will have been mine; but if you get there of your own accord, it will be yours. For who will have granted you either that the deity is omnipotent, or that even if he can do as described he will? and how do you make such assumptions that, if it is possible for \( x \) to resemble \( y \), it will follow that only with difficulty can \( x \) and \( y \) be known apart? and then, that they cannot even be known apart? and finally, that they are identical? for example, if wolves are like dogs, you will end by saying that they are identical. And it is a fact that some honourable things are like dishonourable ones and some good things like not good ones and some artistic things like inartistic ones; why do we hesitate therefore to aver that there is no difference between these? Have we no eye even for incongruities? for there is nothing that cannot be carried over from its own class into another class. But if it were proved that there is no difference between presentations of different classes, we should find presentations that belonged both to their own class and to one foreign to them; how can this possibly occur?

Consequently there is only one way of routing the difficulty about unreal presentations, whether depicted by the imagination, which we admit frequently to take place, or in slumber or under the influence of wine or of insanity: we shall declare that all presentations of this nature are devoid of perspicuity, to which we are bound to cling tooth and nail. For who when feigning to himself an imaginary picture of some object, the moment he bestirs himself and recalls his self-consciousness does not at once perceive the difference between perspicuous presentations
perspicua et inania? Eadem ratio est somniorum. Num censes Ennium cum in hortis cum Servio Galba vicino suo ambulavisset dixisse: 'Visus sum mihi cum Galba ambulare'? At cum somniavit, ita narravit:

visus Homerus adesse poëta.

Idemque in Epicharmo:

Nam videbar somniare med ego esse mortuom.

Itaque simul ut experrecti sumus visa illa contemnimus neque ita habemus ut ea quae in foro gessimus. 52 XVII. "At enim dum videntur eadem est in somnis species eorumque quae vigilantes videmus! Primum interest; sed id omittamus, illud enim dicitum, non eandem esse vim neque integritatem dormientium et vigilantium nec mente nec sensu. Ne vinulenti quidem quae faciunt eadem adprobatione faciunt qua sobrii: dubitant, haesitant, revocant se interdum, iisque quae videntur imbécillos adsentiantur cumque edormiverunt illa visa quam levia fuerint intellegunt. Quod idem contingit insaniis, ut et incipientes furere sentiant et dicant aliquid quod non sit id videri sibi, et cum relaxentur sentiant atque illa dicant Alcmaeonis:

1 Hermann: eorum codd.

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a The Italian Greek (239–169 B.C.) who initiated Latin poetry in Greek metres. He adapted Attic tragedies, e.g. Alcmaeon, quoted §§ 52, 89, and wrote Roman ones; but his greatest work was Annales, an epic of Roman history from which comes the part of a hexameter quoted. Cf. § 88.

b The chief Dorian comic poet, c. 540–450 B.C., lived at Hiero's court at Syracuse.

c The character in Ennius's tragedy: see § 51 n. and § 89.
ACADEMICA, II. (Lucullus), xvi.—xvii.

and unreal ones? The same applies to dreams. Do you fancy that when Ennius had been walking in his grounds with his neighbour Servius Galba he used to say, 'Methought I was walking with Galba'? But when he had a dream he told the story in this way:

Methought the poet Homer stood beside me.

And the same in the case of Epicharmus:

For methought I had a dream that I myself was dead and gone.

And so as soon as we wake up we make light of that kind of visions, and do not deem them on a par with the actual experiences that we had in the forum.

52 XVII. "But you will say that at the time when we are experiencing them the visions we have in sleep have the same appearance as the visual presentations that we experience while awake! To begin with, there is a difference between them; but do not let us dwell on that, for our point is that when we are asleep we have not the same mental or sensory power and fulness of function as we have when awake. Even men acting under the influence of wine do not act with the same decision as they do when sober: they are doubtful and hesitating and sometimes pull themselves up, and they give a more feeble assent to their sense-presentations and, when they have slept it off, realize how unsubstantial those presentations were. The same happens to the insane: at the beginning of their attack they are conscious that they are mad, and say that something is appearing to them that is not real; and also when the attack is subsiding they are conscious of it, and say things like the words of Alcmaeon:
Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit cum oculorum aspectu.

At enim ipse sapiens sustinet se in furore ne adprobet falsa pro veris. Et alias quidem saepe, si aut in sensibus ipsius¹ est aliqua forte gravitas aut tarditas, aut obscuriora sunt quae videntur, aut a perspiciendo temporis brevitate excluditur. Quamquam totum hoc, sapientem aliquando sustinere adsensionem, contra vos est; si enim inter visa nihil interesset, aut semper sustineret aut numquam. Sed ex hoc genere toto perspici potest levitas orationis eorum, qui omnia cupiunt confundere. Quaerimus gravitatis, constantiae, firmitatis, sapientiae iudicium, utimur exemplis somniantium, furiosorum, ebriosorum. Illud attendimus in hoc omni genere quam inconstantier loquamur? Non enim proferremus vino aut somno oppressos aut mente captos tam absurde ut tum diceremus interesse inter vigilantium visa et sobriorum et sanorum et eorum qui essent aliter adfecti, tum nihil interesse. Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta, quod nolunt (ea dico incerta quae ἄ хотелα Graeci)? si enim res se ita habeant ut nihil intersit utrum ita cui videantur² ut insano an sano, cui possit exploratum esse de sua sanitate?

¹ ipsis? Reid.
² ed.: videatur codd.
ACADEMICA, II. (Lucullus), xvii.

But my mind agrees in no way with the vision of my eyes.

But you will say that the wise man in an attack of madness restrains himself from accepting false presentations as true. So indeed he often does on other occasions, if his own senses happen to contain an element of heaviness or slowness, or if the presentations are rather obscure, or if he is debarred by lack of time from a close scrutiny. Although this admission, that the wise man sometimes withholds his assent, goes wholly against your school; for if presentations were indistinguishable, he would either withhold his assent always or never. But out of all this what is 'perspicuous' is the lack of substance in the case put by these thinkers, who aspire to introduce universal confusion. What we are looking for is a canon of judgement proper to dignity and consistency, to firmness and wisdom, what we find are instances taken from dreamers, lunatics and drunkards. Do we notice in all this department how inconsistent that talk is? If we did, we should not bring forward people who are tipsy or fast asleep or out of their minds in such a ridiculous fashion as at one moment to say that there is a difference between the presentations of the waking and sober and sane and of those in other conditions, and at another moment to say that there is no difference. Do they not even see that they make everything uncertain—a position which they repudiate (I use 'uncertain' to translate the Greek adēla)? for if objects are so constituted that it makes no difference whether they appear to anybody as they do to a madman or as they do to a sane person, who can be satisfied of his own sanity? to desire to produce this state of affairs is in
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quod velle efficere non mediocris insaniae est. Similitudines vero aut geminorum aut signorum anulis impressorum pueriliter consequentur. Quis enim nostrum similitudines negat esse, cum eae plurimis in rebus appareant? sed si satis est ad tollendam cognitionem similia esse multa multorum, cur eo non estis contenti, praesertim concedentibus nobis, et cur id potius contenditis quod rerum natura non patitur, ut non in suo quidque genere sit tale quale est nec sit in duobus aut pluribus nulla re differensulla communitas? Ut si sint et ova ovorum et apes simillimae, quid pugnas igitur? Aut quid tibi vis in geminis? conceditur enim similis esse, quo contentus esse potueras: tu autem vis eosdem plane esse, non similis, quod fieri nullo modo potest. Dein confugis ad physicos, eos qui maxime in Academia inridentur, a quibus ne tu quidem iam te abstinebis, et ait Democritum dicere innumerabiles esse mundos, et quidem sic quosdam inter sese non solum similis sed undique perfecte et absolute pares ut inter eos nihil prorsus intersit [et eodem innumerabilia], itemque homines. Deinde postulas ut, si mundus ita sit par alteri mundo ut inter eos ne minimum quidem intersit, concedatur tibi ut in hoc quoque nostro mundo aliquid alicui sic sit par ut nihil differat, nihil

1 non in Halm: non codd.  2 si Müller: sibi codd.  
3 pares Christ: ita pares codd.  4 eos edd. 
5 secl. Halm.

* Ut non depends on both contenditis and non patitur and introduces both sit tale quale est and nec situlla communitas. The assertion refuted by nature is that uniqueness and heterogeneity are not universal (nulla re differens renders ἀξιόφιορος, and communitas ἐπιμυῖα or ἀπαραλλαξία, 'un distinguishableness,' cf. § 34).
itself no inconsiderable mark of insanity. But the way in which they harp on cases of resemblance between twins or between the seals stamped by signet-rings is childish. For which of us denies that resemblances exist, since they are manifest in ever so many things? but if the fact that many things are like many other things is enough to do away with knowledge, why are you not content with that, especially as we admit it, and why do you prefer to urge a contention utterly excluded by the nature of things, denying that everything is what it is in a class of its own and that two or more objects never possess a common character differing in nothing at all? For example, granting that eggs are extremely like eggs and bees like bees, why therefore do you do battle? Or what are you at in this matter of twins? for it is granted that two twins are alike, and that might have satisfied you; but you want them to be not alike but downright identical, which is absolutely impossible. Then you fly for refuge to the natural philosophers, the favourite butts of ridicule in the Academy, from whom even you can no longer keep your hands, and you declare that Democritus says that there are a countless number of worlds, and what is more that some of them to such an extent not merely resemble but completely and absolutely match each other in every detail that there is positively no difference between them, and that the same is true of human beings. Then you demand that if one world so completely matches another world that there is not even the smallest difference between them, it shall be granted to you that in this world of ours likewise some one thing so completely matches some other thing that there is no difference
intersit; cur enim, inquies, cum ex illis individuis unde omnia Democritus gigni adfirmat, in reliquis mundis et in iis quidem innumerabilibus innumerabiles Q. Lutatii Catuli non modo possint esse sed etiam sint, in hoc tanto mundo Catulus alter non possit effici?

56 XVIII. "Primum quidem me ad Democritum vocas; cui non adsentior potiusque refello propter id quod dilucide docetur a politioribus physicis, singularum rerum singulas proprietates esse. Fac enim antiquos illos Servilios, qui gemini fuerunt, tam similes quam dicuntur: num censes etiam eodem fuisse? Non cognoscebantur foris, at domi; non ab alienis, at a suis. An non videmus hoc usu venisse ut, quos numquam putassemus a nobis internosci posse, eos consuetudine adhibita tam facile internosceremus uti ne minimum quidem similes esse viderentur? Hic pugnes licet, non repugnabo; quin etiam concedam illum ipsum sapientem de quo omnis hic sermo est, cum ei res similes occurrant quas non habeat dinotatas, retenturum adsensum nec umquam ulli viso adsensurum nisi quod tale fuerit quale falsum esse non possit. Sed et ad ceteras res habet quandam artem qua vera a falsis possit distinguere, et ad similitudines istas usus adhibendus

\[^{1}\text{Davies : venire codd.}\]

\[^{a}\text{The Stoics, cf. § 85.}\]
or distinction between them; for what is the reason, you will say, why whereas in the rest of the worlds, countless numbers as they are, there not only can be but actually are a countless number of Quintus Lutatius Catuluses, arisen out of those atoms out of which Democritus declares that everything comes into existence, yet in this vast world another Catulus cannot possibly be produced?

XVIII. "In the first place indeed you summon me before Democritus; whose opinion I do not accept but rather reject, on the ground of the fact that is lucidly proved by more accomplished natural philosophers, that particular objects possess particular properties. For suppose that the famous Servilius twins of old days did resemble each other as completely as they are said to have done: surely you do not think that they were actually identical? Out of doors they were not known apart, but at home they were; they were not by strangers, but they were by their own people. Do we not see that it has come about that persons whom we thought we should never be able to know apart we have come by the exercise of habit to know apart so easily that they did not appear to be even in the least degree alike? At this point although you may show fight I shall not fight back; indeed I will actually allow that the wise man himself who is the subject of all this discussion, when he encounters similar things that he has not got distinguished apart, will reserve his assent, and will never assent to any presentation unless it is of such a description as could not belong to a false presentation. But just as he has a definite technique applicable to all other objects to enable him to distinguish the true from the false, so to the resemblances you
est: ut mater geminos internoscit consuetudine oculorum, sic tu internosces si adsueveris. Videsne ut in proverbio sit ovorum inter se similitudo? tamen hoc accepimus, Deli fuisse complures salvis illis qui gallinas alere permultas quaestus causa solerent; ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae id gallina 58 peperisset dicere solebant. Neque id est contra nos, nam nobis satis est ova illa non internoscere, nihil enim magis adsentiri par est hoc illud esse quasi inter illa omnino nihil interesset; habeo enim regulam ut talia visa vera iudicem qualia falsa esse non possint; ab hac mihi non licet transversum, ut aiunt, digitum discedere, ne confundam omnia. Veri enim et falsi non modo cognitio sed etiam natura tolletur si nihil erit quod inter sit, ut etiam illud absurdum sit quod interdum soletis dicere, cum visa in animos imprimantur, non vos id dicere, inter ipsas impressiones nihil interesse, sed inter species et quasdam formas eorum. Quasi vero non specie visa iudicentur, quae fidem nullam habebunt sublata veri et falsi nota! 59 Illud vero perabsurdum quod dicitis probabilia vos sequi si nulla re impediamini. Primum qui potestis non impediri cum a veris falsa non distant? deinde

:quasi Madvig: quam si codd.

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a Species here combines the sense of 'appearances' with that of 'kinds' which it still bears in zoology; it translates eτόν, and quasdam marks formas as an explanatory synonym.
adduce he has to apply practice: just as a mother knows her twins apart by having familiarized her eyes, so you will know them apart if you habituate yourself. Are you aware that the likeness of one egg to another is proverbial? yet we have been told that at Delos at the time of its prosperity a number of people were in the habit of keeping large numbers of hens for trade purposes; these poultry-keepers used to be able to tell which hen had laid an egg by merely looking at it. Nor does that go against us, for we are content not to be able to know those eggs apart, since to agree that this egg is the same as that egg, is nevertheless not the same thing as if there really were no distinction between them; for I possess a standard enabling me to judge presentations to be true when they have a character of a sort that false ones could not have; from that standard I may not diverge a finger's breadth, as the saying is, lest I should cause universal confusion. For not only the knowledge but even the nature of true and false will be done away with if there is no difference between them, so that even the remark that you have a way of occasionally making will be absurd—namely, that what you assert is not that when presentations are impressed on to the mind there is no difference between the imprints themselves, but that there is no difference between their 'species,' or so to say their class-forms. As if forsooth presentations were not judged with reference to their class, and will have no reliability if the mark of truth and falsehood is abolished! But the height of absurdity is your assertion that you follow probabilities if nothing hampers you. In the first place how can you be unhampered when there is no difference between true presenta-
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quod iudicium est veri cum sit commune falsi? Ex his illa necessario nata est ἐποχή, id est adsensionis retentio, in qua melius sibi constitit Arcesilas, si vera sunt quae de Carneade non nulli existimant. Si enim percipi nihil potest quod utrique visum est, tollendus adsensus est; quid enim est tam futile quam quicquam adprobare non cognitum? Carneadem autem etiam heri audiebamus solitum esse eo¹ delabi interdum ut diceret opinanturum, id est peccaturum, esse sapientem. Mihi porro non tam certum est esse aliquid quod comprehendi possit (de quo iam nimium etiam diu disputo) quam sapientem nihil opinari, id est numquam adsentiri rei vel falsae vel incognitae. Restat illud quod dicunt veri inveniundi causa contra omnia dici oportere et pro omnibus. Volo igitur videre quid invenerint. ‘Non solemus,’ inquit, ‘ostendere.’ ‘Quae sunt tandem ista mysteria, aut cur celatis quasi turpe aliquid sententiam vestram?’ ‘Ut qui audient,’ inquit, ‘ratione potius quam auctoritate ducantur.’ Quid si utroque²? num peius est? Unum tamen illud non celant, nihil esse quod percipi possit. An in eo auctoritas nihil obest? Mihi quidem videtur vel plurimum; quis enim ista tam aperte perspicueque et perversa

¹ eo inseruit Davies.
² utrumque codd. plurimi.

* i.e., a suspension of judgement.
tions and false? next, what criterion is there of a true presentation if one criterion belongs in common to a true one and a false? These considerations necessarily engendered the doctrine of epochē, a that is, 'a holding back of assent,' in which Arcesilas was more consistent, if the opinions that some people hold about Carneades are true. For if nothing that has presented itself to either of them can be perceived, assent must be withheld; for what is so futile as to approve anything that is not known? But we kept being told yesterday that Carneades was also in the habit of taking refuge in the assertion that the wise man will occasionally hold an opinion, that is, commit an error. For my part, moreover, certain as I am that something exists that can be grasped (the point I have been arguing even too long already), I am still more certain that the wise man never holds an opinion, that is, never assents to a thing that is either false or unknown. There remains their statement that for the discovery of the truth it is necessary to argue against all things and for all things. Well then, I should like to see what they have discovered. 'Oh,' he says, 'it is not our practice to give an exposition.' 'What pray are these holy secrets of yours, or why does your school conceal its doctrine like something disgraceful?' 'In order,' says he, 'that our hearers may be guided by reason rather than by authority.' What about a combination of the two? is not that as good? All the same, there is one doctrine that they do not conceal—the impossibility of perceiving anything. Does authority offer no opposition at this point? To me at all events it seems to offer a very great deal; for who would have adopted doctrines so openly and manifestly

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et falsa secutus esset, nisi tanta in Arcesila, multo etiam maior in Carneade et copia rerum et dicendi vis fuisset?

61 XIX. "Haec Antiochus fere et Alexandreæ tum et multis annis post multo etiam adseverantius, in Syria cum esset mecum paulo ante quam est mortuus. Sed iam confirmata causa te hominem amicissimum"—me autem appellabat—"et aliquot annis minorem natu non dubitabo monere: Tune, cum tantis laudi-bus philosophiam extuleris Hortensiumque nostrum dissentientem commoveris, eam philosophiam sequere quae confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat nos iudicio, privat adprobatione, omnibus\(^1\) orbat sensibus? Et Cimmeriis quidem, quibus aspectum solis sive deus aliquis sive natura ademerat sive eius loci quem in-colebant situs, ignes tamen aderant, quorum illis uti lumine licebat; isti autem quos tu probas tantis offusis tenebris ne scintillam quidem ulla ad dispiciendum reliquerunt; quos si sequamur, iis vinclis simus adstricti ut nos commovere nequeamus.

62 Sublata enim adsensione omnem et motum animorum et actionem rerum sustulerunt; quod non modo recte fieri sed omnino fieri non potest. Provide etiam ne uni tibi istam sententiam minime liceat defendere; an tu, cum res occultissimas aperueris in lucemque protuleris iuratusque dixeris ea te comperisse (quod

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\(^1\) omni aut omnino *edd.*

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\(^a\) The Catilinarian conspiracy, 63 B.C.

\(^b\) Cicero used this expression in the senate, and it became a cant phrase with which he was often taunted.

\(^c\) A likely emendation gives 'and it was known to me too.'
wrong-headed and false, unless Arcesilas had possessed so great a supply of facts and of eloquence, and Carneades an even much greater?

XIX. "These virtually were the teachings advanced by Antiochus in Alexandria at the time mentioned, and also even much more dogmatically many years afterwards when he was staying with me in Syria a little before his death. But now that my case is established, I will not hesitate to give some advice to you as a very dear friend"—he was addressing myself—"and a person some years my junior: Will you, who have lauded philosophy so highly, and have shaken our friend Hortensius in his disagreement with you, follow a system of philosophy that confounds the true with the false, robs us of judgement, despoils us of the power of approval, deprives us of all our senses? Even the people of Cimmeria, whom some god, or nature, or the geographical position of their abode, had deprived of the sight of the sun, nevertheless had fires, which they were able to employ for light; but the individuals whose authority you accept have so beclouded us with darkness that they have not left us a single spark of light to give us a glimpse of sight; and if we followed them, we should be fettered with chains that would prevent our being able to move a step. For by doing away with assent they have done away with all movement of the mind and also all physical activity; which is not only a mistake but an absolute impossibility. Be careful too that you are not the one person for whom it is most illegitimate to uphold this theory of yours; what, when it was you who exposed and brought to light a deeply hidden plot and said on oath that you knew about it (which I might have said to),
mihi quoque licebat¹ qui ex te illa cognoveram), negabis esse rem ullam quae cognosci comprehendi per-
cipi possit? Vide quaeo etiam atque etiam ne illarum quoque rerum pulcherrimarum a te ipso
minuatur auctoritas.” Quae cum dixisset ille, finem
fecit.

63 Hortensius autem vehementer admirans, quod quidem perpetuo Lucullo loquente fecerat, ut etiam
manus saepe tolleret (nec mirum, nam numquam
arbitror contra Academiam dictum esse subtilius), me
quoque iocansne an ita sentiens (non enim satis in-
tellegebam) coepit hortari ut sententia desisterem.
Tum mihi Catulus, “Si te,” inquit, “Luculli oratio
flexit, quae est habita memoriter accurate copiose,
taceo, neque te quo minus si tibi ita videatur sen-
tentiam mutes deterrendum puto. Illud vero non
censuerim ut eius auctoritate moveare, tantum enim
 te non modo monuit,” inquit adridens, “ut caveres
ne quis improbus tribunus plebis, quorum vides
quanta copia semper futura sit, arriperet te et in
contione quaereret qui tibi constares cum idem
negares quicquam certi posse reperiri, idem te com-
perisse dixisses. Hoc quaeo cave ne te terreai; de
causa autem ipsa malim quidem te ab hoc dissen-
tire, sin cesseris non magnopere mirabor, memini
enim Antiochum ipsum, cum annos multos alia sen-

¹ liquebat Klotz.
ACADEMICA, II. (Lucullus). xix.

having learnt about it from you), will you assert that there is no fact whatever that can be learnt and comprehended and perceived? Pray take care again and again that you may not yourself cause the authority of that most glorious achievement also to be diminished.” Having said this, he ended.

3 Hortensius however, indicating emphatic admiration, as he had in fact done all through Lucullus’s discourse, frequently even raising his hands in wonder (and that was not surprising, for I do not think the case against the Academy had ever been argued with more minute precision), began to exhort me also, whether in jest or earnest (for I could not quite make out), to abandon my opinion. Thereupon Catulus said to me, “If Lucullus’s speech has won you over—and its delivery showed memory, concentration and fluency—, I am silent, and I do not think you ought to be frightened away from changing your opinion if you think fit to do so. But I should not advise your letting his authority influence you; for he all but warned you just now,” he said with a smile at me, “to be on your guard lest some wicked tribune of the people—and what a plentiful supply there will always be of them you are well aware—should arraign you, and cross-examine you in a public assembly as to your consistency in both denying the possibility of finding anything certain and asserting that you had discovered some certainty. Pray don’t be alarmed by this; but as to the actual merits of the case, although I should it is true prefer you to disagree with him, if you give in I shall not be greatly surprised, for I remember that Antiochus himself in spite of having held other views for a number of
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sisset, simul ac visum sit, sententia destitisse." Haec cum dixisset Catulus, me omnes intueri.

64 XX. Tum ego, non minus commotus quam soleo in causis maioribus, huius modi quandam orationem sum exorsus. "Me, Catule, oratio Luculli de ipsa re ita movit ut docti hominis et copiosi et parati et nihil praetereuntis eorum quae pro illa causa dici possent, non tamen ut ei respondere posse diffiderem; auctoritas autem tanta plane me movebat, nisi tu opposuisses non minorem tuam. Adgrediar igitur, si pauca ante quasi de fama mea dixero. Ego enim si aut ostentatione aliqua adductus aut studio certandi ad hanc potissimum philosophiam me applicavi, non modo stultitiam meam sed etiam mores et naturam condemnandam puto. Nam si in minimis rebus pertinentia reprehenditur, calumnia etiam coærcetur, ego de omni statu consilioque totius vitae aut certare cum aliis pugnaciter aut frustrari cum alios tum etiam me ipsum velim? Itaque, nisi ineptum putarem in tali disputatione id facere quod cum de re publica disceptatur fieri interdum solet, iurarem per Iovem deosque penates me et ardere studio veri reperiendi et ea sentire quae dicerem. Qui enim possum non cupere verum invenire, cum gaudeam si

1 Lambinus: quadam oratione codd.
years abandoned his opinion as soon as he saw fit." After these words from Catulus, everybody looked towards me.

64 XX. Thereupon I, feeling quite as nervous as I usually do when I have a specially big case on, began what was almost a set speech on the following lines. "For my part, Catulus, Lucullus’s speech on the actual merits of the issue has affected me as that of a scholarly, fluent and well-equipped person who passes by none of the arguments that can be advanced in support of the case put forward, though all the same not to the point of my distrusting my ability to answer him; yet his great authority was unquestionably working upon me, had you not set against it your authority which is no smaller. I will therefore set about it, after a few preliminary remarks on the subject of my own reputation, if I may use the term.

65 For if my own motive in choosing this particular school of philosophy for my adherence was some sort of ostentation or combativeness, I consider that not merely my folly but even my moral character deserves condemnation. For if in the most trifling matters we censure obstinacy and actually punish chicanery, am I likely to want either to join battle with others for the sake of fighting, or to deceive not only others but myself also, when the entire system and principle of the whole of life is the issue? Accordingly unless I thought it foolish in such a discussion to do what is customary occasionally in political controversy, I should swear by Jove and the gods of my household that I am fired with zeal for the discovery of the truth, and that I really hold the opinions that I am stating. For how can I fail to be eager for the discovery of truth, when I rejoice if I...
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simile veri quid invenerim? Sed, ut hoc pulcherri-
mum esse iudico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare
falsa turpissimum est. Nec tamen ego is sum qui
nihil umquam falsi adprobem, qui numquam ad-
sentiar, qui nihil opiner, sed quaerimus de sapiente.
Ego vero ipse et magnus quidem sum opinator (non
enim sum sapiens) et meas cogitationes sic derigo,
non ad illam parvulam Cynosuram qua

fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto,

ut ait Aratus, eoque derectius gubernant quod eam
tenent quae

cursu interiore brevi convertitur orbe,

sed Helicen et clarissimos Septemtriones, id est ra-
tiones has latiore\(^1\) specie, non ad tenue eliminatas. Eo
fit ut errem et vager latius; sed non de me, ut dixi,
sed de sapiente quaeritur. Visa enim ista cum acriter
mentem sensumve pepulerunt accipio, iisque inter-
dum etiam adsentior (nec percipio tamen, nihil enim
arbitror posse percipi)—non sum sapiens, itaque visis
cedo neque possum resistere; sapientis autem hane
censet Arcesilas vim esse maximam, Zenoni adsen-
tiens, cavere ne capiatur, ne fallatur videre—nihil est
enim ab ea cogitatione quam habemus de gravitate

\(^1\) latiores? Reid.

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\(^a\) The word *opinator* is coined to suit the pretended self-
depreciation of the speaker.

\(^b\) See *N.D.* ii. 104 n., 106: Cicero quotes his own
translation.

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have discovered something that resembles truth? But just as I deem it supremely honourable to hold true views, so it is supremely disgraceful to approve falsehoods as true. And nevertheless I myself am not the sort of person never to give approval to anything false, never give absolute assent, never hold an opinion; it is the wise man that we are investigating. For my own part however, although I am a great opinion-holder (for I am not a wise man), at the same time the way in which I steer my thinking is not by that tiny star, the Cynosure, in which Phoenicians place their trust by night
To guide them on the deep,
as Aratus puts it, and steer the straighter because they keep to her who

revolves upon

An inner circle and an orbit brief,

but by Helicē and the resplendent Septentriones, that is, by these theories of wider aspect, not fined down and over-subtilized. The result is that I roam and wander more widely; but it is not I, as I said, but the wise man that is the subject of our inquiry. For when the presentations you talk of have struck my mind or my sense sharply I accept them, and sometimes I actually give assent to them (though nevertheless I do not perceive them, for I hold that nothing can be perceived)—I am not a wise man, and so I yield to presentations and cannot stand out against them; whereas the strongest point of the wise man, in the opinion of Arcesilas, agreeing with Zeno, lies in avoiding being taken in and in seeing that he is not deceived—for nothing is more removed from the conception that we have of
sapientis errore, levitate, temeritate diiunctius. Quid igitur loquar de firmitate sapientis? quem quidem nihil opinari tu quoque, Luculle, concedis. Quod quoniam a te probatur (ut praepostere tecum agam; mox referam me ad ordinem), haec primum conclusio quam habeat vim considera: XXI. 'Si ulli rei sapiens adsentietur umquam, aliquando etiam opinabitur; numquam autem opinabitur; nulli igitur rei adsentietur.' Hanc conclusionem Arcesilas probabat, confirmabat enim et primum et secundum (Carneades non numquam secundum illud dabat, adsentiri aliquando: ita sequebatur etiam opinari, quod tu non vis, et recte, ut mihi videris). Sed illud primum, sapientem si adsensurus esset etiam opinaturum, falsum esse et Stoici dicunt et eorum adstipulator Antiochus; posse enim eum falsa a veris et quae non possint percipi ab iis quae possint distinguere.

Nobis autem primum, etiam si quid percipi possit, tamen ipsa consuetudo adsentiendi periculosa esse videtur et lubrica, quam ob rem, cum tam vitiosum esse constet adsentiri quicquam aut falsum aut incognitum, sustinenda est potius omnis adsensio, ne praecipitet si temere processerit; ita enim finitima sunt falsa veris eaque quae percipi non possunt eis quae possunt¹ (si modo ea sunt quaedam: iam enim videbimus) ut tam in praecipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere. Sin autem omnino nihil esse quod percipi possit a me sumpsero et quod tu mihi

¹ eis quae possunt inseruit Reid.
the dignity of the wise man than error, frivolity or rashness. What then shall I say about the wise man's firmness? even you, Lucullus, allow that he never advances a mere opinion. And since you agree with this (to deal with you out of turn: I will soon return to a regular procedure), consider first

67 the validity of this syllogism: XXI. 'If the wise man ever assents to anything, he will sometimes also form an opinion; but he never will form an opinion; therefore he will not assent to anything.' This syllogism Arcesilas used to approve, for he used to accept both the major premiss and the minor (Carneades used sometimes to grant as minor premiss that the wise man sometimes assents, so that it followed that he also holds an opinion, which you will not allow, and rightly, as I think). But the major premiss, that if the wise man did assent he would also hold an opinion, both the Stoics and their supporter Antiochus declare to be false, arguing that the wise man is able to distinguish the false from the true and the imperceptible from the perceptible. But in our view, in the first place, even if anything could be perceived, nevertheless the mere habit of assenting appears dangerous and slippery, and therefore since it is agreed that to give assent to anything that is either false or unknown is so serious a fault, preferably all assent is to be withheld, to avoid having a serious fall if one goes forward rashly; for things false lie so close to things true, and things that cannot be perceived to things that can (assuming there are such things, which we shall see soon), that it is the duty of the wise man not to trust himself to such a steep slope. But if on the contrary I assume on my own authority that there is nothing at all that can be
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das accepero, sapientem nihil opinari, effectum illud erit, sapientem adsensus omnes cohibiturum, ut videndum tibi sit idne malis an aliquid opinaturum esse sapientem. ‘Neutrum,’ inquies, ‘illorum.’ Nitamur igitur nihil posse percipi; etenim de eo omnis est controversia.

ACADEMICA, II. (Lucullus), xxii.—xxii.

perceived, and accept your admission that the wise man forms no opinion, this will prove that the wise man will restrain all acts of assent, so that you will have to consider whether you prefer this view or the view that the wise man will hold some opinion. 'Neither of those views,' you will say. Let us therefore stress the point that nothing can be perceived, for it is on that that all the controversy turns.

69 XXII. "But first let us have a few words with Antiochus, who studied under Philo the very doctrines that I am championing for such a long time that it was agreed that nobody had studied them longer, and who also wrote upon these subjects with the greatest penetration, and who nevertheless in his old age denounced this system, not more keenly than he had previously been in the habit of defending it. Although therefore he may have been penetrating, as indeed he was, nevertheless lack of constancy does diminish the weight of authority. For I am curious to know the exact date of the day whose dawning light revealed to him that mark of truth and falsehood which he had for many years been in the habit of denying. Did he think out something original? His pronouncements are the same as those of the Stoics. Did he become dissatisfied with his former opinions? Why did he not transfer himself to another school, and most of all why not to the Stoics? for that disagreement with Philo was the special tenet of the Stoic school. What, was he dissatisfied with Mnesarchus? or with Dardanus? they were the leaders of the Stoics at Athens at the time. He never quitted Philo, except after he began to have an audience of his own. But why this sudden revival of the Old Academy? It is thought that he wanted to retain
videtur, cum a re ipsa descisceret, retinere voluisse—quod erant qui illum gloriae causa facere dicerent, sperare etiam ut ii qui se sequerentur Antiochii vocarentur. Mihi autem magis videtur non potuisse sustinere concursum omnium philosophorum (et enim de ceteris sunt inter illos non nulla communia, haec Academicorum est una sententia quam reliquorum philosophorum nemo probet); itaque cessit, et, ut ii qui sub Novis solem non ferunt, item ille cum aestuaret veterum ut Maenianorum sic Academicorum umbram secutus est. Quoque solebat uti argumentum cum ei placebat nihil posse percipi, cum quaereret, Dionysius ille Heracleotes utrum comprehendisset certa illa nota qua adsentiri dicitis oportere—illudne quod multos annos tenuisset Zenonique magistro credidisset, honestum quod esset id bonum solum esse, an quod postea defensitavisset, honesti inane nomen esse, voluptatem esse summum bonum?—qui ex illius commutata sententia docere vellet nihil ita signari in animis nostris a vero posse quod non eodem modo posset a falso, is curavit quod argumentum ex Dionysio ipse sumpsisset ex eo ceteri sumerent. Sed cum hoc alio loco plura, nunc ad ea quae a te, Luculle, dicta sunt.

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a *Novae Tabernae*, a row of silversmiths' and money-changers' booths skirting the Forum.

b Timber balconies added to shops round the Forum, to accommodate spectators at the games. Maenius was consul 338 B.C.

c Antiochus had refuted the doctrine that truth can be discerned because it commands the instinctive assent of the mind by pointing out that a prominent exponent of this doctrine had at different times assented to two contradictory opinions. Yet he himself later on underwent an equally violent change of opinion.
the dignity of the name in spite of abandoning the reality—for in fact some persons did aver that his motive was ostentation, and even that he hoped that his following would be styled the School of Antiochus. But I am more inclined to think that he was unable to withstand the united attack of all the philosophers (for although they have certain things in common on all other subjects, this is the one doctrine of the Academics that no one of the other schools approves); and accordingly he gave way, and, just like people who cannot bear the sun under the New Row, a took refuge from the heat in the shade of the Old Academy, as they do in the shadow of the Balconies. b And as to the argument that he was in the habit of employing at the period when he held that nothing could be perceived, which consisted in asking which of his two doctrines had the famous Dionysius of Heraclea grasped by means of that unmistakable mark which according to your school ought to be the foundation of assent—the doctrine that he had held for many years and had accepted on the authority of his master Zeno, that only the morally honourable is good, or the doctrine that he had made a practice of defending afterwards, that morality is an empty name, and that the supreme good is pleasure?—in spite of Antiochus's attempt to prove from Dionysius's change of opinion that no impression can be printed on our minds by a true presentation of a character that cannot also be caused by a false one, he yet ensured that the argument which he himself had drawn from Dionysius should be drawn by everybody else from himself. c But with him I will deal more at length elsewhere; I turn now, Lucullus, to what was said by you.

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XXIII. "Et primum quod initio dixisti videamus quale sit, similiter a nobis de antiquis philosophis commemorari atque seditiosi solerent claros viros sed tamen populares aliquos nominare. Illi cum res non\(^1\) bonas tractent, similis bonorum videri volunt; nos autem ea dicimus nobis videri quae vosmet ipsi nobilissimis philosophis placuisse conceditis. Anaxagoras nivem nigram dixit esse: ferres me si ego idem dicerem? tu ne si dubitarem quidem. At quis est hic? num sophistis (sic enim appellabantur ii qui ostentationis aut quaestus causa philosophabantur)?

Maxima fuit et gravitatis et ingenii gloria. Quid loquar de Democrito? Quem cum eo conferre possimus non modo ingenii magnitudine sed etiam animi, qui ita sit ausus ordiri, 'Haec loquor de universis'? nihil excipit de quo non profiteatur, quid enim esse potest extra universa? Quis hunc philosophum non anteponit Cleanthi Chrysippo reliquis inferioris aetatis, qui mihi cum illo collati quintae classis videntur? Atque is non hoc dicit quod nos, qui veri esse aliquid non negamus, percipi posse negamus; ille verum plane negat esse; sensusque idem\(^2\) non obscuros dicit sed tenebrosos—sic enim appellant

\(^{1}\) non inseruit Ascensius.
\(^{2}\) Reid: sensus quidem codd.
"And first let us see what we are to make of your remark at the beginning,\(^a\) that our way of recalling ancient philosophers was like the sedition-mongers' habit of putting forward the names of persons who are men of distinction but yet of popular leanings. Those people although they have unworthy designs in hand desire to appear like men of worth; and we in our turn declare that the views we hold are ones that you yourselves admit to have been approved by the noblest of philosophers. Anaxagoras said\(^b\) that snow is black: would you endure me if I said the same? Not you, not even if I expressed myself as doubtful. But who is this Anaxagoras? surely not a sophist (for that is the name that used to be given to people who pursued philosophy for the sake of display or profit)? Why, he was a man of the highest renown for dignity and intellect. Why should I talk about Democritus? Whom can we compare for not only greatness of intellect but also greatness of soul, with one who dared to begin, 'These are my utterances about the universe'?—he excepts nothing as not covered by his pronouncement, for what can be outside the universe? Who does not place this philosopher before Cleanthes or Chrysippus or the rest of the later period, who compared with him seem to me to belong to the fifth class?\(^d\) And he does not mean what we mean, who do not deny that some truth exists but deny that it can be perceived; he flatly denies that truth exists at all; and at the same time says that the senses are (not dim but) 'full of darkness'\(^e\)—for that is the term he uses occurs here only. Horace, *Sat. r. ii. 47*, has 'in classe secunda' of 'second-class' merchandise.

\(^a\) Lucullus's first argument; all philosophers are really sceptical.
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eos. Is qui hunc maxime est admiratus, Chius Metrodor us, initio libri qui est de natura, 'Nego' inquit 'scire nos sciamus ne aliquid an nihil sciamus, ne id ipsum quidem, nescire (aut scire), scire nos, nec omnino sitne aliquid an nihil sit.' Furere tibi Empedocles videtur, at mihi dignissimum rebus iis de quibus loquitur sonum fundere; num ergo is excaecat nos aut orbat sensibus si parum magnam vim censet in iis esse ad ea quae sub eos subiecta sunt iudicanda? Parmenides, Xenophanes, minus bonis quamquam versibus sed tamen illis versibus, increpant eorum adrogantiam quasi irati, qui cum sciri nihil possit audiant se scire dicere. Et ab eis aiebas removendum Socraten et Platonem. Cur? an de ulla certius possum dicere? vixisse cum iis equidem videor: ita multi sermones perscripti sunt e quibus dubitari non possit quin Socrati nihil sit visum sciri posse; exceptit unum tantum, scire se nihil se scire, nihil amplius. Quid dicam de Platone? qui certe tam multis libris haec persecutus non esset nisi probavit, ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam praesertim, nulla fuit ratio persequi. XXIV. Videorne tibi non ut Saturninus nominare modo inlustres homines, sed etiam imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi nobilem? Atqui habebam molestos vobis, sed minatos, Stil-

1 illis nonnulli codd.

See § 14.  
Ibid.  

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for them. His greatest admirer, the Chian Metrodorus, at the beginning of his volume *On Nature* says: 'I deny that we know whether we know something or know nothing, and even that we know the mere fact that we do not know (or do know), or know at all whether something exists or nothing exists.' You think that Empedocles raves, but I think that he sends forth an utterance most suited to the dignity of the subject of which he is speaking; surely therefore he is not making us blind or depriving us of our senses if he holds the opinion that they do not possess sufficient force to enable them to judge the objects that are submitted to them? Parmenides and Xenophanes—in less good verse it is true but all the same it is verse—inveigh almost angrily against the arrogance of those who dare to say that they know, seeing that nothing can be known. Also you said that Socrates and Plato must not be classed with them. Why? can I speak with more certain knowledge about any persons? I seem to have actually lived with them, so many dialogues have been put in writing which make it impossible to doubt that Socrates held that nothing can be known; he made only one exception, no more—he said that he did know that he knew nothing. Why should I speak about Plato? he certainly would not have set out these doctrines in so many volumes if he had not accepted them, for otherwise there was no sense in setting out the irony of the other master, especially as it was unending.' XXIV. Do you agree that I do not merely cite the names of persons of renown, as Saturninus did, but invariably take some famous and distinguished thinker as my model? Yet I had available philosophers who give trouble to your school,
ponem Diodorum Alexinum, quorum sunt contorta et aculeata quaedam sophismata (sic enim appellantur fallaces conclusiunculae); sed quid eos colligam cum habeam Chrysippum, qui fulcire putatur porticum Stoicorum? Quam multa ille contra sensus, quam multa contra omnia quae in consuetudine probantur! At dissolvit idem. Mihi quidem non videtur; sed dissolverit sane: certe tam multa non collegisset quae nos fallerent probabilitate magna nisi videret iis resisti non facile posse. Quid Cyrenaici tibi\(^1\) videntur, minime contempti philosophi? qui negant esse quicquam quod percipi possit extrinsecus: ea se sola percipere quae tactu intumo sentiant, ut dolorem, ut voluptatem, neque se quo quid colore aut quo sono sit scire sed tantum sentire adfici se quodam modo.

"Satis multa de auctoribus—quamquam ex me quaesieras nonne putarem post illos veteres tot saeculis inveniri verum potuisse tot ingeniiis tantis\(^2\) studiis quaerentibus. Quid inventum sit paulo post videro, te ipso quidem iudice. Arcesilan vero non obtrectandi causa cum Zenone pugnavisse, sed verum invenire voluisse sic intellegitur. Nemo umquam superiorum non modo expresserat sed ne dixerat quidem

\(^1\) tibi *inservit Durand.* \(^2\) tantis? *Reid*: tantisque *codd.*

\(a\) The Stoa Poikilē at Athens, the meeting-place of the school, which took its name from it.
\(b\) In § 16.
although they are petty in their method, Stilpo, Diodorus, Alexinus, the authors of certain tortuous and pungent sophismata (as the term is for little syllogistic traps); but why should I bring in them, when I have Chrysippus, supposed to be a buttress of the Stoics' Colonnade? What a number of arguments he produced against the senses, and against everything that is approved in common experience! But he also refuted those arguments, you will say. For my own part I don’t think that he did; but suppose he did refute them, yet undoubtedly he would not have collected so many arguments to take us in with their great probability if he had not been aware that they could not easily be withstood. What do you think of the Cyrenaics, by no means despicable philosophers? they maintain that nothing external to themselves is perceptible, and that the only things that they do perceive are the sensations due to internal contact, for example pain and pleasure, and that they do not know that a thing has a particular colour or sound but only feel that they are themselves affected in a certain manner.

"Enough about authority—although you had put the question to me whether I did not think that with so many able minds carrying on the search with such zealous energy, after so many ages since the old philosophers mentioned, the truth might possibly have been discovered. What actually has been discovered permit me to consider a little later, with you yourself indeed as umpire. But that Arcesilas did not do battle with Zeno merely for the sake of criticizing him, but really wished to discover the truth, is gathered from what follows. That it is possible for a human being to hold no opinions, and not only
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posse hominem nihil opinari, nec solum posse sed ita necesse esse sapienti; visa est Arcesilae cum vera sententia tum honesta et digna sapiente. Quaesivit de Zenone fortasse quid futurum esset si nec percipere quicquam posset sapiens nec opinari sapientis esset. Ille, credo, nihil opinaturum quoniam esset quod percipi posset. Quid ergo id esset? Visum, credo. Quale igitur visum? Tum illum ita definisse, ex eo quod esset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et effictum. Post requisitum, etiamne si eiusdem modi esset visum verum quale vel falsum. Hic Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse visum quod percipi posset, si id tale esset ab eo quod est ut eiusdem modi ab eo quod non est posset esse. Recte consensit Arcesilas ad definitionem additum, neque enim falsum percipi posse neque verum si esset tale quale vel falsum; incubuit autem in eas disputationes ut doceret nullum tale esse visum a vero ut non eiusdem modi etiam a 78 falso possit esse. Haec est una contentio quae adhuc permanserit. Nam illud, nulli rei adsensurum esse
that it is possible but that it is the duty of the wise man, had not only never been distinctly formulated but had never even been stated by any of his predecessors; but Arcesilas deemed this view both true and also honourable and worthy of a wise man. We may suppose him putting the question to Zeno, what would happen if the wise man was unable to perceive anything and if also it was the mark of the wise man not to form an opinion. Zeno no doubt replied that the wise man's reason for abstaining from forming an opinion would be that there was something that could be perceived. What then was this? asked Arcesilas. A presentation, was doubtless the answer. Then what sort of a presentation? Hereupon no doubt Zeno defined it as follows, a presentation impressed and sealed and moulded from a real object, in conformity with its reality. There followed the further question, did this hold good even if a true presentation was of exactly the same form as a false one? At this I imagine Ženo was sharp enough to see that if a presentation proceeding from a real thing was of such a nature that one proceeding from a non-existent thing could be of the same form, there was no presentation that could be perceived. Arcesilas agreed that this addition to the definition was correct, for it was impossible to perceive either a false presentation or a true one if a true one had such a character as even a false one might have; but he pressed the points at issue further in order to show that no presentation proceeding from a true object is such that a presentation proceeding from a false one might not also be of the same form. This is the one argument that has held the field down to the present day. For the point that the wise man will
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sapientem, nihil ad hanc controversiam pertinebat; licebat enim nihil percipere et tamen opinari—quod a Carneade dicitur probatum, equidem Clitomacho plus quam Philoni aut Metrodoro credens hoc magis ab eo disputatum quam probatum puto. Sed id omittamus. Illud certe opinatione et perceptione sublata sequitur, omnium adsensionum retentio, ut, si ostendero nihil posse percipi, tu concedas numquam adsensurum esse. ¹

79 XXV. "Quid ergo est quod percipi possit, si ne sensus quidem vera nuntiant? Quos tu, Luculle, communi loco defendis; quod ne ita ² facere posses, idcirco heri non necessario loco contra sensum tam multa dixeram. Tu autem te negas infracto reme neque columbae collo commoveri. Primum cur? nam et in remo sentio non esse id quod videatur, et in columba pluris videri colores nec esse plus uno. Deinde nihilne praeterea diximus? Maneant ³ illa omnia, iacet ⁴ ista causa. Veraces suos esse sensum dicit. Igitur semper auctorem habes, et eum qui magno suo periculo causam agat! eo enim rem demittit Epicurus, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitus sit, nulli umquam esse credendum. Hoc est verum esse, confidere suis testibus et in pravitate insistere! Itaque Timagoras Epicureus negat sibi umquam, cum oculum torsisset, duas ex lucerna flam-

¹ esse: sit necesse? Reid.
² ita Müller: id codd.
³ manent Reid.
⁴ iacet Reid: lacerat, iaceat codd.
⁵ in pravitate Reid: inportata, inportane codd.

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a §§ 19 ff. b See § 19.
c The third person, used of the person addressed, is rather contemptuous.

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not assent to anything had no essential bearing on this dispute; for he might perceive nothing and yet form an opinion—a view which is said to have been accepted by Carneades; although for my own part, trusting Clitomachus more than Philo or Metrodorus, I believe that Carneades did not so much accept this view as advance it in argument. But let us drop that point. If the acts of opining and perceiving are abolished, it undoubtedly follows that all acts of assent must be withheld, so that if I succeed in proving that nothing can be perceived, you must admit that the wise man will never assent.

XXV. "What is there then that can be perceived, if not even the senses report the truth? You defend them, Lucullus, by a stock argument; but it was to prevent your being able to do it in that way that I had gone out of my way yesterday to say so much against the senses. Yet you assert that the broken oar and the pigeon’s neck don’t upset you. In the first place why? for in the instance of the oar I perceive that what is seen is not real, and in that of the pigeon that several colours are seen and really there are not more than one. In the next place, surely we said much beside that! Suppose all our arguments stand, the case of you people collapses. His own senses, quoth he, are truthful! If so, you always have an authority, and one to risk his all in defence of the cause! for Epicurus brings the issue to this point, that if one sense has told a lie once in a man’s life, no sense must ever be believed. This is true candour—to trust in one’s own witnesses and persist in perversity! Accordingly, Timagoras the Epicurean denies that he has ever really seen two little flames coming from the lamp when he has screwed up
mulas esse visas; opinionis enim esse mendacium, non oculorum. Quasi quae ratur quid sit, non quid videatur! Sit hic quidem maiorum similis; tu vero, qui visa sensibus alia vera dicas esse, alia falsa, qui ea distinguis? Et desine, quae so, communibus locis; domi nobis ista nascuntur! Si, inquis, deus te interroget sanis modo et integris sensibus num amplius quid desideres, quid respondeas? Utinam quidem roget! audiret quam nobiscum male age ret! Ut enim vera videamus, quam longe videmus? Ego Catuli Cumanum ex hoc loco cerno et e regione video, Pompeianum non cerno, neque quicquam interi ectum est quod obstet, sed intendi acies longius non potest. O praecelarum prospectum! Puteolos videmus, at familiare nostrum C. Avianium fortasse in porticu Neptuni ambulantem non vide mus; at ille nescio qui qui in scholis nominari solet mille et octingenta stadia quod abesset videbat: quaedam volucrees longius. Responderem igitur audacter isti vestro deo me plane his oculis non esse contentum. Dictet me acerius videre quam illos pisces fortasse qui neque videntur a nobis et nunc quidem sub oculis sunt neque ipsi nos suspicere possunt; ergo ut illis aqua, sic nobis aër crassus offunditur.

1 Sed desine edd. (Desine vel Desiste Reid).
2 Davies: audires, audies codd.
3 et e regione Reid: regionem codd.

a Presumably a public resort at Puteoli, the modern Pozzuoli.
b Pliny, Nat. Hist. vii. 85, repeats this astounding story on Cicero's authority, although he gives the distance as 135,000 paces; and he quotes from Varro that the telescopic person's name was Strabo, and that from Libybaeum in Sicily he saw the Punic fleet sail from Carthage.

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ACADEMICA, II. (Lucullus), xxv.

an eye, since it is a lie of the opinion, not of the eyes. As though the question were what exists, not what seems to exist! However, Timagoras may be allowed to be true to his intellectual ancestry; but as for you, who say that some sense-presentations are true and some false, how do you distinguish them apart? And do pray desist from mere stock arguments: those are products we have a home supply of! If a god, you say, were to inquire of you whether, given healthy and sound senses, you want anything more, what would you reply? Indeed I wish he would make the inquiry! he would be told how badly he was dealing with us! For even granting that our sight is accurate, how wide is its range? I can make out Catulus’s place at Cumae from where we are, and can see it straight in front of me, but I can’t make out his villa at Pompei, although there is nothing in between to block the view, but my sight is not able to carry any further. O what a glorious view! We can see Puteoli, but we can’t see our friend Gaius Avianius, who is very likely taking a stroll in the Colonnade of Neptune; whereas that somebody or other who is regularly quoted in lectures used to see an object two hundred and twenty-five miles off, and certain birds can see further. Therefore I should boldly answer that deity of your friends that I am by no means satisfied with the eyes that I have got. He will say that my sight is keener than that of the fishes down there, very likely, which we cannot see though they are under our eyes at the very moment, and which also themselves cannot see us above them; it follows that we are shut in by an opaque envelope of air as they are by one of water.
At amplius non desideramus\(^1\)! Quid? talpam num desiderare lumen putas? Neque tam quererer cum deo quod parum longe quam quod falsum viderem. Videsne navem illam? stare nobis videtur, at iis qui in navi sunt moveri haec villa. Quaere rationem cur ita videatur; quam ut maxime inveneris, quod haud scio an non possis, non tu verum te\(^2\) testem habere, sed eum non sine causa falsum testimonium dicere ostenderis. XXVI. Quid ego de nave? vidi enim a te remum contemni; maiora fortasse quaeris. Quid potest esse sole maius, quem mathematici amplius duodeviginti partibus confirmant maiorem esse quam terram? Quantulus nobis videtur! mihi quidem quasi pedalis. Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse eum quam videatur, sed non multo; ne maiorem quidem multo putat esse, vel tantum esse quantus videatur, ut oculi aut nihil mentiantur aut non multum. Ubi igitur illud est 'semel'? Sed ab hoc credulo, qui numquam sensus mentiri putat, discedamus, qui ne nunc quidem, cum ille sol, qui tanta incitatione fertur ut celeritas eius quanta sit ne cogitari quidem possit, tamen nobis stare videatur. Sed ut minuam controversiam, videte queso quam in parvo lis sit. Quattuor sunt capita quae concludant nihil esse quod nosci percipi comprehendi possit, de quo haec tota quaestio est: e quibus primum est esse aliquod visum falsum,

\(^1\) desiderant Christ. \(^2\) te inseruit Davies.

\(a\) § 19.

\(b\) Latin arithmetic expressed the proportion of 19 to 1 by saying that '19 is greater than 1 by 18 parts.'

\(c\) See § 79 fin.
But, you say, we don't wish for more! What, do you think a mole doesn't wish for light? And I should not quarrel with the deity so much about the limited range of my sight as about its inaccuracy. Do you see yonder ship? To us she appears to be at anchor, whereas to those on board her this house appears in motion. Seek for a reason for this appearance, and however much you succeed in finding one—though I doubt if you can—you will not have made out that you have got a true witness but that your witness is for reasons of his own giving false evidence. XXVI. Why do I talk about a ship? for I saw a that you think the illustration of the oar contemptible; perhaps you want bigger examples. What can be bigger than the sun, which the mathematicians declare to be nineteen times the size of the earth b? How tiny it looks to us! to me it seems about a foot in diameter. Epicurus on the other hand thinks that it may possibly be even smaller than it looks, though not much; he thinks that it is not much larger either, or else exactly the size that it appears to be, so that the eyes either do not lie at all or else not much. What becomes then of that 'once' c of which we spoke? But let us quit this gullible person, who thinks that the senses never lie,—not even now, when the sun up there, that is travelling with such rapidity that the magnitude of its velocity cannot even be conceived, nevertheless appears to us to be standing still. But to narrow down the controversy, pray see how small a point it is on which the issue turns. There are four heads of argument intended to prove that there is nothing that can be known, perceived or comprehended, which is the subject of all this debate: the first of these arguments is that there is such a thing
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secundum non posse id percipi, tertium inter quae visa nihil intersit fieri non posse ut eorum alia percipi possint, alia non possint, quartum nullum esse visum verum a sensu profectum cui non adpositum sit visum aliud quod ab eo nihil intersit quodque percipi non possit. Horum quattuor capitum secundum et tertium omnes concedunt; primum Epicurus non dat, vos quibuscum res est id quoque conceditis; omnis pugna de quarto est. Qui igitur P. Servilium Geminum videbat, si Quintum se videre putabat, incidebat in eius modi visum quod percipi non posset, quia nulla nota verum distinguebatur a falso; qua distinctione sublata quam haberet in C. Cotta qui bis cum Gemino consul fuit agnoscendo eius modi notam quae falsa esse non posset? Negas tantam similitudinem in rerum natura esse. Pugnas omnino, sed cum adversario facili; ne sit sane: videri certe potest, fallet igitur sensum, et si una fefellerit similitudo, dubia omnia reddiderit; sublato enim iudicio illo quo oportet agnosci, etiamsi ipse erit quem videris qui tibi videbitur, tamen non ea nota iudicabis, qua dicis oportere, ut non possit esse eiusdem modi falsa. Quando igitur potest tibi P.

* Identical pictures may be formed in the mind (1) truly, when one of the senses is affected by an external object, and (2) falsely, when we mistake one object for another, or when we merely imagine we see an object. In the latter case the mental picture is not 'perceived' in the technical sense here assumed. Therefore it is not 'perceived' in the former case either. 

* See § 56.
as a false presentation; the second, that a false presentation cannot be perceived; the third, that of presentations between which there is no difference it is impossible for some to be able to be perceived and others not; the fourth, that there is no true presentation originating from sensation with which there is not ranged another presentation that precisely corresponds to it and that cannot be perceived. The second and third of these four arguments are admitted by everybody; the first is not granted by Epicurus, but you with whom we are dealing admit that one too; the entire battle is about the fourth. If therefore a person looking at Publius Servilius Geminus used to think he saw Quintus, he was encountering a presentation of a sort that could not be perceived, because there was no mark to distinguish a true presentation from a false one; and if that mode of distinguishing were removed, what mark would he have, of such a sort that it could not be false, to help him to recognize Gaius Cotta, who was twice consul with Geminus? You say that so great a degree of resemblance does not exist in the world. You show fight, no doubt, but you have an easy-going opponent; let us grant by all means that it does not exist, but undoubtedly it can appear to exist, and therefore it will cheat the sense, and if a single case of resemblance has done that, it will have made everything doubtful; for when that proper canon of recognition has been removed, even if the man himself whom you see is the man he appears to you to be, nevertheless you will not make that judgement, as you say it ought to be made, by means of a mark of such a sort that a false likeness could not have the same character. Therefore seeing that it is possible for Publius
Geminus Quintus videri, quid habes explorati cur non possit tibi Cotta videri qui non sit, quoniam aliquid videtur esse quod non est? Omnia dicis sui generis esse, nihil esse idem quod sit alius. Stoicum est istuc quidem nec admodum credibile, nullum esse pilum omnibus rebus talem qualis sit pilus alius, nullum granum. Haec refelli possunt, sed pugnare nolo; ad id enim quod agitur nihil interest omnibusne partibus visa res nihil differat an internosci non possit etiamsi differat. Sed si hominum similitudo tanta esse non potest, ne signorum quidem? Die mihi, Lysippus eodem aere, eadem temperatione, eodem caelo atque ceteris omnibus centum Alexandros eiusdem modi facere non posset? qua igitur notione discerneres? Quid si in eiusdem modi cera centum sigilla hoc anulo impressero, ecqueae poterit in agnosendo esse distinctio? an tibi erit quae-rendus anularius aliqui, quoniam gallinarium in- venisti Deliacum illum qui ova cognosceret? XXVII. Sed adhibes artem advocatam etiam sensibus. Pictor videt quae nos non videmus, et simul inflavit tibicen a perito carmen agnoscitur. Quid? hoc nonne videtur contra te valere, si sine magnis artificiis, ad quae pauci accedunt, nostri quidem generis admodum, nec videre nec audire possimus? Iam illa praeclara, quanto artificio esset sensus nostros

\[1\] atque *Reid: aqua codd.* \[a\] See §§ 50, 54, 56.  
[b] Lysippus had sole permission from Alexander to make statues of him; he made a great many.  
[c] See § 57.  
[e] § 30.
Geminus Quintus to appear to you, what reason have you for being satisfied that a person who is not Cotta cannot appear to you to be Cotta, inasmuch as something that is not real appears to be real? You say that everything is in a class of its own, and that nothing is the same as what some other thing is. That is, it is true, a Stoic argument, and it is not a very convincing one—that no hair or grain of sand is in all respects the same as another hair or grain. These assertions can be refuted, but I don't want to fight; for it makes no difference to the point at issue whether an object completely within sight does not differ at all from another or cannot be distinguished from it even if it does differ. But if so great a resemblance between human beings is impossible, is it also impossible between statues? Tell me, could not Lysippus, by means of the same bronze, the same blend of metals, the same graver and all the other requisites, make a hundred Alexanders of the same shape? then by what mode of recognition would you tell them apart? Well, if I imprint a hundred seals with this ring on lumps of wax of the same sort, will there possibly be any mode of distinction to aid in recognizing them? Or will you have to seek out some jeweller, as you found that poultry-keeper at Delos who recognized eggs? XXVII. But you call in the aid of art to plead in defence even of the senses. A painter sees things that we do not, and a musical expert recognizes a tune as soon as a flute-player has blown a note. Well, does not this seem to tell against you, if without great artistic acquirements, to which few people, of our race indeed very few, attain, we are unable either to see or to hear? Again those were remarkable points about the high artistic skill shown
mentemque et totam constructionem hominis fabricata natura. Cur non extimescam opinandi temeritatem? Etiamne hoc adfirmare potes, Luculle, esse aliquam vim, cum prudentia et consilio scilicet, quae finxerit vel, ut tuo verbo utar, quae fabricata sit hominem? Qualis ista fabrica est? ubi adhibita? quando? cur? quo modo? Tractantur ista ingeniose, disputantur etiam eleganter; denique videantur sane, ne adfirmentur modo. Sed de physicis mox (et quidem ob eam causam ne tu, qui id me facturum paulo ante dixeris, videare mentitus); sed ut ad ea quae clariora sunt veniam, res iam universas profundam, de quibus volumina impleta sunt non a nostris solum sed etiam a Chrysippo; de quo queri solent Stoici, dum studiose omnia conquisierit contra sensus et perspicuitatem contraque omnem consuetudinem contraque rationem, ipsum sibi respondentem inferiorem fuisse, itaque ab eo armatum esse Carneadem. Ea sunt eius modi quae a te diligentissime tractata sunt. Dormientium et vinulentorum et furiosorum visa imbecilliora esse dicebas quam vigilantium siccorum sanorum. Quo modo? Quia, cum experrectus esset Ennius, non diceret se vidisse Homerum sed visum esse, Alcmaeo autem sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit . . .

\[a\] See i. 29 n.  
\[b\] § 17.  
\[c\] § 55.  
\[d\] §§ 47-53.  
\[e\] See § 51 n.

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in Nature's fabrication of our senses and mind and the whole structure of a human being. Why should I not be extremely afraid of rashness in forming opinion? Can you even assert this, Lucullus, that there is some force, united I suppose with providence and design, that has moulded or, to use your word, fabricated a human being? What sort of workmanship is that? where was it applied? when? why? how? You handle these matters cleverly, and expound them in a style that is even elegant: well then, let us grant that they appear, only provided that they are not affirmed. But with the natural philosophers we will deal soon (and that with the object of saving you, who said just now that I should go to them, from appearing to have told a falsehood); whereas, to come to matters less obscure, I will now pour forth the facts of the universe, about which volumes have been filled not only by our school but also by Chrysippus; of whom the Stoics are in the habit of complaining that, while he carefully sought out all the facts that told against the senses and their clarity and against the whole of common experience and against reason, when answering himself he got the worst of it, and thus it was he that furnished weapons to Carneades. My points are of the sort that have been handled very industriously by you. Your assertion was that presentations seen by people asleep and tipsy and mad are feeblener than those of persons awake and sober and sane. How? Because, you said, when Ennius had woken up he did not say that he had seen Homer but that he had seemed to see him, while his Alcmaeon says

But my mind agrees in no wise...
Similia de vinulentis. Quasi quisquam neget et qui experrectus sit eum somniasse se\(^1\) et cuius furor con-
sederit putare non fuisse ea vera quae essent sibi
visa in furore! Sed non id agitur; tum cum vide-
bantur quo modo viderentur, id quae
tur. Nisi vero
Ennium non putamus ita totum illud audivisse

si modo id somniavit, ut si vigilans audiret; exper-
rectus enim potuit illa visa putare, ut erant,\(^2\) somnia,
dormienti vero aeque ac vigilanti probabantur. Quid?
Iliona somno illo
mater, te appello . . .
nonne ita credidit\(^3\) filium locutum ut experrecta
etiam crederet? Unde enim illa

age adsta, mane, audi; iteradum eadem ista mihi—?
num videtur minorem habere visis quam vigilantes
fidem?

89  XXVIII. "Quid loquar de insanis? Qualis tandem
fuit adfinis tuus, Catule, Tuditanus? quisquam
sanissimus tam certa putat quae videt quam is
putabat quae videbantur? Quid ille qui:

video, video te. vive, Ulixes, dum licet?

nonne etiam bis exclamavit se videre cum omnino

\(^1\) somniasse se Müll\(\text{er}:\) somnia rei Reid: somniare codd.
\(^2\) erant Mdv.: erant et codd.
\(^3\) Halm: credit codd.

\(^{a}\) Presumably part of the dream about Homer, § 51 n.
\(^{b}\) Quoted from the Iliona (see p. 662) of Pacuvius (see
p. 393).
\(^{c}\) Apparently this comes from an Ajax Furens, but no
Latin tragedy on this subject is recorded.
ACADEMICA, II. (Lucullus), xxvii.—xxviii.

There are similar passages about men tipsy. As if anybody would deny that a man that has woken up thinks that he has been dreaming, or that one whose madness has subsided thinks that the things that he saw during his madness were not true! But that is not the point at issue; what we are asking is what these things looked like at the time when they were seen. Unless indeed we think that, if Ennius merely dreamt that passage

O piety of spirit ...

he did not hear the whole of it in the same way as if he had been listening to it when awake; for when he had woken up he was able to think those appearances dreams, as they were, but he accepted them as real while he was asleep just as much as he would have done if awake. Again, in that dream of Iliona,

Mother, on thee I call ...

did she not so firmly believe that her son had spoken, that she believed it even after waking up? For what is the cause of her saying

Come, stand by me, stay and hear me; say those words to me again—?

does she seem to have less faith in her visual presentations than people have when they are awake?

XXVIII. "What shall I say about those who are out of their mind? What pray are we to think of your relative Tuditanus, Catulus? does anybody perfectly sane think that the objects that he sees are as real as Tuditanus thought that his visions were? What was the condition of the character who says

I see, I see thee. Live, Ulysses, whilst thou mayest—?

did he not actually shout out twice over that he saw,
non videret? Quid? apud Euripidem Hercules cum ut Eurystheì filios ita suos confìgebat sagittis, cum uxorem interemebat, cum conabatur etiam patrem, non perinde movebatur falsis ut veris moveretur? Quid? ipse Alcmaeo tuus, qui negat 'cor sibi cum oculis consentire,' nonne ibidem incitato furore unde haec flamma oritur?

et illa deinceps

incedunt, incedunt, adsunt, me expetunt.

Quid cum virginis fidem implorat—
fer mi auxilium, pestem abige a me, flammiferam hanc vim quae me excruciat!
cæruleo incinctae angui incedunt, circumstant cum ardentibus taedis—?

num dubitas quin sibi haec videre videatur? Itemque cetera:

intendit crinitus Apollo arcum auratum laeva innixus, Diana facem iacit a luna—

90 qui magis haec crederet si essent quam credebat quia videbantur? apparebat enim iam 'cor cum oculis consentire.' Omnia autem haec proferuntur ut illud efficiatur quo certius nihil potest esse, inter visa

1 sic edd.: incede incede codd.
2 angui Columna: igni codd.
3 sic anonymus apud Reid: luna... lacva codd.
4 ed.: apparet codd.

a See § 52.

b In bending a bow the left arm being more forward seems to do more work than the right.—The ms. text makes Apollo lean on the moon and Diana fling her torch from her left hand!

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although he was not seeing at all? Or Hercules in Euripides, when he was transfixed his own sons with his arrows as if they were those of Eurystheus, when he was making away with his wife, when he was attempting to make away with his father too,—was he not being affected by things false in the same manner as if the things by which he was affected had been true? Again, Alcmaeon himself whom you quote, who says that 'his mind agrees not with his eyes,'—does he not in the same passage spur on his frenzy and cry

Whence does this flame arise?

and then the words

They come, they come! Now, now they are upon me!
'Tis me they seek!

What when he appeals to the maiden's loyalty for aid—

Help me, drive the venom off, the flaming violence that torments me!
Girt with steely snake they come, they ring me round with burning torches?

surely you do not doubt that he seems to himself to see these things? And similarly the rest:

Apollo of the flowing locks
Against me bends his gilded bow
With all the force of his left arm;
Dian her torch flings from the moon—

how would he have believed these things more if they had really been true than he actually did believe them because they seemed to be? for as it was it seemed that 'mind with eyes agreeth.' But all these things are brought forward in order to prove what is the most certain fact possible, that in respect of
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vera et falsa ad animi adsensum nihil interesse. Vos autem nihil agitis cum illa falsa vel furiosorum vel somniantium recordatione ipsorum refellitis; non enim id quae ritur, qualis recordatio fieri soleat eorum qui experrecti sint aut eorum qui furere destiterint, sed qualis visio fuerit aut furentium aut somniantium tum cum movebantur. Sed abeo a sensibus.

91 "Quid est quod ratione percipi possit? Dialecticam inventam esse dicitis veri et falsi quasi disceptatricem et iudicem. Cuius veri et falsi, et in qua re? In geometriane quid sit verum aut falsum dialecticus iudicabit an in litteris an in musicis? At ea non novit. In philosophia igitur? Sol quantus sit quid ad illum? quod sit summum bonum quid habet ut queat iudicare? Quid igitur iudicabit? quae coniunctio, quae diiunctio vera sit, quid ambigue dictum sit, quid sequatur quamque rem, quid repugnet? Si haec et horum similia iudicat, de se ipsa iudicat; plus autem pollicebatur, nam haec quidem iudicare ad ceteras res quae sunt in philosophia multae atque magnae non est satis. Sed quoniam tantum in ea arte ponitis, videte ne contra vos tota nata sit, quae primo progressu festive tradit elementa loquendi et ambiguorum intel legentiam conclusendique ratio-

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a See §§ 26, 27.

b ἑν ἀληθῶν καὶ φευδῶν λόγων διαγωνωτική Sext. P.H. ii. 229.

c i.e., dialectic, or rather λογική, which included both διαλεκτική, or logic in the modern sense, and ἠπορική, elementa loquendi below.
ACADEMICA, II. (Lucullus), xxviii.

the mind's assent there is no difference between true presentations and false ones. But your school achieve nothing when you refute those false presentations by appealing to the recollection of madmen or dreamers; for the question is not what sort of recollection is usually experienced by those who have woken up or have ceased to be mad, but what was the nature of the visual perception of men mad or dreaming at the moment when their experience was taking place. But I am getting away from the senses.

91 "What is it that the reason is capable of perceiving? Your school says that dialectic was invented a to serve as a 'distinguisher' b or judge between truth and falsehood. What truth and falsehood, and on what subject? Will the dialectician judge what is true or false in geometry, or in literature, or in music? But those are not the subjects with which he is acquainted. In philosophy therefore? What has the question of the size of the sun to do with him? what means has he to enable him to judge what is the supreme good? What then will he judge? what form of hypothetical judgement or of inference from alternative hypotheses is valid, what proposition is ambiguous, what conclusion follows from any given premiss and what is inconsistent with it? If the reason judges these and similar matters, it judges about itself; but the promise that it held out went further, as to judge merely these matters is not enough for all the other numerous and important problems contained in philosophy. But since your school sets so much store by that science,c see that it is not essentially entirely against you, when at the first stage it gaily imparts the elements of discourse, the solution of ambiguous propositions and the theory of

92 The sôrîtes fallacy is irrefutable,
nem, tum paucis additis venit ad soritas, lubricum sane et periculosum locum, quod tu modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi genus. XXIX. Quid ergo? istius vitii num nostra culpa est? Rerum natura nullam nobis dedit cognitionem finium ut ulla in re statueret possimus quatenus; nec hoc in acervo tritici solum unde nomen est, sed nulla omnino in re—minutatim interrogati, dives pauper, clarus obscurus sit, multa paua, magna parva, longa brevia, lata angusta, quanto aut addito aut dempto certum respondeamus non habemus. At vitiosi sunt soritae. Frangite igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint; erunt enim, nisi cavetis. 'Cautum est,' inquit; 'placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur (verbi causa) tria paucan sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat quiescere, id est quod ab iis dicitur ἡπνω χαίζειν.' 'Per me vel stertas licet,' inquit Carneades, 'non modo quiescas; sed quid proficit? sequitur enim qui te ex somno excitet et eodem modo interroget: "Quo in numero conticuisti, si ad eum numerum unum addidero, multane erunt?"—progrediere rursus quoad videbitur.' Quid plura? hoc enim fateris, neque ultimum te paucorum neque primum multorum respondere posse; cuius generis error ita manat ut non videam quo non possit accedere. 'Nihil me laedit,' inquit, 'ego enim ut agitator

1 [non] Halm.

* See § 49. The argument is that the mere existence of the Sorites shows that there is no such thing as logical certainty or absolute knowledge.
the syllogism, but then by a process of small additions comes to the sōrites,\(^a\) certainly a slippery and dangerous position, and a class of syllogism that you lately declared to be erroneous. XXIX. What then? is that an error for which we are to blame? No faculty of knowing absolute limits has been bestowed upon us by the nature of things to enable us to fix exactly how far to go in any matter; and this is so not only in the case of a heap of wheat from which the name is derived, but in no matter whatsoever—if we are asked by gradual stages, is such and such a person a rich man or a poor man, famous or undistinguished, are yonder objects many or few, great or small, long or short, broad or narrow, we do not know at what point in the addition or subtraction to give a definite answer. But you say that the sōrites is erroneous. Smash the sōrites then, if you can, so that it may not get you into trouble, for it will if you don’t take precautions. ‘Precautions have been taken,’ says he, ‘for the policy of Chrysippus is, when questioned step by step whether (for example) 3 is few or many, a little before he gets to “many,” to come to rest, or, as they term it, ἕσυχαζειν.’ ‘So far as I am concerned,’ says Carneades, ‘you may not only rest but even snore; but what’s the good of that? for next comes somebody bent on rousing you from slumber and carrying on the cross-examination: “If I add 1 to the number at which you became silent, will that make many?”—you will go forward again as far as you think fit.’ Why say more? for you admit my point, that you cannot specify in your answers either the place where ‘a few’ stops or that where ‘many’ begins; and this class of error spreads so widely that I don’t see where it may not get to. ‘It doesn’t
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callidus prius quam ad finem veniam equos sustinebo, eoque magis si locus is quo ferentur equi praeceps crit: sic me,' inquit, 'ante sustineo, nec diutius captiose interroganti respondeo.' Si habes quod liqueat neque respondses, superbe; si non habes, ne tu quidem percipis. Si quia obscura, concedo, sed negas te usque ad obscura progrede. Inlustribus igitur rebus insistis. Si id tantum modo ut taceas, nihil adsequeris, quid enim ad illum qui te captare vult utrum tacentem inretiat te an loquentem? sin autem usque ad novem verbi gratia sine dubitatione respondses paucæ esse, in decumо insistis, etiam a certis et inlustrioribus cohibes adsensum; hoc idem me in obscuris facere non sinis. Nihil igitur te contra soritas ars ista adiuvat quae nec augendi nec minuendi quid aut primum sit aut postremum docet.

95 Quid quod eadem illa ars quasi Penelope telam retexens tollit ad extremum superiora? utrum ea vestra an nostra culpa est? Nempe fundamentum dialecticae est quidquid enuntietur (id autem appellant ἅξιωμα, quod est quasi effatum) aut verum esse aut falsum; quid igitur? haec vera an falsa sunt: 'Si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris?' Haec scilicet inexplicabilia esse dicitis, quod est

1 nec augentis nec minuentis Halm.

2 mentiris Klotz (cf. § 96): mentiris verum dicis codd.; mentiris an verum dicis Schütz.

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touch me at all,' says he, 'for like a clever charioteer, before I get to the end, I shall pull up my horses, and all the more so if the place they are coming to is precipitous: I pull up in time as he does,' says he, 'and when captious questions are put I don't reply any more.' If you have a solution of the problem and won't reply, that is an arrogant way of acting, but if you haven't, you too don't perceive the matter; if because of its obscurity, I give in, but you say that you don't go forward till you get to a point that is obscure. If so, you come to a stop at things that are clear. If you do so merely in order to be silent, you don't score anything, for what does it matter to the adversary who wants to trap you whether you are silent or speaking when he catches you in his net? but if on the contrary you keep on answering 'few' as far as 9, let us say, without hesitating, but stop at 10, you are withholding assent even from propositions that are certain, nay, clear as daylight; but you don't allow me to do exactly the same in the case of things that are obscure. Consequently that science of yours gives you no assistance against a sorites, as it does not teach you either the first point or the last in the process of increasing or diminishing. What of the fact that this same science destroys at the end the steps that came before, like Penelope unweaving her web? is your school to blame for that or is ours? Clearly it is a fundamental principle of dialectic that every statement (termed by them axiōma, that is, a 'proposition') is either true or false; what then? is this a true proposition or a false one—' If you say that you are lying and say it truly, you lie'? Your school of course says that these problems are 'in-
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odiosius quam illa quae nos non comprehensa et non perpepta dicimus.

XXX. "Sed hoc omitto, illud quaero: si ista explicari non possunt nec eorum ullam iudicium invenitur ut respondere possitis verane an falsa sint, ubi est illa definitio, effatum esse id quod aut verum aut falsum sit? Rebus sumptis adiungam ex iis sequendas esse alias, alias improbandas, quae sint in genere contrario. Quo modo igitur hoc conclusum esse iudicas: 'Si dicis nunc lucere et verum dicis, lucet; dicis autem nunc lucere et verum dicis; lucet igitur'? Probatis certe genus et rectissime conclusum dicitis, itaque in docendo eum primum concludendi modum traditis. Aut quidquid igitur eodem modo concluditor probabitis aut ars ista nulla est. Vide ergo hanc conclusionem probaturusne sis: 'Si dicis te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris; dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis; mentiris igitur'; qui potes hanc non probare cum probaveris eiusmodem generis superiorem? Haec Chrysippea sunt, ne ab ipso quidem dissoluta. Quid enim faceret huic conclusioni: 'Si lucet, lucet; lucet autem; lucet igitur'? cederet siculiet, ipsa enim ratio conexi, cum concesseris superius, cogit inferius concedere. Quid ergo haec ab illa con-

1 sequenda esse alia, alia improbanda? ed.
2 lucet . . . dicis inseruit Manutius.

a δπορα.
b αlias, alias = effata alia, alia (attracted to the gender of rebus).
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soluble,' which is more vexatious than the things termed by us 'not grasped' and 'not perceived.'

XXX. "But I drop this point and ask the following question: if the problems in question are insoluble and no criterion of them is forthcoming to enable you to answer whether they are true or false, what becomes of the definition of a 'proposition' as 'that which is either true or false'? Taking certain premises I will draw the conclusion that, of two sets of propositions, to be classed as contradictory, one set is to be adopted and the other set to be rejected."

What judgement do you pass on the procedure of the following syllogism—'If you say that it is light now and speak the truth, it is light; but you do say that it is light now and speak the truth; therefore it is light'? Your school undoubtedly approve this class of syllogism and say that it is completely valid, and accordingly it is the first mode of proof that you give in your lectures. Either therefore you will approve of every syllogism in the same mode, or that science of yours is no good. Consider therefore whether you will approve the following syllogism: 'If you say that you are lying and speak the truth, you are lying; but you do say that you are lying and speak the truth; therefore you are lying'; how can you not approve this syllogism when you approved the previous one of the same class? These fallacies are the inventions of Chrysippus, and even he himself could not solve them; for what could he make of this syllogism—'If it is light, it is light; but it is light; therefore it is light'? Of course he would agree; for the very nature of hypothetical inference compels you to grant the conclusion if you have granted the premiss. What then is the difference between this
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clusione differt: 'Si mentiris, mentiris; mentiris autem; mentiris igitur'? Hoc negas te posse nec adprobare nec improbare; qui igitur magis illud? si ars, si ratio, si via, si vis denique conclusionis valet, eadem est in utroque. Sed hoc extremum eorum est: postulant ut excipiantur haec inexplicabilia. Tribunum alium censeo videant: a me istam exceptionem numquam impetrabunt. Etenim cum ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et contemnit et inridet, non impetrent ut verum esse concedat quod ita effabimur, 'Aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet,' cum dialectici sic statuant, omne quod ita disiunctum sit quasi 'aut etiam aut non' non modo verum esse sed etiam necessarium, vide quam sit cautas is quem isti tardum putant; 'Si enim,' inquit, 'alterutrum concessero necessarium esse, necesse erit cras Hermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere; nulla autem est in natura rerum talis necessitas.' Cum hoc igitur dialectici pugnent, id est Antiochus et Stoici; totam enim evertit dialecticam, nam si e contrariis disiunctio—contraria autem ea dico, cum alterum aiat, alterum neget—si talis disiunctio falsa potest esse, nulla vera est; mecum vero quid habent litium, qui ipsorum disciplinam sequor? Cum aliquid huius modi inciderat, sic ludere Carneades solebat: 'Si recte conclusi,

1 catus Lambinus: acutus Reid.
2 bardum? Reid.

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* In civil suits the praetor did not try the facts but issued an instruction to an inferior court to cast the defendant if certain facts were proved, and sometimes also unless certain other facts were proved: the latter clause was an exceptio. If the praetor refused to grant an exceptio, the defendant might appeal to a tribune, who could procure the grant by
syllogism and the former one—'If you are lying, you are lying; but you are lying; therefore you are lying'? You say that you are unable either to agree to this or to disprove it; how then are you more able to deal with the other? if science, reason, method, in fact if the syllogistic proof is valid, it is the same in either case. But the farthest length they go is to demand that these insoluble problems should be deemed an exception. My advice to them is to apply to some tribune: they will never get that 'saving clause' from me. For as they will not get Epicurus, who despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic, to admit the validity of a proposition of the form 'Hermarchus will either be alive to-morrow or not alive,' whereas dialecticians lay it down that every disjunctive proposition of the form 'either $x$ or not-$x$' is not only valid but even necessary, see how on his guard the man is whom your friends think slow; for 'If,' he says, 'I admit either of the two to be necessary, it will follow that Hermarchus must either be alive to-morrow or not alive; but as a matter of fact in the nature of things no such necessity exists.' Therefore let the dialecticians, that is, Antiochus and the Stoics, do battle with this philosopher, for he overthrows the whole of dialectic, if a disjunctive proposition consisting of two contrary statements—'contrary' meaning one of them affirmative, the other negative—if a disjunctive proposition of this sort can be false, none is true; but what quarrel have they with me, who am a disciple of their own school? When any situation of this nature occurred, Carneades used to play with the matter thus: 'If my conclusion is threatening if it were not given to annul the whole of the praetor's instruction.
teneoulled; sin vitiose, minam Diogenes mihi reddet'(ab eo enim Stoico dialecticam didicerat, haec autem merces erat dialecticorum). Sequor igitur eas vias quas didici ab Antiocho, nec reperio quo modo iudicem 'Si lucet, lucet' verum esse (ob eam causam quod ita didici, omne quod ipsum ex se conexum sit verum esse), non iudicem 'Si mentiris, mentiris' eodem modo esse conexum. Aut igitur et hoc et illud aut nisi hoc ne illud quidem iudicabo.

XXXI. "Sed ut omnes istos aculeos et totum tortuosum genus disputandi relinquamus ostendamusque qui simus, iam explicata tota Carneadis sententia Antiochi ista congruent universa. Nec vero quicquam ita dicam ut quisquam id fingi suspicetur: a Clitomachosumam, qui usque ad senectutem cum Carneade fuit, homo et acutus ut Poenus et valde studiosus ac diligens. Et quattuor eius libri sunt de sustinendis adsensionibus, haec autem quae iam dicam sunt sumpta de primo. Duo placet esse Carneadi genera visorum, in uno hanc divisionem, alia visa esse quae percipi possint, alia quae percipi non possint, in altero autem alia visa esse probabilia, alia non probabilia; itaque quae contra sensus contraque perspicuittatem dicuntur ea pertinere ad superiorem divisionem, contra posteriorem nihil dici.
correct, I keep to it; if it is faulty, Diogenes will pay me back a mina^ (for Diogenes as a Stoic had taught him dialectic, and that was the fee of professors of that subject). I therefore am following the methods of procedure that I learnt from Antiochus, and I cannot make out how I am to form the judgement that the proposition 'If it is light, it is light' is a true one (because I was taught that every hypothetical inference is true), but not form the judgement that 'If you are lying, you are lying' is an inference on the same lines. Either therefore I shall make both the former judgement and the latter one, or, if not the former, not the latter either.

XXXI. "But to leave all those stinging repartees and the whole of the tortuous class of argument^ and to display our real position, as soon as the whole system of Carneades has been unfolded the doctrines of your Antiochus will come to the ground in complete collapse. However, I will not assert anything in such a manner that anybody may suspect me of inventing; I shall take it from Clitomachus, who was a companion of Carneades quite until old age, a clever fellow as being a Carthaginian, and also extremely studious and industrious. There are four volumes of his that deal with the withholding of assent, but what I am now going to say has been taken from Volume One. Carneades holds that there are two classifications of presentations, which under one are divided into those that can be perceived and those that cannot, and under the other into those that are probable and those that are not probable^; and that accordingly those presentations that are styled by the Academy contrary to the senses and contrary to perspicuity belong to the former division, whereas the latter division

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oportere; quare ita placere, tale visum nullum esse ut perceptio consequeretur, ut autem probatio, multa. Etenim contra naturam est\(^1\) probabile nihil esse, et sequitur omnis vitae ea quam tu, Luculle, commemorabas eversio; itaque et sensibus probanda multa sunt, teneatur modo illud, non inesse in iis quicquam tale quale non etiam falsum nihil ab eo differens esse possit. Sic quidquid acciderit specie probabile, si nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitati illi contrarium, utetur eo sapiens, ac sic omnis ratio vitae gubernabitur. Etenim is quoque qui a vobis sapiens inducitur multa sequitur probabilia, non comprehensa neque percepta neque adsensa sed similia veri; quae nisi probet, omnis vita tollatur. 100 Quid enim? conscendens navem sapiens num comprehensum animo habet atque perceptum se ex sententia navigaturum? qui potest? Sed si iam ex hoc loco proficiscatur Puteolos stadia triginta probo navigio, bono gubernatore, hac tranquillitate, probabile ei\(^2\) videatur se illuc venturum esse salvum. Huius modi igitur visis consilia capiet et agendi et non agendi, faciliorque erit ut albam esse nivem probet quam erat Anaxagoras (qui id non modo ita esse negabat sed sibi, quia sciret aquam nigram esse unde illa concreta\(^3\) esset, albam ipsam esse ne videri

\(^1\) est Müller: esset codd.  
\(^2\) ei inseruit Lamminus.  
\(^3\) Man.: congregata codd.  

\(^a\) §§ 31, 53, 58.
ACADEMICA, II. (Lucullus), xxxi.

must not be impugned; and that consequently his view is that there is no presentation of such a sort as to result in perception, but many that result in a judgement of probability. For it is contrary to nature for nothing to be probable, and entails that entire subversion of life of which you, Lucullus, were speaking; accordingly even many sense-percepts must be deemed probable, if only it be held in mind that no sense-presentation has such a character as a false presentation could not also have without differing from it at all. Thus the wise man will make use of whatever apparently probable presentation he encounters, if nothing presents itself that is contrary to that probability, and his whole plan of life will be charted out in this manner. In fact even the person whom your school brings on the stage as the wise man follows many things probable, that he has not grasped nor perceived nor assented to but that possess verisimilitude; and if he were not to approve them, all life would be done away with. Another point: when a wise man is going on board a ship surely he has not got the knowledge already grasped in his mind and perceived that he will make the voyage as he intends? how can he have it? But if for instance he were setting out from here to Puteoli, a distance of four miles, with a reliable crew and a good helmsman and in the present calm weather, it would appear probable that he would get there safe. He will therefore be guided by presentations of this sort to adopt plans of action and of inaction, and will be readier at proving that snow is white than Anaxagoras was (who not only denied that this was so, but asserted that to him snow did not even appear white, because he knew that it was made of water solidified and that
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101 quidem); et quaccumque res eum sic attinget ut sit visum illud probabile neque ulla re impeditum, movebitur. Non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus; habet corpus, habet animum, movetur mente, movetur sensibus, ut esse\(^1\) ei vera multa videantur, neque tamen habere insignem illam et propriam percipiendi notam, eoque sapientem non adsentiri, quia possit eiusdem modi existere falsum aliquod cuius modi hoc verum. Neque nos contra sensus aliter dicimus ac Stoici, qui multa falsa esse dicunt longeque aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur.

XXXII. "Hoc autem si ita sit, ut unum modo sensibus falsum videatur, praesto est qui neget rem ullam percipi posse sensibus! Ita nobis tacentibus ex uno Epicuri capite, altero vestro perceptio et comprehensio tollitur. Quod est caput Epicuri? 'Si ullum sensus visum falsum est, nihil percipi potest.' Quod vestrum? 'Sunt falsa sensus visa.' Quid sequitur? Ut taceam, conclusio ipsa loquitur nihil posse percipi. 'Non concedo,' inquit, 'Epicuro.' Certa igitur cum illo, qui a te totus diversus est, noli mecum, qui hoc quidem certe, falsi esse aliquid in 102 sensibus, tibi adsentior. Quamquam nihil mihi tam mirum videtur quam ista dici, ab Antiocho quidem

\(^1\) esse *inservit ed.*

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\(^a\) i.e., Lucullus, whom Cicero is addressing, *cf.* §§ 80, 94.

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1 water was black); and whatever object comes in contact with him in such a way that the presentation is probable, and unhindered by anything, he will be set in motion. For he is not a statue carved out of stone or hewn out of timber; he has a body and a mind, a mobile intellect and mobile senses, so that many things seem to him to be true, although nevertheless they do not seem to him to possess that distinct and peculiar mark leading to perception, and hence the doctrine that the wise man does not assent, for the reason that it is possible for a false presentation to occur that has the same character as a given true one. Nor does our pronouncement against the senses differ from that of the Stoics, who say that many things are false and widely different from what they appear to the senses.

XXXII. "If however this be the case, let the senses receive but a single false presentation, and he stands ready to deny that the senses can perceive anything! Thus a single first principle of Epicurus combined with another belonging to your school results in the abolition of perception and comprehension, without our uttering a word. What is the principle of Epicurus? 'If any sense-presentation is false, nothing can be perceived.' What is yours? 'There are false sense-presentations.' What follows? Without any word of mine, logical inference of itself declares that nothing can be perceived. 'I do not admit Epicurus's point,' says he. Well then, fight it out with Epicurus—he differs from you entirely; don't join issue with me, who at all events agree with you so far as to hold that there is an element of falsehood in the senses. Although nothing seems to me so surprising as that those doctrines should be
maxime, cui erant ea quae paulo ante dixi notissima. Licet enim hoc quivis arbitratu suo reprehendat quod negemus rem ullam percipi posse, certe levior reprehensio est; quod tamen dicimus esse quaedam probabilia, non videtur hoc satis esse vobis. Ne sit; illa certe debemus effugere quae a te vel maxime agitata sunt: ‘Nihil igitur cernis? nihil audis? nihil tibi est perspicuum?’ Explicavi paulo ante Clitomachon auctore quo modo ista Carneades diceret; accipe quem ad modum eadem dicantur a Clitomacho in eo libro quem ad C. Lucilium scripsit poëtam, cum scripsisset iisdem de rebus ad L. Censorinum eum qui consul cum M’. Manilio fuit. Scripsit igitur his fere verbis—sunt enim mihi nota, propterea quod earum ipsarum rerum de quibus agimus prima institutio et quasi disciplina illo libro continetur—sed scriptum est ita: Academicis placere esse rerum eius modi dissimilitudines ut aliae probabiles videantur, aliae contra; id autem non esse satis cur alia posse percipi dicas, alia non posse, propterea quod multa falsa probabilia sint, nihil autem falsi perceptum et cognitum possit esse. Itaque ait vehementer errare eos qui dicant ab Academia sensus eripi, a quibus numquam dictum sit aut colorem aut saporem aut sonum nullum esse, illud sit disputatum, non

\*149 B.C.
\*Quasi marks disciplina as an explanation of institutio used to translate some Greek term, perhaps στήμα.
asserted, especially indeed by Antiochus, who was perfectly well acquainted with the arguments that I stated a little before. For even though anybody at his own discretion may criticize our statement that nothing can be perceived, that is a less serious criticism; but it is our assertion that there are some things that are probable that seems to your school to be inadequate. It may be; anyhow it is certainly up to us to get round the difficulties that you raised with the greatest insistency: 'Do you then see nothing? do you hear nothing? is nothing clear to you?' I quoted from Clitomachus a little earlier an explanation of the way in which Carneades treated the difficulties you refer to; let me give you the way in which the same points are dealt with by Clitomachus in the volume that he wrote to the poet Gaius Lucilius, although he had written on the same subjects to the Lucius Censorinus who was Manius Manilius's colleague in the consulship.\(^a\) He wrote then in almost these words—for I am familiar with them, because the primary 'system' or doctrine\(^b\) which we are dealing with is contained in that book—but it runs as follows: 'The Academic school holds that there are dissimilarities between things of such a nature that some of them seem probable and others the contrary; but this is not an adequate ground for saying that some things can be perceived and others cannot, because many false objects are probable but nothing false can be perceived and known.' And accordingly he asserts that those who say that the Academy robs us of our senses are violently mistaken, as that school never said that colour, taste or sound was non-existent, but their contention was that these presentations do not contain a mark of truth and
inesse in iis propriam quae nusquam alibi esset veri et certi notam. Quae cum exposuisset, adiungit dupliciter dici adsensus sustinere sapientem, uno modo cum hoc intellegatur, omnino eum rei nulli adsentiri, altero cum se a respondendo ut aut adprobet quid aut improbet sustineat, ut neque neget aliquid neque aiat; id cum ita sit, alterum placere, ut numquam adsentiatur, alterum tenere, ut sequens probabilitatem ubicumque haec aut occurrat aut deficiat aut ‘etiam’ aut ‘non’ respondere possit. Etenim cum placeat eum qui de omnibus rebus contineat se ab adsentiendo moveri tamen et agere aliquid, relinqui eius modi visa quibus ad actionem excitemur, item ea quae interrogati in utramque partem respondere possimus, sequentes tantum modo quod ita visum sit, dum sine adsensu; neque tamen omnia eius modi visa adprobari, sed ea quae nulla re impedirentur.

Haec si vobis non probamus, sint falsa sane, invidiosa certe non sunt, non enim lucem eripimus, sed ea quae vos percipi comprehendique, eadem nos, si modo probabilia sint, videri dicimus.

XXXIII. "Sic igitur inducto et constituto probabiliter, et eo quidem expedito, soluto, libero, nulla re implicato, vides profecto, Luculle, iacere iam illud

1 ut quid aut adprobet? Reid.
2 etenim cum Reid: nec ut codd.
3 adprobavit cod. unus.
certainty peculiar to themselves and found nowhere else. After setting out these points, he adds that the formula 'the wise man withholds assent' is used in two ways, one when the meaning is that he gives absolute assent to no presentation at all, the other when he restrains himself from replying so as to convey approval or disapproval of something, with the consequence that he neither makes a negation nor an affirmation; and that this being so, he holds the one plan in theory, so that he never assents, but the other in practice, so that he is guided by probability, and wherever this confronts him or is wanting he can answer 'yes' or 'no' accordingly. In fact as we hold that he who restrains himself from assent about all things nevertheless does move and does act, the view is that there remain presentations of a sort that arouse us to action, and also answers that we can give in the affirmative or the negative in reply to questions, merely following a corresponding presentation, provided that we answer without actual assent; but that nevertheless not all presentations of this character were actually approved, but those that nothing hindered.

If we do not win your approval for these doctrines, they may no doubt be false, but certainly they are not detestable. For we don't rob you of daylight, but, whereas you speak of things as being 'perceived' and 'grasped,' we describe the same things (provided they are probable) as 'appearing.'

XXXIII. "Now therefore that we have thus brought in and established 'probability,' and a probability rid of difficulties, untrammelled, free, unentangled with anything, you doubtless see, Lucullus, that all your former advocacy of 'perspicuity' now has a ground for action."
tuum perspicuitatis patrocinium. Iisdem enim hic sapiens de quo loquor oculis quibus iste vester caelum, terram, mare intuebitur, iisdem sensibus reliqua quae sub quemque sensum cadunt sentiet. Mare illud quod nunc favonio nascente purpureum videtur, idem huic nostro videbitur, nec tamen adsentietur, quia nobismet ipsis modo caeruleum videbatur, mane ravum, quodque nunc qua a sole conlucet albecit et vibrat dissimileque est proximo et continenti, ut etiamsi possis rationem reddere cur id eveniat, tamen non possis id verum esse quod videbatur oculis de-

106 fendere. Unde memoria, si nihil percipimus? sic enim quaerebas. Quid? meminisse visa nisi comprensa non possumus? Quid? Polyuenus, qui magnus mathematicus fuisse dicitur, is posteaquam Epicuro adsentiens totam geometriam falsam esse credidit, num illa etiam quae sciebat oblitus est? Atqui falsum quod est id percipi non potest, ut vobismet ipsis placet; si igitur memoria perceptarum comprensarumque rerum est, omnia quae quisque meminit habet comprensas atque percepta; falsi autem comprehendii nihil potest, et omnia meminitor Siron Epicuri dogmata; vera igitur illa sunt nunc omnia. Hoc per me licet; sed tibi aut concedendum est ita esse, quod minime vis, aut memoriam mihi remittas oportet et fateare esse ei locum, etiamsi

1 ravum videbitur? ed.
2 habet? Reid: habet ea codd.
3 Davies: facile vel facere codd.

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* See § 22.
collapses. For this wise man of whom I am speaking will behold the sky and earth and sea with the same eyes as the wise man of your school, and will perceive with the same senses the rest of the objects that fall under each of them. Yonder sea that now with the west wind rising looks purple, will look the same to our wise man, though at the same time he will not 'assent' to the sensation, because even to ourselves it looked blue just now and tomorrow it will look grey, and because now where the sun lights it up it whitens and shimmers and is unlike the part immediately adjoining, so that even if you are able to explain why this occurs, you nevertheless cannot maintain that the appearance that was presented to your eyes was true! If we perceive nothing, what is the cause of memory?—that was a question you were asking. What? are we unable to remember sense-presentations unless we have comprehended them? What? Polyaenus is said to have been a great mathematician: after he had accepted the view of Epicurus and come to believe that all geometry is false, surely he did not forget even the knowledge that he possessed? Yet what is false cannot be perceived, as you yourselves hold; if therefore the objects of memory are things perceived and comprehended, all the things a man remembers he holds grasped and perceived; but nothing false can be grasped, and Siro remembers all the doctrines of Epicurus; therefore in the present state of things those doctrines are all true. This may be so as far as I am concerned; but you are either bound to allow that it is so, which is the last thing you are willing to do, or you must grant me memory and admit that it has a place, even if grasp and
comprehensio perceptioque nulla sit. Quid fiet artibus? Quibus? Iisne quae ipsae fatentur conectura se plus uti quam scientia, an iis quae tantum id quod videtur sequuntur nec habent istam artem vestram qua vera et falsa diiudicent?

"Sed illa sunt lumina duo quae maxime causam istam continent. Primum enim negatis fieri posse ut quisquam nulli rei adsentiatur, et id quidem perspicuum esse. Cum Panaetius, princeps prope meo quidem iudicio Stoicorum, ea de re dubitare se dicat quam omnes praeter eum Stoici certissimam putant, vera esse haruspicum responsa, auspicia, oracula, somnia, vaticinationes, seque ab adsensu sustineat, quod is potest facere etiam de iis rebus quas illi a quibus ipse didicit certas habuerunt, cur id sapiens de reliquis rebus facere non possit? An est aliquid quod positum vel improbare vel adprobare possit, dubitare non possit? An tu in soritis poteris hoc cum voles, ille in reliquis rebus non poterit eodem modo insistere, praesertim cum possit sine adsensione ipsam veri similitudinem non impeditam sequi? Alterum est quod negatis actionem ullius rei posse in eo esse qui nullam rem adsensu suo comprobet; primum enim videri oportet, in quo est etiam adsensus, dicunt enim Stoici sensus ipsos adsensus esse, quos quoniam adpetitio consequatur, actionem sequi, tolli

1 et id quidem p. esse Reid: at . . . est codd.
2 responsa inseruit Ernesti: omnia ? Reid.
3 etiam ? Reid: ut codd.: vel Goerens.
4 habuerunt Kaiser: erint codd.
5 est Reid : sit codd.

† δανεμπόδιστος, i.e., not inconsistent with some other apparent truth.
ACADEMICA, II. (Lucullus), xxxiii.

07 perception are non-existent. What will happen to the sciences? What sciences? the ones that themselves confess that they make more use of conjecture than knowledge, or those that are only guided by appearance, and are not possessed of that method belonging to your school to enable them to distinguish what is true from what is false?

"But the two outstanding things that hold your case together are the following. The first is your statement that it is impossible for anybody to assent to nothing, and that this at all events is 'perspicuous.' Seeing that Panaetius, who in my judgement at all events is almost the chief of the Stoics, says that he is in doubt as to the matter which all the Stoics beside him think most certain, the truth of the pronouncements of diviners, of auspices and oracles, of dreams and soothsaying, and that he restrains himself from assent, which he can do even about things that his own teachers held to be certain, why should not the wise man be able to do so about everything else? Is there any proposition that he can either reject or approve, but is not able to doubt? will you be able to do so with sōrites arguments when you wish, but he not be able to call a similar halt in everything else, especially as he is able to follow mere resemblance to truth when unhampered,\(^a\) without the act of assent? The second point is the assertion of your school that no action as regards anything is possible in the case of a man who gives the approval of his assent to nothing; for in the first place the thing must be seen, and that includes assent, for the Stoics say that the sensations are themselves acts of assent, and that it is because these are followed by an impulse of appetition that action

\(^a\) Suspending of assent is possible, and compatible with action.
autem omnia si visa tollantur. XXXIV. Hac de re in utramque partem et dicta sunt et scripta multa, sed brevi res potest tota confici. Ego enim etsi maximam actionem puto repugnare visis, obsistere opinionibus, adsensus lubricos sustinere, credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti, Herculi quendam laborem exanclatum a Carneade, quod, ut feram et immanem beluam, sic ex animis nostris adsensionem, id est opinationem et temeritatem, extraxisset, tamen (ut ea pars defensionis relinquatur) quid impediet actionem eius qui probabilia sequitur nulla re impediente?

"Hoc,' inquit, 'ipsum impediet, quod statuet ne id quidem quod probet posse percipi.' Iam istuc te quoque impediet in navigando, in conserendo, in uxore ducenda, in liberis procreandis, plurimisque in rebus in quibus nihil sequere praeter probabile.

"Et tamen illud usitatum et saepe repudiatum referes, non ut Antipater sed ut aedip pressius; nam Antipatrum reprehensum quod diceret consentaneum esse ei qui adfirmaret nihil posse comprehendi id ipsum saltem dicere posse comprehendi. Quod ipsi Antiocho pingue videbatur et sibi ipsum contrarium; non enim potest conveyenter dici nihil comprehendi posse si quicquam comprehendi posse dicatur. Illo modo potius putat urguendum fuisse Carneadem: cum sapientis nullum decretum esse posset nisi compren-

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*a i.e., the activity of reason.*

§ 29.
follows, whereas if sense-presentations are done away with, everything is done away with. XXXIV. On this matter a great deal has been said and written both for and against, but the whole subject can be dealt with briefly. For even although my own opinion is that the highest form of activity \footnote{a} wars against sense-presentations, withstands opinions, holds back acts of assent on their slippery slope, and although I agree with Clitomachus when he writes that Carneades really did accomplish an almost Her- culean labour in ridding our minds of that fierce wild beast, the act of assent, that is of mere opinion and hasty thinking, nevertheless (to abandon that section of the defence) what will hamper the activity of the man that follows probabilities when nothing hampers? ‘The very fact,’ says he, ‘that he will decide that not even what he approves can be perceived, will hamper him.’ Well then, that same fact will hamper you also in going a voyage, in sowing a crop, in marrying a wife, in begetting a family, in ever so many things in which you will be following nothing but probability.

‘And putting that aside, you repeat the old, familiar and oft-rejected argument, not in Antipater’s manner, but as you say ‘coming more to grips with it’ \footnote{b}; for Antipater, you tell us, was censured for saying that it was consistent for one who asserted that nothing could be grasped to say that that assertion itself could be grasped. This seemed stupid and self-contradictory even to Antiochus; for it cannot consistently be said that nothing can be grasped if anything is said to be able to be grasped. The way in which Antiochus thinks Carneades should preferably have been attacked was this—to make him admit that, since the wise man can have no
sum perceptum cognitum, ut hoc ipsum decretum quidem,\(^1\) decretum\(^2\) sapientis esse nihil posse percipi, fateretur esse perceptum. Proinde quasi sapiens nullum aliud decretum habeat et sine decretis vitam agere possit! Sed ut illa habet probabilia non percepta, sic hoc ipsum, nihil posse percipi; nam si in hoc haberet cognitionis notam, eadem uteretur in ceteris; quam quoniam non habet, utitur probabilibus. Itaque non metuit ne confundere omnia videatur et incerta reddere. Non enim, quem ad modum si quaesitum ex eo sit stellarum numerus par an impar sit, item si de officio multisque aliis de rebus in quibus versatus exercitatusque sit, nescire se dicat; in incertis enim nihil est probabile, in quibus autem est, in iis non deerit sapienti nec quid faciat nec quid respondeat. Ne illam quidem praetermisisti, Luculle, reprehensionem Antiochi—nec mirum, in primis enim est nobilis—qua solebat dicere Antiochus Philonem maxime perturbatum: cum enim sumetur unum, esse quaedam falsa visa, alterum, nihil ea differre a veris, non attendere superius illud ea re a se esse concessum quod videretur esse quaedam in visis differentia, eam toli altero quo neget visa a

\(^1\) quidem: quid, quod, qui codd. nonnulli.
\(^2\) decretum inseruit ed.
ACADEMICA, II. (Lucullus), xxxiv.

'decision' that is not grasped and perceived and known, therefore this particular decision itself, that it is the decision of the wise man that nothing can be perceived, is perceived. Just as if the wise man held no other decision and could conduct his life without decisions! On the contrary, he holds this particular opinion, that nothing can be perceived, in just the same way as he holds the 'probable' but not 'perceived' views that have been mentioned; for if he had a mark of knowledge in this case, he would employ the same mark in all other cases, but since he has not got it, he employs probabilities. Thus he is not afraid lest he may appear to throw everything into confusion and make everything uncertain. For if a question be put to him about duty or about a number of other matters in which practice has made him an expert, he would not reply in the same way as he would if questioned as to whether the number of the stars is even or odd, and say that he did not know; for in things uncertain there is nothing probable, but in things where there is probability the wise man will not be at a loss either what to do or what to answer. Nor yet, Lucullus, did you pass over the criticism made by Antiochus—and no wonder, as it is one of the most famous—which Antiochus used to say Philo had found most upsetting: it was that when the assumption was made, first, that there were some false presentations, and secondly, that they differed in no respect from true ones, Philo failed to notice that whereas he had admitted the former proposition on the strength of the apparent existence of a certain difference among presentations, this fact was refuted by the latter proposition, his denial that true presentations differ
falsis vera differre; nihil tam repugnare. Id ita esset si nos verum omnino tolleremus; non facimus, nam tam vera quam falsa cernimus. Sed probandi species est, percipiendi signum nullum habemus.

112 XXXV. "Ac mihi videor nimis etiam nunc agereieiune. Cum sit enim campus in quo exsultare possit oratio, cur eam tantas in angustias et Stoicorum dumeta compellimus? Si enim mihi cum Peripatetico res esset, qui id percipi posse diceret ‘quod impressum esset e vero,’ neque adhiberet illam magnam accessionem, ‘quo modo imprimi non posset e falso,’ cum simplici homine simpliciter agerem nec magno opere contenderem, atque etiam si, cum ego nihil dicerem posse comprehendi, diceret ille sapientem interdum opinari, non repugnarem, praesertim ne Carneade quidem huic loco valde repugnante: nunc quid facere possum? Quaero enim quid sit quod comprehendi possit; respondet mihi non Aristoteles aut Theophrastus, ne Xenocrates quidem aut Polemo, sed qui minor est, ‘tale verum quale falsum esse non possit.’ Nihil eius modi invenio; itaque incognito nimirum adsentiar, id est opinabor. Hoc mihi et Peripatetici et vetus Academia concedit, vos negatis, Antiochus in primis, qui me valde movet, vel quod amavi hominem sicut

1 Reid: aderere, adhaerere etc. codd.

a Species = phantasia. b i.e., Antiochus.
from false ones; and that no procedure could be more inconsistent. This would hold good if we abolished truth altogether; but we do not, for we observe some things that are true just as we observe some that are false. But there is 'appearance' as a basis of approval, whereas we have no mark as a basis of perception.

"And even now I feel that my procedure is too cramped. For when there is a wide field in which eloquence might expatiate, why do we drive it into such confined spaces and into the briary thickets of the Stoics? If I were dealing with a Peripatetic, who would say that we can perceive 'an impression formed from a true object,' without adding the important qualification 'in a manner in which it could not be formed from a false one,' I would meet his frankness with frankness and would not labour to join issue with him, and if, when I said that nothing can be grasped, he said that the wise man sometimes forms an opinion, I would even refrain from combating him, especially as even Carneades does not vehemently combat this position; but as it is what can I do? For I put the question what there is that can be grasped; I receive the answer, not from Aristotle or Theophrastus, not even from Xenocrates or Polemo, but from a smaller person, 'A true presentation of such a sort that there cannot be a false one of the same sort.' I do not encounter any such presentation; and accordingly I shall no doubt assent to something not really known, that is, I shall hold an opinion. This both the Peripatetics and the Old Academy grant me, but your school denies it, and Antiochus does so first and foremost, who influences me strongly, either because I loved the man as he
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ille me, vel quod ita iudico, politissimum et acutissimum omnium nostrae memoriae philosophorum. A quo primum quaero quo tandem modo sit eius Academiae cuius esse se profiteatur. Ut omittam alia, haec duo de quibus agitur quis umquam dixit aut veteris Academiae aut Peripateticorum, vel id solum percipi posse quod esset verum tale quale falsum esse non posset, vel sapientem nihil opinari? Certe nemo: horum neutrum ante Zenonem magno opere defensum est. Ego tamen utrumque verum puto, nec dico temporis causa sed ita plane probo.

114  XXXVI. "Illud ferre non possum: tu cum me incognito adsentiri vetes idque turpissimum esse dicas et plenissimum temeritatis, tantum tibi adroges ut exponas disciplinam sapientiae, naturam rerum omnium evolvas, mores fingas, fines bonorum malorumque constituas, officia discribas, quam vitam ingrediar definias, idemque etiam disputandi et intellegendi iudicium dicas te et artificium traditum, perficies ut ego ista innumerabilia complectens nusquam labar, nihil opiner? Quae tandem ea est disciplina ad quam me deducas si ab hac abstraxeris? vereor ne subadrogaanter facias si dixeris tuam, atqui ita dicas necesse est. Neque vero tu solus sed ad suam quisque rapiet. Age, restitero Peripateticis, qui sibi
ACADEMICA, II. (Lucullus), xxxv.—xxxvi.

did me, or because I judge him as the most polished and the most acute of all the philosophers of our time. The first question that I put to him is, how pray can he belong to that Academy to which he professes to belong? To omit other points, what member of the Old Academy or of the Peripatetic school ever made these two statements that we are dealing with—either that the only thing that can be perceived is a true presentation of such a sort that there could not be a false one of the same sort, or that a wise man never holds an opinion? No one, without a doubt; neither of these propositions was much upheld before Zeno. I nevertheless think both of them true, and I do not say so just to suit the occasion, but it is my deliberate judgement.

XXXVI. "One thing I cannot put up with: when you forbid me to assent to something that I do not know and say that this is most disgraceful and reeks with rashness, but take so much upon yourself as to set out a system of philosophy, to unfold a complete natural science, to mould our ethics and establish a theory of the chief good and evil and map out our duties and prescribe the career that I am to embark upon, and also actually profess to be ready to impart a criterion and scientific system of dialectic and logic, will you secure that I on my side when embracing all your countless doctrines shall never make a slip, never hold a mere opinion? What system pray is there for you to convert me to if you can withdraw me from this one? I am afraid you may be doing rather a presumptuous thing if you say your own system, yet all the same you are bound to say so. Nor indeed will you be alone, but everybody will hurry me into his own system. Come, suppose I stand out against
cum oratoribus cognitionem esse, qui claros viros a se instructos dicant rem publicam saepe rexisse, sustinuero Epicureos, tot meos familiares, tam bonos, tam inter se amantes viros: Diodoto quid faciam Stoico, quem a puero audivi, qui mecum vivit tot annos, qui habitat apud me, quem et admiror et diligo, qui ista Antiochi¹ contemnit? ‘Nostra,’ inquies, ‘sola vera sunt.’ Certe sola, si vera, plura enim vera discrepantia esse non possunt. Utrum igitur nos impudentes qui labi nolimus,² an illi adrogantes qui sibi persuaserint scire se solos omnía? ‘Non me quidem,’ inquit, ‘sed sapientem dico scire.’ Optime! nempe ista scire quae sunt in tua disciplina. Hoc primum quale est, a non sapiente explicari sapientiam? Sed discedamus a nobismet ipsis, de sapiente loquamur, de quo ut saepe iam dixi omnis haec quaestio est.

116 “In tres igitur partes et a plerisque et a nobismet ipsis distributa sapientia est. Primum ergo, si placet, quae de natura rerum sint quaesita videamus. At³ illud ante: estne quisquam tanto inflatus errore ut sibi se illa scire persuaserit? Non quaero rationes eas quae ex coniectura pendent, quae disputationibus hue et illuc trahuntur, nullam adhibent persuadendi necessitatem; geometrae provideant, qui se pro-

¹ Antiochi? Reid (cf. 98): Antiochia codd.
² nolumus codd. plerique.
³ at Reid: velut codd.
the Peripatetics, who say that they are akin to the orators and that famous men equipped with their teaching have often governed the state. and suppose I resist the Epicureans, that crowd of friends of my own, so worthy and so affectionate a set of men: what shall I do with Diodotus the Stoic, whose pupil I have been from a boy, who has been my associate for so many years, who lives in my house, whom I both admire and love, and who despises the doctrines of Antiochus that you are putting forward? ‘Our doctrines,’ you will say, ‘are the only true ones.’ If they are true, certainly they are the only true ones, for there cannot be several true systems disagreeing with one another. Then is it we that are shameless, who do not wish to make a slip, or they presumptuous, who have persuaded themselves that they alone know everything? ‘I don’t say that I myself know,’ says he, ‘but that the wise man knows.’ Excellent! no doubt you mean ‘knows the doctrines that are in your system.’ To begin with, what are we to think of this—wisdom being unfolded by a man that is not wise? But let us leave ourselves and speak about the wise man, on whom all this inquiry turns, as I have often said already.

116 “Wisdom then is divided by your own school, as it is also by most philosophers, into three parts. First therefore, if you agree, let us see what investigations have been made about natural science. But one thing first: is there anybody so puffed up with error as to have persuaded himself that he knows this subject? I am not asking about the theories that depend upon conjecture, that are dragged to and fro in debate, employing no convincing cogency; let the geometricians see to that, whose claim is that...
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fitentur non persuadere sed cogere, et qui omnia vobis quae describunt probant. Non quaero ex his illa initia mathematicorum quibus non concessis digitum progridi non possunt, punctum esse quod magnitudinem nullam habeat, extremitatem et quasi libramentum in quo nulla omnino crassitudo sit, lineamentum sine ualla latitudine.¹ Haec cum vera esse concessero, si adigam ius iurandum sapientem, nec prius quam Archimedes eo inspectante rationes omnes descripsisset eas quibus efficitur multis partibus solem maiorem esse quam terram, iuraturum putas? Si fecerit, solem ipsum quem deum censet esse con-

117 tempserit. Quodsi geometricis rationibus non est crediturus, quae vim adferunt in docendo, vos ipsi ut dicitis, ne ille longe abierit ut argumentis credat philosophorum; aut si est crediturus, quorum potissimum? omnia² enim physicorum licet explicare, sed longum est; quaero tamen quem sequatur. Finge aliquem nunc fieri sapientem, nondum esse; quam potissimum sententiam eliget et disciplinam? etsi quam-cumque eliget, insipiens eliget; sed sit ingenio divino, quem unum e physicis potissimum probabit? nec plus uno poterit. Non perseguor quaestionem infinitas; tantum de principiis rerum et quibus omnia

¹ latitudine Reid: latitudine carentem codd.  
² somnia? Reid.

¹ Libramentum, ‘evenness,’ applied primarily to the scales of a balance; quasi marks it as here used to explain extremitatem, which is a translation of πέρας (i.e. πέρας σώματος, the boundary of a solid, viz. a surface, επιφάνεια).
they do not persuade but convince, and who prove all their propositions by their diagrams to the satisfaction of your school. I am not asking these people about those first principles of mathematics which must be granted before they are able to advance an inch—that a point is a thing without magnitude, that a 'boundary' or surface\(^a\) is a thing entirely devoid of thickness, a line a thing without any breadth. When I have admitted the correctness of these definitions, if I put the wise man on his oath, and not until Archimedes has first, with him looking on, drawn all the diagrams proving that the sun is many times as large as the earth, do you think that he will take the oath? If he does, he will have shown contempt for the sun itself which he deems is a god. But if he is going to refuse credence to the methods of geometry, which in their teaching exercise a compelling force, as your school itself asserts, surely he for his part will be far from believing the proofs of the philosophers; or else, if he does believe them, which school's proofs will he choose? for one might set out all the systems of the natural philosophers, but it would be a long story: all the same, I want to know which philosopher he follows. Imagine that somebody is becoming a wise man now, but is not one yet; what doctrine or system will he select to adopt? although whichever one he does select, the selection will be made by a man not wise; but suppose he be an inspired genius, which single one among the natural philosophers will he choose to approve? more than one he will not be able to. I am not asking about problems of unlimited vagueness: let us merely consider what authority he will approve in respect of the elements
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constant videamus quem probet, est enim inter
magnos homines summa dissensio.

118 XXXVII. "Princeps Thales, unus e septem cui
sex reliquos concessisse primas ferunt, ex aqua dixit
costare omnia. At hoc Anaximandro populari et
sodali suo non persuasit; is enim infinitatem naturae
dixit esse e qua omnia gignerentur. Post eius
auditor Anaximenes infinitum aëra, sed ea quae ex
eo orerentur definita; gigni autem terram, aquam,
ignem, tum ex his omnia. Anaxagoras materiam in-
finitam, sed ex ea particulias similes inter se, minutias;
eas primum confusas, postea in ordinem adductas
mente divina. Xenophanes, paulo etiam antiquior,
unum esse omnia neque id esse mutabile, et id esse
deum, neque natum umquam et sempiternum, con-
globata figura; Parmenides ignem qui moveat terram
quae ab eo formetur; Leucippus plenum et inane;
Democritus huic in hoc similis, uberior in ceteris;
Empedocles haec pervolgata et nota quattuor; Hera-
clitus ignem; Melissus hoc quod esset infinitum
et immutabile et fuisse semper et fore. Plato ex
materia in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse
censet a deo sempiternum. Pythagorei ex numeris
et mathematicorum initiis proficiisci volunt omnia.
Ex his eliget vester sapiens unum aliquem, credo,

\[ Omnia = \tau \rho \varepsilon \nu. \]

\[ a \] See i. 28 note d.

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of which the universe—a consists, for it is a subject extremely debated among the great.

At the head of the list Thales, the one of the Seven to whom the remaining six are stated to have unanimously yielded the first place, said that all things are made of water. But in this he did not carry conviction with his fellow-citizen and associate Anaximander; Anaximander said that there exists an infinity of substance—from which the universe was engendered. Afterwards his pupil Anaximenes held that air is infinite, but the things that spring from it finite, and that earth, water and fire are engendered, and then the universe of things out of these. Anaxagoras held that matter is infinite, but that out of it have come minute particles entirely alike, which were at first in a state of medley but were afterwards reduced to order by a divine mind. Xenophanes at a somewhat earlier date said that the universe is one, and that this is unchanging, and is god, and that it never came into being but has existed for ever, of a spherical shape; Parmenides said that the primary element is fire, which imparts motion to the earth that receives from it its conformation; Leucippus’s elements were solid matter and empty space; Democritus resembled him in this but was more expansive in the rest of his doctrines; Empedocles taught the four ordinary elements that we know; Heraclitus, fire; Melissus, that the present infinite and unchangeable universe has existed and will exist always. Plato holds the view that the world was made by god out of the all-containing substance, to last for ever. The Pythagoreans hold that the universe originates out of numbers and the first principles of the mathematicians. From these teachers your wise
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quem sequatur: ceteri tot viri et tanti repudiati 119 ab eo condemnatiisque discendent. Quamcumque vero sententiam probaverit, eam sic animo comprehensam habebit ut ea quae sensibus, nec magis adprobabit nunc lucere quam, quoniam Stoicus est, hunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem quae et se et ipsum fabricata sit et omnia moderetur moveat regat. Erit ei persuasum etiam solem lunam stellas omnes terram mare deos esse, quod quaedam animalis intellegentia per omnia ea permanet et transeat; fore tamen aliquando ut omnis hic mundus ardens deflagret. XXXVIII. Sint ista vera (vides enim iam me fateri aliquid esse veri), comprehend ea tamen et percipi nego. Cum enim tuus iste Stoicus sapiens syllabatim tibi ista dixerit, veniet flumen orationis aureum fundens Aristoteles qui illum desipere dicat; neque enim ortum esse umquam mundum quod nulla fuerit novo consilio inito tam praeclari operis inceptio, et ita esse eum undique aptum ut nulla vis tantos queat motus mutationemque moliri, nulla senectus diuturnitate temporum existere ut hic ornatus umquam dilapsus occidat. Tibi hoc repudiare, illud autem superius sicut caput et famam tuam defendere necesse erit, cum1 mihi ne ut dubitem quidem re- 120 linquatur. Ut omittam levitatem temere adsentien-

1 cum inservit Goerzus.

a Quaedam marks a translation of some phrase like Diog. vii. 147 τεύων δὲ εἶναι ζωὸν ἀθάνατον λογικόν.

b A rendering of the two meanings of κινησις.
man will doubtless select some single master to follow, while the numerous residue of men of such distinction will depart rejected and condemned by him. But whatever opinion he approves, he will hold it in as firm a mental grasp as he holds the presentations that he grasps by the senses, and he will not be more firmly convinced that it is now daylight than he is convinced, being a Stoic, that this world is wise and is possessed of an intelligence that constructed both itself and the world, and that controls, moves and rules the universe. He will also be convinced that the sun and moon and all the stars and the earth and sea are gods, because a 'vital intelligence' permeates and passes through them all; but that nevertheless a time will come when all this world will be burnt out with heat. XXXVIII. Suppose these facts of yours are true (for you see now that I do admit the existence of some truth), nevertheless I deny that they are 'grasped' and perceived. For when your Stoic wise man aforesaid has told you those facts one syllable at a time, in will come Aristotle, pouring forth a golden stream of eloquence, to declare that he is doting, since the world never had a beginning, because there never can have been a commencement, on new and original lines, of so glorious a structure, and since it is so compactly framed on every side that no force could bring about such mighty movements of mutation, no old age arise from the long lapse of years to cause this ordered cosmos ever to perish in dissolution. For you it will be obligatory to spurn this view, and to defend the former one as you would your life and honour, while to me it is not even left to doubt. Not to speak of the frivolity of those who assent without consideration, how valuable
tium, quanti libertas ipsa aestimanda est non mihi necesse esse quod tibi est! Quaero\textsuperscript{1} cur deus, omnia nostra causa cum faceret (sic enim vultis), tantam vim natricum viperarumque fecerit, cur mortifera tam multa ac\textsuperscript{2} perniciosa terra marique disperserit. Negatis haec tam polite tamque subtiliter effici potuisse sine divina aliqua sollertia (cuius quidem vos maiestatem deductis usque ad apium formicarumque perfectionem, ut etiam inter deos Myrmecides aliquis minutorum opusculorum fabricator fuisse videatur): \textsuperscript{121} negas sine deo posse quicquam. Ecce tibi e transverso Lampsacenus Strato, qui det isti deo immunitatem magni quidem muneres (et\textsuperscript{3} cum sacerdotes deorum vacationem habeant, quanto est aequius habere ipsos deos!); negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum. Quaeque sint, docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec ut ille qui ex\textsuperscript{4} asperis et levibus et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta haec esse dicat interiecto inani—somnia censet haec esse Democriti, non docentis sed optantis,—ipse autem singulas mundi partes persequens quidquid aut sit aut fiat naturalibus fieri aut factum esse docet ponderibus et motibus. Ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore! quis enim potest, cum ex-

\textsuperscript{1} quaero \textit{inservit Reid.} \\
\textsuperscript{2} ac \textit{inservit Reid.} \\
\textsuperscript{3} et \textit{Goerens: sed codd.} \\
\textsuperscript{4} \textit{ex inservit Reid.}

\textsuperscript{a} A Greek artist famous for his microscopic works, doubtless chosen here because of his appropriate name (or nickname) 'Son of an Ant.'
is the mere freedom of my not being faced by the same obligation as you are! I ask for what reason did the deity, when making the universe for our sakes (for that is the view of your school), create so vast a supply of water-snakes and vipers, and why did he scatter so many death-bringing and destructive creatures over land and sea? Your school asserts that this highly finished and accurately constructed world of ours could not have been made without some skill of a divine nature (indeed it brings down that majestic deity to minutely fabricating the bees and the ants, so that we must even suppose that the list of gods included some Myrmecides, an artist whose works were on a minutely small scale): you assert that nothing can be created without a god. Lo, here you have Strato of Lampsacus cutting in, bent on bestowing upon your deity exemption from exertion on any extensive scale (and seeing that the priests of the gods have holidays, how much fairer it is that the gods themselves should have them!); he declares that he does not make use of divine activity for constructing the world. His doctrine is that all existing things of whatever sort have been produced by natural causes, although he does not follow the master who says that this world of ours was welded out of rough and smooth, hook-shaped or crooked atoms interspersed with void—he judges these doctrines to be dreams on the part of Democritus, the talk of a visionary, not of a teacher,—but he himself, reviewing the various departments of the universe one by one, teaches that whatever either is or comes into being is or has been caused by natural forces of gravitation and motion. Assuredly he frees the deity from a great task, and also me from alarm! for who
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istimet curari se a deo, non et dies et noctes divinum numen horrere et si quid adversi acciderit (quod cui non accidit?) extimescere ne id iure evenerit? Nec Stratoni tamen adsentior nec vero tibi; modo hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur.

122 XXXIX. “Latent ista omnia, Luculle, crassis occultata et circumfusa tenebris, ut nulla acies humani ingenii tanta sit quae penetrare in caelum, terram intrare possit. Corpora nostra non novimus, qui sint situs partium, quam vim quaeque pars habeat ignoramus; itaque medici ipsi, quorum intererat ea nosse, aperuerunt ut viderentur, nec eo tamen aiunt empirici notiora esse illa, quia posit fieri ut patefacta et detecta mutentur. Sed ecquid nos eodem modo rerum naturas persecare aperire dividere possimus, ut videamus terra penitusne defixa sit et quasi radicibus suis haereat an media pendeat? Habitatari ait Xenophanes in luna, eamque esse terram multarum urbi um et montium: portenta videntur, sed tamen nec ille qui dixit iurare posit ita se rem habere neque ego non ita. Vos etiam dicitis esse e regione nobis in contraria parte terrae qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia,
ACADEMICA, II. (Lucullus), xxxviii.—xxxix.

holding the view that a god pays heed to him can avoid shivering with dread of the divine power all day and all night long, and if any disaster happens to him (and to whom does it not?) being thoroughly frightened lest it be a judgement upon him? All the same I do not accept the view of Strato, nor yet yours either; at one moment one seems the more probable, and at another moment the other.

XXXIX. "All those things you talk about are hidden, Lucullus, closely concealed and enfolded in thick clouds of darkness, so that no human intellect has a sufficiently powerful sight to be able to penetrate the heaven and get inside the earth. We do not know our own bodies, we are ignorant of the positions of their parts and their several functions; and accordingly the doctors themselves, being concerned to know the structure of the body, have cut it open to bring its organs into view, yet nevertheless the empiric school assert that this has not increased our knowledge of them, because it is possibly the case that when exposed and uncovered they change their character. But is it at all within our power similarly to dissect and open up and separate the constituents of the universe, in order to see whether the earth is firmly fixed deep down and holds so to speak by its own roots, or hangs suspended at the centre? Xenophanes says that the moon is inhabited, and is a land of many cities and mountains: these seem marvellous doctrines, but nevertheless I am no more able to swear that they do not agree with the facts than their author could swear that they do. Your school even says that there are people opposite to us on the contrary side of the earth, standing with the soles of their feet turned in the
quos antipodas vocatis: cur mihi magis suspensus
qui ista non aspernus quam eis qui cum audiunt
desipere vos arbitrantur? Hicetas Syracosius, ut ait
Theophrastus, caelum solem lunam stellas supera
denique omnia stare censet neque praeter terram
rem ullam in mundo moveri, quae cum circum axem
se summa celeritate convertat et torquet, eadem effici
omnia quae si stante terra caelum moveretur; atque
hoc etiam Platonem in Timaeo dicere quidam arbit-
trantur, sed paulo obscurius. Quid tu, Epicure?
loquere, putas solem esse tantulum? ego ne bis\(^1\)
quidem tantum! Et vos ab illo inridemini et ipsi
illum viciissim eluditis. Liber igitur a tali inrisione
Socrates, liber Aristo Chius, qui nihil istorum sciri
putant\(^2\) posse. Sed redeo ad animum et corpus.
Satisne tandem ea nota sunt nobis, quae nervorum
natura sit, quae venarum? tenemusne quid sit
animus, ubi sit, denique sitne an, ut Dicaearcho
visum est, ne sit quidem ullus? si est, trisne partes
habeat, ut Platonii placuit, rationis irae cupiditatis,
an simplex unusque sit? si simplex, utrum sit ignis
an anima an sanguis an, ut Xenocrates, numerus\(^3\)
nullo corpore (quod intellegi quale sit vix potest)?
et quidquid est, mortale sit an aeternum? nam

\(^1\) Reid: ego ne vobis codd.: egone? ne bis Lambinus.
\(^2\) ed. (cf. § 74): putat codd.
\(^3\) numerus Bentley: mens codd.

\(a\) Plato, Timaeus 40 b.
\(b\) See § 82.
\(c\) See § 122, where however the mind is not introduced.
\(d\) Republic, e.g., 439 d ff. τὸ λογιστικὸν, τὸ θυμοειδὲς and τὸ
επιθυμητικὸν.
\(e\) Some Stoics said fire, others warm breath (πνεῦμα
ἐνθερμον).
\(f\) Empedocles.
opposite direction to ours, whom you call 'antipodes': why are you more irritated with me who do not scoff at these doctrines of yours than with those who when they hear them think you are out of your minds? The Syracusan Hicetas, as Theophrastus asserts, holds the view that the heaven, sun, moon, stars, and in short all of the things on high are stationary, and that nothing in the world is in motion except the earth, which by revolving and twisting round its axis with extreme velocity produces all the same results as would be produced if the earth were stationary and the heaven in motion; and this is also in some people's opinion the doctrine stated by Plato in *Timaeus,*\(^a\) but a little more obscurely. What is your view, Epicurus? say, do you really think that the sun is as small as it appears? for my own part I don't think it is twice as big either! Your school are laughed at by Epicurus, and you yourselves also in your turn mock at him. Mockery of that sort therefore does not touch Socrates and does not touch Aristo of Chios, who think that none of the things that you treat of can be known. But I return to the mind and the body.\(^c\) Pray are we sufficiently acquainted with the nature of the sinews and the veins? do we grasp what mind is, where it is, and in fine whether it exists, or, as Dicaearchus held, does not even exist at all? If it does, do we know if it has three parts, as Plato\(^d\) held, reason, passion and appetite, or is a simple unity? if simple, whether it is fire or breath\(^e\) or blood,\(^f\) or, as Xenocrates said, an incorporeal numerical formula (a thing the very nature of which is almost unintelligible)? and whatever it is, whether it is mortal or everlasting? for many arguments are put forward
utramque in partem multa dicuntur. Horum aliquid vestro sapienti certum videtur, nostro ne quid maxime quidem probabile sit occurrit, ita sunt in plerisque contrariarum rationum paria momenta.

125 XL. "Sin agis verecundius et me accusas non quod tuis rationibus non adsentiar sed quod nullis, vincam animum cuique adsentiar deligam—quem potissimum? quem? Democritum: semper enim, ut scitis, studiosus nobilitatis fui. Urgebor iam omnium vestrum convicio: 'Tune aut inane quicquam putas esse, cum ita completa et conferta sint omnia ut et quidquid movebitur corporeum cedat et qua quidque cesserit aliud ilico subsequatur? aut atomos uallas e quibus quidquid efficiatur illarum sit dissimillimum? aut sine aliqua mente rem ullam effici posse praecclaram? et cum in uno mundo ornatus hic tam sit mirabilis, innumerabilis supra infra, dextra sinistra, ante post, alios dissimiles, alios eiusdem modi mundos esse? et ut nos nunc simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videamus, sic innumerabiles paribus in locis esse eisdem nominibus honoribus rebus gestis ingeniis formis aetatibus, eisdem de rebus disputantes? et si nunc aut si etiam dormientes aliquid animo videre videamur, imagines extrinsecus in animos nostros per corpus inrumpere? Tu vero ista ne asciveris neve fueris commenticiis rebus

1 quidquid Reid: quod codd.
2 corporeum Reid: corporum codd.

* Impliyng that Democritus holds the high position in philosophy that noblemen hold in society.*

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on both sides. Some part of these matters seems to your wise man to be certain, but ours has not a notion even what part is most probable, to such an extent do most of these matters contain equal reasons for contrary theories.

XL. "If on the other hand you behave with greater modesty and charge me not with not agreeing with your arguments but with not agreeing with any, I will overcome my inclination, and will choose, in order to agree with him—whom for preference? whom? Democritus: for, as you know I have always been a devotee of rank! Now I shall be assailed with upbraiding by all of you: 'Can you really suppose that any such thing as empty void exists, when the universe is so completely filled and packed that whenever a bodily object is set in motion it gives place and another object at once moves into the place that it has left? or that any atoms exist out of which are made things that are all entirely unlike them? or that anything splendid can be produced without the action of some mind? and that when one world contains the marvellously ordered beauty that we see, there exist above it and below, on the right and on the left, in front and behind, countless other worlds, some unlike it and others of the same sort? and that just as we are now at Bauli and have a view of Puteoli, so there are innumerable other groups of people with the same names and distinctions and records, minds, appearances and ages, discussing the same subjects in similar places? and that, if now or if even when asleep we seem to see something with the mind, it means that images are forcing a way through the body into our minds from outside? You must not accept such notions, or give your assent to mere
adsensus: nihil sentire est melius quam tam prava sentire! Non ergo id agitur ut aliquid adsensu meo comprobum, quod tu vide ne impudenter etiam postules, non solum adroganter, praesertim cum ista tua mihi ne probabilia quidem videantur; nec enim divinationem quam probatis ullam esse arbitror, fatumque illud esse quo omnia contineri dicitis contemno—ne exaedificatum quidem hunc mundum divino consilio existimo; atque haud scio an ita sit. XLI. Sed cur rapior in invidiam? licetne per vos nescire quod nescio? An Stoicis ipsis inter se disceptare, cum iis non licebit? Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus, mente praeditus qua omnia regantur, Cleanthes, qui quasi maiorum est gentium Stoicus, Zenonis auditor, solem dominari et rerum potiri putat; ita cogimur dissen- sione sapientium dominum nostrum ignorare, quippe qui nesciamus soli an aetheri serviamus. Solis autem magnitudinem—ipse enim hic radiatus me intueri videtur, admonens ut crebro faciam mentionem sui—vos ergo huius magnitudinem quasi decempeda permensi refertis, ego me quasi malis architectis mensurae vestrae nego credere: dubium est uter nostrum sit—leviter ut dicam—inverecundior? Nec tamen istas quaestiones physicorum exter-

1 quod Davies: quae codd.
2 esse om. Christ.
3 non <nobis>? Reid.
4 Morgenstern: verecundior codd.
fictions: it is better to have no opinions than to have 126 such wrong ones! Oh, then, the object is not to get me to give the approval of my assent to something—a demand which it is surely actually impudent and not merely arrogant for you to make, especially as these dogmas of yours don’t seem to me even probable; for I don’t as a matter of fact think that there is any such thing as the divination which your school accepts, and I make light of the existence of that destiny which your school declares to be the bond that holds the universe together—I do not even deem that this world was built on a divine plan; and yet it may be so. XLI. But why am I dragged into disfavour? may I have your leave not to know what I do not know? Are the Stoics to be allowed to dispute among themselves but nobody allowed to dispute with the Stoics? Zeno and almost all the other Stoics think the aether a supreme deity, endowed with a mind whereby the universe is ruled, Cleanthes, the Stoic of the older families as it were, who was a disciple of Zeno, holds that the sun is lord and master of the world; thus the disagreement of the wise compels us to be ignorant of our own lord, inasmuch as we do not know whether we are the servants of the sun or of the aether. Then the size of the sun—for this radiant sun himself seems to be gazing at me, reminding me to keep mentioning him—your school then report his size as if you had measured it with a ten-foot rule, while I declare that I mistrust this measurement of yours as I distrust incompetent architects: then is it doubtful which of us is—to speak frivolously—the more modest? And all the same I do not think that these physical investigations of yours should be put out of bounds.
minandas puto. Est enim animorum ingeniorum-que naturale quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturae; erigimur, altiores fieri videmur, humana despicimus, cogitantesque supera atque caelestia haec nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. Indagatio ipsa rerum cum maximarum tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem; si vero aliquid occurrit quod veri simile videatur, humanissima completur animus voluptate. Quaeret igitur haec et vester sapiens et hic noster, sed vester ut adsentiatur credat adfirmet, noster ut vereatur temere opinari praecelareque agi secum putet si in eius modi rebus veri simile quod sit invenerit.

Veniamus nunc ad bonorum malorumque notionem: at\(^1\) paulum ante dicendum est. Non mihi videntur considerare cum\(^2\) ista valde adfirmant earum etiam rerum auctoritatem si quae inlustriores videantur amittere. Non enim magis adsentiantur nec adprobant lucere nunc quam cum cornix cecinerit tum aliquid eam aut iubere aut vetare, nec magis adfirmabunt signum illud si erunt mensi sex pedum esse quam solem, quem metiri non possunt, plus quam duodeviginti partibus maiorem esse quam terram. Ex quo illa conclusio nascitur: si sol quantus sit percipi non potest, qui ceteras res eodem modo quo magnitu-
For the study and observation of nature affords a sort of natural pasturage for the spirit and intellect; we are uplifted, we seem to become more exalted, we look down on what is human, and while reflecting upon things above and in the heavens we despise this world of our own as small and even tiny. There is delight in the mere investigation of matters at once of supreme magnitude and also of extreme obscurity; while if a notion comes to us that appears to bear a likeness to the truth, the mind is filled with the most humanizing kind of pleasure. These researches therefore will be pursued both by your wise man and by this sage of ours, but by yours with the intention of assenting, believing and affirming, by ours with the resolve to be afraid of forming rash opinions and to deem that it goes well with him if in matters of this kind he has discovered that which bears a likeness to truth.

Now let us come to the concept of good and evil: but a few words must be said first. When they assert those doctrines so positively they seem to me to forget that they also lose the guarantee for facts that appear to be more clear. For their assent to or acceptance of the fact that daylight is now shining is no more positive than their assent to the belief that when a crow croaks it is conveying some command or prohibition, and if they measure yonder statue, they will not affirm that it is six feet high with greater positiveness than they will affirm that the sun, which they cannot measure, is more than nineteen times as large as the earth. From this springs the following train of argument: if it cannot be perceived how large the sun is, he that accepts all other things in the same way as he accepts the sun
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dinem solis adprobat, is eas res non percipit; magnitudo autem solis percipi non potest; qui igitur id adprobat quasi percipiaret, nullam rem percipit. Responderint posse percipi quantus sol sit: non repugnabo dum modo eodem modo cetera percipi comprehendique dicant; nec enim possunt dicere aliud alio magis minusve comprehendi, quoniam omnium rerum una est definitio comprehendi.

129 XLII. "Sed quod coeperam: quid habemus in rebus bonis et malis explorati? Nempe fines constituiendi sunt ad quos et bonorum et malorum summa referatur; qua de re est igitur inter summos viros maior dissensio? Omitto illa quae relictajam videntur—ut Erillum, qui in cognitione et scientia summum bonum ponit; qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum ab eo dissenserit et quam non multum a Platone. Megaricorum fuit nobilis disciplina, cuius, ut scriptum video, princeps Xenophanes quem modo nominavi; deinde eum securi Parmenides et Zeno (itaque ab his Eleatici philosophi nominabantur), post Euclides, Socratis discipulus, Megareus (a quo idem illi Megarici dicti); qui id bonum solum esse dicebant quod esset unum et simile et idem semper. Hi quoque multa a Platone. A Menedemo autem, quod is Eretrius1 fuit, Eretriaci appellati; quorum omne bonum in mente positum et mentis acie qua verum

1 Lambinus: Eretrias, Eretria, ex Eretria codd.

a i.e., summum bonum et summum malum, 'the supreme good and the supreme evil.' Finis has come to be almost a synonym for summum, 'highest in the scale,' losing the sense of 'object aimed at.'
ACADEMICA, II. (Lucullus), xli.—xlii.

does not perceive those things; but the size of the sun cannot be perceived; therefore he that accepts it as if he perceived it, perceives nothing. Suppose their answer is that it can be perceived how large the sun is: I will not combat this provided that they say that everything else can be perceived and grasped in the same manner; for in fact it is impossible for them to say that one thing is grasped more, or less, than another, since there is one definition of mental grasp in relation to all objects.

XLII. "But to resume: in the matter of good and evil what certain knowledge have we got? Clearly the task is to determine the Ends which are the standards of both the supreme good and the supreme evil; if so, what question is the subject of greater disagreement among the leading thinkers? I leave out the systems that appear to be now abandoned—for example Erillus, who places the chief good in learning and in knowledge; although he was a pupil of Zeno, you see how much he disagreed with him and how little with Plato. A famous school was that of the Megarians, whose founder, as I see it recorded, was Xenophanes whom I mentioned just now; next he was followed by Parmenides and Zeno (and so the school of thought derived from them the name of Eleatic) and afterwards by Euclides, the pupil of Socrates, a Megarian (from whom the same school obtained the title of Megarian); their doctrine was that the sole good is that which is always one and alike and the same. These thinkers also took much from Plato. But from Menedemus, who was an Eretrian, they received the designation of the Eretrian school; they placed their good wholly in the mind and in keenness of mental vision whereby the
cernetur. Eliii\textsuperscript{1} similia sed opinor explicata uberius
et ornatus. Hos si contemnimus et iam abiectos
putamus, illos certe minus despicere debemus: Aristonem, qui cum Zenonis fuisset auditor, re probavit
ea quae ille verbis, nihil esse bonum nisi virtutem nec
malum nisi quod virtuti esset contrarium; in mediis
ea momenta quae Zeno voluit nulla esse censuit.
Huic summum bonum est in his rebus neutram in
partem moveri, quae \textit{\v{d}i\v{a}\v{f}o\v{p}\v{o}t\u{a}} ab ipso dicitur;
Pyrrho autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quae
\textit{\v{a}n\v{a}\v{t}he\v{a}t\u{a}} nominatur. Has igitur tot sententias ut
omittamus, haec nunc videamus quae diu multumque
defensa sunt. Alii voluptatem finem esse voluerunt;
quorum princeps Aristippus qui Socratem audierat,
unde Cyrenaici; post Epicurus, cuius est discipula
nunc notior nec tamen cum Cyrenaicis de ipsa
voluptate consentiens. Voluptatem autem et ho-
nestatem finem esse Callipho censuit, vacare omni
molestia Hieronymus, hoc idem cum honestate
Diodorus, ambo hi Peripatetici; honeste autem
vivere fruentem rebus iis quas primas homini natura
conciliet et vetus Academia censuit, ut indicant
scripta Polemonis quem Antiochus probat maxime,
et Aristoteles eiusque amici huc proxime videntur

\textsuperscript{1} Eliii (\textit{vel Eliaci}) \textit{Reid:} ulli, illi codd. : Herilli \textit{Mdv.}

\textsuperscript{a} The \textit{term} is more often applied as an adjective to the
things themselves, \textit{\v{d}i\v{a}\v{a}\v{f}o\v{r}a}, 'indifferent.'
truth is discerned. The school of Elis taught a similar doctrine, but I believe they expounded it in a more copious and ornate style. If we look down on these philosophers and think them out of date, we are undoubtedly bound to feel less contempt for the following: Aristo, who, having been a disciple of Zeno, proved in practice what his master established in theory, that nothing is good except virtue, and nothing evil unless it is contrary to virtue; those motives of action which Zeno held to exist in things intermediate he deemed to be non-existent. Aristo's chief good is in these things to be moved in neither direction—he himself calls it *adiaphoria*; Pyrrho on the other hand held that the wise man does not even perceive these things with his senses—the name for this unconsciousness is *apatheia*. Leaving on one side therefore all these numerous opinions, let us now look at the following which have long been strongly championed. Others have held that the end is pleasure; their founder was Aristippus, who had been a pupil of Socrates, and from whom they get the name of the Cyrenaic school; after him came Epicurus, whose doctrine is now more famous, although on the actual subject of pleasure it does not agree with the Cyrenaics. But Callipho defined the end as being pleasure and moral goodness, Hieronymus as freedom from all annoyance, Diodorus the same combined with moral goodness—both the two latter were Peripatetics; but the Old Academy defined the end as living the moral life while enjoying those primary things which nature recommends to man—this is proved by the writings of Polemo, who is very highly approved by Antiochus; and also Aristotle and his adherents seem to come very near...
accedere. Introducebat etiam Carneades, non quo probaret sed ut opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse frui rebus iiis quas primas natura conciliavisset. Honeste autem vivere, quod ducatur a conciliatione naturae, Zeno statuit finem esse bonorum, qui inventor et princeps Stoicorum fuit.

132 XLIII. "Iam illud perspicuum est, omnibus his finibus bonorum quo exposui malorum fines esse contrarios. Ad vos nunc refero quem sequar, modo ne quis illud tam ineruditum absurdumque respondeat, 'Quemlibet, modo aliquem ': nihil potest dici inconsideratius. Cupio sequi Stoicos: licetne—omitto per Aristotelem, meo iudicio in philosophia prope singularem—per ipsum Antiochum? qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem, si perpauca mutavit, germanissimus Stoicus. Erit igitur res iam in discrimine, nam aut Stoicus constituat sapiens aut veteris Academiae. Utrumque non potest, est enim inter eos non de terminis sed de tota possessione contentio, nam omnis ratio vitae definitione summi boni continetur, de qua qui dissident de omni vitae ratione dissident. Non potest igitur uterque esse sapiens, quoniam tanto opere dissentiant, sed alter. Si Polcmoneus, peccat Stoicus rei falsae adsentiens—nam vos quidem nihil esse dicitis a sapiente tam alienum; sin vera sunt Zenonis, eadem

1 quidem: autem ? ed.
2 constituetur Lambinus.
3 nam vos quidem Davies: num quidem codd.: namque idem Reid.

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to this position. Also Carneades used to put forward the view—not that he held it himself but in order to combat the Stoics with it—that the chief good was to enjoy those things that nature had recommended as primary. Zeno however, who was the originator and first head of the Stoics, set it up that the end of goods is the morally honourable life, and that this is derived from nature's recommendation.

32 XLIII. "There follows the obvious point that corresponding to all the ends of goods that I have set out there are opposite ends of evils. Whom I am to follow now I leave to you, only do not let anyone make that very uneducated and ridiculous answer 'Any body you like, only follow somebody'; no remark could be more ill-considered. I am eager to follow the Stoics: have I permission—I don't say from Aristotle, in my judgement almost the outstanding figure in philosophy, but from Antiochus himself? he was called an Academic, and was in fact, had he made very few modifications, a perfectly genuine Stoic. Well then, the matter will now come to an issue: we must settle on either the Stoic wise man or the wise man of the Old Academy. To take both is impossible, for the dispute between them is not about boundaries but about the whole ownership of the ground, since the entire scheme of life is bound up with the definition of the supreme good, and those who disagree about that disagree about the whole scheme of life. They cannot therefore each of them be the wise man, since they disagree so widely; it must be one or the other. If Polemo's is, the Stoic wise man sins in assenting to a falsehood—for you certainly say that nothing is so alien from the wise man; if on the other hand Zeno's
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in veteres Academicos Peripateticosque dicenda. Hic igitur neutri adsentietur? Sin, inquam, uter est prudentior? Quid? cum ipse Antiochus dissentit quibusdam in rebus ab his quos amat Stoicis, nonne indicat non posse illa probanda esse sapienti? Placet Stoicis omnia peccata esse paria, at hoc Antiocho vehementissime dissplicet; liceat tandem mihi considerare utram sententiam sequar. ‘Praecide,’ inquit, ‘statue aliquando quidlibet!’ Quid quod quae dicuntur et acuta mihi videntur in utramque partem et paria? nonne caveam ne scelus faciam? scelus enim dicebas esse, Luculle, dogma prodere; contineo igitur me ne incognito adsentiar—quod mihi tecum est dogma commune. Ecce multo maior etiam dissensio: Zeno in una virtute positam beatam vitam putat; quid Antiochus? ‘Etiam,’ inquit, ‘beatam sed non beatissimam.’ Deus ille qui nihil censuit deesse virtuti, homuncio hic qui multa putat praeter virtutem homini partim cara esse, partim etiam necessaria. Sed ille vereor ne virtuti plus tribuat quam natura patiatur, praesertim Theophrasto multa diserte copioseque contra dicente. Et hic metuo ne vix sibi constet qui cum dicat esse quaedam et corporis et fortunae mala, tamen eum qui in his omnibus sit beatum fore censeat si sapiens sit. Distrahor—tum hoc mihi probabilius tum illud

1 Reid: adsentiens si nunquam codd.
2 quid quae dicuntur quid (et alia) codd.: correxit Guiet.
3 cara edd.: clara codd.: praeclara? Reid.
4 contra inseruit Goerens.

a i.e., an opinion once decided, decretum, cf. § 27.

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doctrine is true, the same verdict has to be passed against the Old Academics and the Peripatetics. Will Antiochus therefore agree with neither? or if not, which of the two, say I, is the wiser? What then? when Antiochus himself disagrees in some things from these Stoic friends of his, does he not show that it is impossible for these views to be what the wise man must approve? The Stoics hold that all sins are equal, but with this Antiochus most violently disagrees; do please give me leave to deliberate which opinion to follow. ‘Cut it short,’ says he; ‘do for once decide on something!’ What of the fact that the arguments advanced seem to me both acute on either side and equally valid? am I not to be careful not to commit a crime? for you, Lucullus, said that it is a crime to abandon a dogma; therefore I hold myself in so as not to assent to a thing unknown—that is a dogma that I share with you.

Look at an even much wider disagreement: Ženo thinks that the happy life is placed in virtue alone; what is the view of Antiochus? ‘Yes,’ says he, ‘the happy life, but not the happiest.’ Ženo was a god, he deemed that virtue lacks nothing: Antiochus is a puny mortal, he thinks that many things besides virtue are some of them dear to man and some even necessary. But I fear that Ženo assigns more to virtue than nature would allow, especially as Theophrastus says a great deal with eloquence and fullness on the opposite side. And as for Theophrastus, I am afraid it is hardly consistent of him both to say that certain evils of body and estate do exist, and yet to hold that a man for whom these are his entire environment will be happy if he is wise. I am dragged in different directions—now the latter view seems to
videtur. Et tamen, nisi alterutrum sit, virtutem iacere plane puto; verum in his discrepant.

XLIV. "Quid, illa in quibus consentiunt num pro veris probare possumus? Sapientis animum num quam nec cupiditate moveri nec laetitia ecferri? age, haec probabilia sane sint: num etiam illa, num quam timere, numquam dolere? Sapiensne non timeat ne patria deletur? non doleat si deleta sit? Durum, sed Zenoni necessarium, cui praeter honestum nihil est in bonis; tibi vero, Antioche, minime, cui praeter honestatem multa bona, praeter turpitudinem multa mala videntur, quae et venientia metuat sapiens necesse est et venisse doleat. Sed quaero quando ista fuerint ab Academia vetere decreta, ut animum sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent. Mediocritates illi probabant, et in omni permotione naturalem volebant esse quendam modum. Legimus omnes Crantoris veteris Academici De Luctu; est enim non Magnus verum aureolus et, ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecepit, ad verbum ediscendus libellus. Atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant permotiones istas animis nostris datas, metum cavendi causa, misericordiam aegritudinemque clementiae; ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cotem esse dicebant, recte secusne alias

1 ab ins. edd.

*Cf. § 27.*

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me the more probable, now the former. And yet I firmly believe that unless one or other is true, virtue is overthrown; but they are at variance on these points.

135 XLIV. "Again, those tenets on which they agree surely cannot be approved by us as true? The doctrine that the mind of the wise man is never moved by desire or elated by joy? well, granted that this may be probable, surely the following tenets are not so too, that he never feels fear and that he never feels pain? would the wise man feel no fear lest his country might be destroyed? no pain if it were? A hard doctrine, although unavoidable for Zeno, who includes nothing in the category of good save moral worth; but not at all unavoidable for you, Antiochus, who think many things good beside moral worth, and many bad beside baseness—things that the wise man is bound to fear when they are coming and to regret when they have come. But I want to know when the Old Academy adopted 'decisions' of that sort, asserting that the mind of the wise man does not undergo emotion and perturbation. That school were upholders of the mean in things, and held that in all emotion there was a certain measure that was natural. We have all read the Old Academician Crantor's *On Grief*, for it is not a large but a golden little volume, and one to be thoroughly studied word by word, as Panaetius enjoins upon Tubero. And the Old Academy indeed used to say that the emotions in question were bestowed by nature upon our minds for actually useful purposes—fear for the sake of exercising caution, pity and sorrow for the sake of mercy; anger itself they used to say was a sort of whetstone of courage—whether this was right or not let us con-
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136 viderimus. Atrocitas quidem ista tua quo modo in veterem Academiam inruperit nescio; illa vero ferre non possum, non quo mihi displaceant (sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia Stoicorum, quae παραδοξα nominantur), sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles ista tetigit (hos enim quasi eosdem esse vultis)? illi umquam dicerent sapientes solos reges, solos divites, solos formosos, omnia quae ubique essent sapientis esse, neminem consulem praetorem imperatorem, nescio an ne quinquevirum quidem quemquam, nisi sapientem, postremo solum civem, solum liberum, insipientes omnes peregrinos, exules, servos, furiosos? denique scripta¹ Lycurgi, Solonis, duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges? ne urbes quidem aut
civitates nisi quae essent sapientium? Haec tibi, Luculle, si es adsensus Antiocho familiari tuo, tam sunt defendenda quam moenia, mihi autem bono modo tantum quantum videbitur.

XLV. "Legi apud Clitomachum, cum Carneades et Stoicus Diogenes ad senatum in Capitolio starent, A. Albinum qui tum P. Scipione et M. Marcello consuli-bus praetor esset, eum qui cum avo tuo, Luculle, consul fuit, doctum sane hominem ut indicat ipsius historia scripta Graece, iocantem dixisse Carneadi: 'Ego tibi, Carneade, praetor esse non videor [quia sapiens

¹ praescripta? Reid.

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¹ This is done in the *Tusculan Disputations.*
² *i.e.*, allow you to advance them.
³ With Critolaus they came on an embassy from Athens, 155 B.C.
⁴ This interpolation spoils the joke, which turns on the Academician’s doctrine of the uncertainty of all things.
136 sider on another occasion. How indeed that ferocity of yours forced an entrance into the Old Academy I do not know; but I cannot approve those doctrines, not because they seem unsatisfactory to me (for most of the ‘surprising arguments,’ the so-called paradoxa. of the Stoics belong to Socrates), but where did Xenocrates hint at those views, or Aristotle (for you maintain that Xenocrates and Aristotle are almost identical)? could they ever say that wise men alone are kings, alone wealthy, alone handsome, that all the things anywhere existing belong to the wise man, that no one is consul or praetor or general, no one even a police-magistrate, except the wise man, and finally that he only is a citizen and a free man, and that all those not wise are foreigners and exiles and slaves and madmen? in fact that the rules given under the hand of Lycurgus and Solon, and our Twelve Tables, are not laws? that there are no cities even nor states save those that are the work of wise men? You, Lucullus, if you have accepted the views of your associate Antiochus, are bound to defend these doctrines as you would defend the walls of Rome, but I need only do so in moderation, just as much as I think fit.

XLV. “I have read in Clitomachus that when Carneades and the Stoic Diogenes were on the Capitol attending on the senate, Aulus Albinus, who was praetor at the time, in the consulship of Publius Scipio and Marcus Marcellus,—he was a colleague of your grandfather, Lucullus, as consul, and his own history written in Greek shows him to have been a decidedly learned man,—said to Carneades in jest: ‘In your view, Carneades, I am not a real praetor [because I am not a wise man], nor is this a real
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non sum]¹ nec haec urbs nec in ea civitas.' Tum ille:
' Huic Stoico non videris.' Aristoteles aut Xenocrates, quos Antiochus sequi volebat, non dubitavisset quin et praetor ille esset et Roma urbs et eam civitas incoleret; sed ille noster est plane, ut supra 138 dixi, Stoicus, perpauca balbutiens. Vos autem mihi verenti ne labar ad opinationem et aliquid adsciscam et comprobem incognitum (quod minime vultis), quid consilii datis? Testatur saepe Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias quae defendi possint de finibus bonorum, circumcidit et amputat multitudinem—aut enim honestatem esse finem aut voluptatem aut utrumque; nam qui summum bonum dicant id esse si vacemus omni molestia, eos invidiosum nomen voluptatis fugere, sed in vicinitate versari, quod facere eos etiam qui illud idem cum honestateconiungerent, nec multo secus eos qui ad honestatem prima naturae commoda adiungerent; ita tris relinquit sententias quas putet probabiliter posse 139 defendi. Sit sane ita, quamquam a Polemonis et Peripateticorum et Antiochi finibus non facile divellor nec quicquam habeo adhuc probabilius—verum tamen video quam suaviter voluptas sensibus nostris blandiatur. Labor eo ut adsentiar Epicuro aut Aristippo: revocat virtus vel potius reprendit manu, pecudum illos motus esse dicit, hominem iungit deo.

¹ Reid.
city nor its corporation a real corporation.' 'In the view of our Stoic friend here you are not,' replied Carneades. Aristotle or Xenocrates, the masters of whom Antiochus made himself out to be a follower, would not have doubted either that Albinus was a praetor or Rome a city or its inhabitants a corporation; but our friend Carneades, as I said above, is a downright Stoic, though stammering on a very few points. As for yourselves however, seeing that I am afraid I may slip into forming opinions and adopt and approve something that I do not know (which you specially disapprove of), what advice do you give me? Chrysippus often solemnly avows that from among possible views as to the chief good there are only three that can be defended—a crowd of others he lops off and discards: for he holds that the end is either moral goodness, or pleasure, or a combination of the two; for those who say that the chief good consists in our being free from all trouble are trying (he says) to avoid the unpopular word 'pleasure,' but don't get very far away from it, and the same is also the case with those who combine freedom from trouble with moral goodness, nor is it very different with those who to moral goodness join the primary advantages of nature: thus he leaves three opinions that he thinks capable of a probable defence. Suppose it is so, although I find it hard to be parted from the Ends of Polemo and the Peripatetics and Antiochus, and hitherto have got nothing more probable—but nevertheless I see how sweetly pleasure flatters our senses. I am slipping into agreeing with Epicurus or else Aristippus: virtue calls me back, or rather plucks me back with her hand; she declares that those are the feelings of the beasts of the field, and
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Possum esse medius, ut, quoniam Aristippus quasi animum nullum habeamus corpus solum tuetur, Zeno quasi corporis simus expertes animum solum complectitur, ut Calliphontem sequar, cuius quidem sententiam Carneades ita studiose defensitabat ut eam probare etiam videretur (quamquam Clitomachus adfirmabat numquam se intellegere potuisse quid Carneadi probaretur); sed si istum finem velim sequi, nonne ipsa veritas et gravis et recta ratio mihi obversetur, 'Tune,¹ cum honestas in voluptate contemnenda consistat, honestatem cum voluptate tamquam hominem cum belua copulabis?' XLVI. Unum igitur par quod depugnet relicum est, voluptas cum honestate; de quo Chrysippo fuit quantum ego sentio non magna contentio. Alteram si sequare, multa ruunt et maxime communitas cum hominum genere, caritas amicitia iustitia, reliquae virtutes, quarum esse nulla potest nisi erit gratuita, nam quae voluptate quasi mercede aliqua ad officium impellitur, ea non est virtus sed fallax imitatio simulatioque virtutis. Audi contra illos qui nomen honestatis se ne intellegi quidem dicant, nisi forte quod gloriosum sit in vulgus id honestum velimus dicere; fontem omnium bonorum in corpore esse, hanc normam, hanc regulam, hanc praescriptionem esse naturae, a qua qui aberravisset, eum numquam quid in vita sequeretur habiturum. Nihil igitur me putatis,² haec et alia innumerabilia cum audiam, moveri? Tam moveor quam tu, Luculle, nec me minus homi-

¹ tune Reid: tum codd.
² putabis Manutius: putas Goerens.
she links the human being with god. A possible line is for me to be neutral, so that, as Aristippus looks only at the body, as if we had no mind, and Zeno takes into consideration only the mind, as if we were without a body, I should follow Calliphon, whose opinion indeed Carneades was constantly defending with so much zeal that he was thought actually to accept it (although Clitomachus used to declare that he had never been able to understand what Carneades did accept); but if I were willing to follow that End, would not truth herself and the weight of right reason meet me with the reply: 'What, when the essence of morality is to scorn pleasure, will you couple morality with pleasure, like a human being with a beast?'

XLVI. There remains therefore one match to be fought off—pleasure versus moral worth: and on this issue Chrysippus, as far as I for my part can perceive, had not much of a struggle. If one should follow the former, many things fall in ruin, and especially fellowship with mankind, affection, friendship, justice and the rest of the virtues, none of which can exist unless they are disinterested, for virtue driven to duty by pleasure as a sort of pay is not virtue at all but a deceptive sham and pretence of virtue. Hear on the opposite side those who say that they do not even understand what the word 'virtue' means, unless indeed we choose to give the name 'moral' to what looks well with the mob: that the source of all things good is in the body—this is nature's canon and rule and injunction, to stray away from which will result in a man's never having an object to follow in life. Do you people therefore suppose that when I am listening to these and countless other things, I am quite unaffected? I am just as much affected as
nem quam te putaveris. Tantum interest quod tu cum es commotus adquiescis, adsentiris, adprobas, verum illud certum comprehensum perceptum ratum firmum fixum vis esse,¹ deque eo nulla ratione neque pelli neque moveri potes, ego nihil eius modi esse arbitror cui si adsensus sim non adsentiar saepe falso, quoniam vera a falsis nullo discrimine separatur, praesertim cum iudicia ista dialecticae nulla sint.

142 "Venio enim iam ad tertiam partem philosophiae. Aliud iudicium Protagorae est qui putet id cuique verum esse quod cuique videatur, aliud Cyrenaicorum qui praeter permotione; intimas nihil putant esse iudiciai, aliud Epicuri qui omne iudicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis et in voluptate constituit; Plato autem omne iudicium veritatis veritatemque ipsam abductam ab opinionibus et a sensibus cogitationis ipsius et mentis esse voluit. Num quid horum probat noster Antiochus? Ille vero ne maiorum quidem suorum—ubi enim aut Xenocraten sequitur, cuius libri sunt de ratione loquendi multi et multum probati, aut ipsum Aristotelem, quo profecto nihil est acutius, nihil politius? A Chrysippo pedem nusquam. XLVII. Quid ergo Academici appellamur? an abutimur gloria nominis? Aut cur cogimur eos sequi qui inter se dissident? In hoc ipso quod

¹ vis esse Reid: fuisse vis vel fuisset vel vis codd.

* See 1. 25 note.
ACADEMICA, II. (Lucullus), xlvi.—xlvii.

you are, Lucullus, pray don’t think that I am less a human being than yourself. The only difference is that whereas you, when you have been deeply affected, acquiesce, assent, approve, hold that the fact is certain, comprehended, perceived, ratified, firm, fixed, and are unable to be driven or moved away from it by any reason, I on the contrary am of the opinion that there is nothing of such a kind that if I assent to it I shall not often be assenting to a falsehood, since truths are not separated from falsehoods by any distinction, especially as those logical criteria of yours are non-existent.

"For I come now to the third part of philosophy. One view of the criterion is that of Protagoras, who holds that what seems true to each person is true for each person, another is that of the Cyrenaics, who hold that there is no criterion whatever except the inward emotions, another that of Epicurus, who places the standard of judgement entirely in the senses and in notions of objects and in pleasure; Plato however held that the entire criterion of truth and truth itself is detached from opinions and from the senses and belongs to the mere activity of thought and to the mind. Surely our friend Antiochus does not approve any doctrine of these teachers? On the contrary he does not even accept anything from his own ancestors—for where does he follow either Xenocrates, who has many volumes on logic that are highly thought of, or Aristotle himself, who is assuredly unsurpassed for acumen and finish? He never diverges a foot’s length from Chrysippus. XLVII. Why then are we called the Academics? is our use of that glorious title a mistake? Or why is the attempt made to force us to follow a set of thinkers who are divided among
in elementis dialectici docent, quo modo iudicare oporteat verum falsumne sit si quid ita conexum est ut hoc, 'si dies est, lucet,' quanta contentio est! Aliter Diodoro, aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet. Quid? cum Cleanthe doctore suo quam multis rebus Chrysippus dissidet? quid? duo vel principes dialecticorum, Antipater et Archidemus, opiniosissimi homines, nonne multis in rebus dissentient? Quid me igitur, Luculle, in invidiam et tamquam in contionem vocas, et quidem, ut seditiosi tribuni solent, occludi tabernas iubes? quo enim spectat illud cum artificia tolli quereris a nobis, nisi ut opifices concitentur? Qui si undique omnes convenerint, facile contra vos incitabuntur! expromam primum illa invidiosa, quod eos omnes qui in contione stabunt exsules servos insanos esse dicatis; dein ad illa veniam quae iam non ad multitudinem sed ad vosmet ipsos qui adestis pertinent: negat enim vos Zeno, negat Antiochus scire quicquam. 'Quo modo?' inquies; 'nos enim defendimus etiam insipientem multa comprendere.' At scire negatis quemquam rem ullam nisi sapientem; et hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat: nam cum extensis digitis adversam manum ostenderat, 'visum' inquiebat 'huius modi est'; dein cum paulum digitos contraxerat, 'ad-sensus huius modi'; tum cum plane compresserat

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* This word is coined by Cicero in jest. For *opinio* = δόξα or ὀπίσθενa cf. i. 39, 42.

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themselves? Even on a matter that is among the very elements taught by the dialecticians, the proper mode of judging the truth or falsehood of a hypothetical judgement like 'if day has dawned, it is light,' what a dispute goes on!' Diodorus holds one view, Philo another, Chrysippus another. Then, how many points of difference there are between Chrysippus and his teacher Cleanthes? Then, do not two of even the leading dialecticians, Antipater and Archidemus, the most obstinate dogmatists$^a$ of all mankind, disagree on many things? Why then, Lucullus, do you bring me into disfavour, and summon me before a public assembly, so to speak, and actually imitate seditious tribunes and order the shops to be shut? for what is the object of your complaint that we are abolishing the practical sciences, unless it aims at stirring up the craftsmen? But if they all come together from every quarter, it will be easy to stir them on to attack your side! I shall first expound the unpopular doctrine that all the persons then standing in the assembly are on your showing exiles, slaves and madmen; then I shall come to the point that concerns not the multitude but you yourselves now present: according to Zeno and according to Antiochus, you do not know anything! 'What do you mean by that?' you will say; 'for what we maintain is that even the unwise man can comprehend many things.' But you deny that anybody except the wise man knows anything; and this Zeno used to demonstrate by gesture: for he would display his hand in front of one with the fingers stretched out and say 'A visual appearance is like this'; next he closed his fingers a little and said, 'An act of assent is like this'; then he pressed his
pugnumque fecerat, comprensionem illam esse dicebat (qua ex similitudine etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, κατάληψιν imposuit); cum autem laevam manum ad moverat et illum pugnum arte vehementerque compresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat, cuius compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem—sed qui sapiens sit aut fuerit ne ipsi quidem solent dicere. Ita tu nunc, Catule, lucere nescis, nec tu, Hortensi, in tua villa nos esse! Num minus haec invidiose dicuntur? nec tamen nimis eleganter; illa subtilius. Sed quo modo tu, si comprehendi nihil posset, artificia concidere dicebas nec mihi dabas id quod probabile esset satis magnum vim habere ad artes, sic ego nunc tibi refero artem sine scientia esse non posse. An pateretur hoc Zeuxis aut Phidias aut Polyclitus, nihil se scire, cum in iis esset tanta sollertia? Quodsi eos docuisset aliquis quam vim habere diceretur scientia, desinerent irasci: ne nobis quidem suscenserent cum didicissent id tollere nos quod nusquam esset, quod autem satis esset ipsis relinquere. Quam rationem maiorum etiam comprobat diligentia, qui primum iurare 'ex sui animi sententia' quemque voluerunt, deinde ita teneri 'si sciens falleret' (quod inscientia multa versaretur in vita), tum qui testimonium diceret ut

\[^{a}\text{See § 22 note.}\]
fingers closely together and made a fist, and said that that was comprehension (and from this illustration he gave to that process the actual name of catalēpsis, which it had not had before); but then he used to apply his left hand to his right fist and squeeze it tightly and forcibly, and then say that such was knowledge, which was within the power of nobody save the wise man—but who is a wise man or ever has been even they themselves do not usually say. On that showing you, Catulus, at the present moment, do not know that it is daytime, nor do you, Hortensius, know that we are at your country-house! Surely these are not less unpopular arguments? though they are not over-neatly put—the ones before were more clearly worked out. But just as you said that if nothing can be comprehended, the practice of the arts and crafts collapses, and would not grant me that sufficient validity for this purpose is possessed by probability, so now I retort to you that art cannot exist without scientific knowledge. Would Zeuxis or Phidias or Polycitus endure to admit that they knew nothing, when they possessed such great skill? But if somebody explained to them what power is said to be possessed by knowledge, they would cease to be angry: indeed they would not feel a tinge of resentment even against us after it had been explained to them that we do away with a thing that nowhere exists but left to themselves what is sufficient for them. This theory is also supported by the precaution of our ancestors in requiring every juror to swear to give a verdict 'after the opinion of his own mind,' and afterwards to be held guilty of perjury 'if he gave a false verdict wittingly' (because much that was unwitting occurred in life), and then
‘arbitrari’ se diceret etiam quod ipse vidisset, quaeque iurati iudices cognovissent ea non ut ‘esse facta’ sed ut ‘videri’ pronuntiarentur.

147 XLVIII. “Verum quoniam non solum nauta significat sed etiam Favonius ipse insusurrat navigandi nobis, Luculle, tempus esse, et quoniam satis multa dixi, est mihi perorandum. Posthac tamen cum haec quaeremus, potius de dissensionibus tantis summorum virorum disseramus, de obscuritate naturae deque errore tot philosophorum (qui de bonis contrariisque rebus tanto opere discrepant ut, cum plus uno verum esse non possit, iacere necesse sit tot tam nobiles disciplinas), quam de oculorum sensuumque reliquorum mendaciiis et de sorite aut pseudomeno, quas plagas ipsi contra se Stoici texue-runt.” Tum Lucullus: “Non moleste,” inquit, “fero nos haec contulisse; saepius enim congregientes nos, et maxume in Tusculanis nostris, si quae videbuntur requiremus.” “Optume,” inquam, “sed quid Catulus sentit? quid Hortensius?” Tum Catulus: “Egone?” inquit; “ad patris revolvor sententiam, quam quidem ille Carneadeam esse dicebat, ut percipi nihil putem posse, adsensurum autem non perpeito, id est opinaturum, sapientem existumem, sed ita ut intellegat se opinari sciatque1

1 sentiatque? Reid.

* This foreshadows De Finibus, and possibly the preceding words also include De Natura Deorum, which was certainly written after the second edition of Academica was finished.  
\(^b\) See § 49 note.  
\(^c\) See § 95.
enacted that a witness giving evidence should say that he 'thought' even something that he had him-
self seen, and that the jury giving their verdict on oath should declare not that the facts which they had ascertained 'had occurred' but that they 'appeared to have.'

XLVIII. "However, Lucullus, not only is our Conclusion sailor signalling but even the west wind itself is whispering that it is time for us to be cruising, and also I have said enough; so I ought to round off. On a later occasion however when we engage in these inquiries, let us by preference discuss the wide differences of opinion that exist among the men of greatest eminence, the obscurity of nature and the errors of all these philosophers (who disagree so violently about things good and their opposites\(^a\) that, since there cannot be more than one truth, a large number of these famous systems must of necessity collapse), rather than the subject of the falsehoods told by our eyes and the rest of our senses, and the fallacies of 'the heap'\(^b\) and 'the liar'\(^c\)—traps that the Stoics have set to catch themselves." "I am not sorry," rejoined Lucullus, "that we have debated these subjects; in fact we will meet more frequently, and particularly at our places at Tus-
culum, to investigate such questions as we think fit." "Excellent," said I, "but what is Catulus's view? and Hortensius's?" "My view?" replied Catulus; "I am coming round to the view of my father, which indeed he used to say was that of Carneades, and am beginning to think that nothing can be perceived, but to deem that the wise man will assent to some-
thing not perceived, that is, will hold an opinion, but with the qualification that he will understand that
nihil esse quod comprehendi et percipi possit; quare ἐποχή illam omnium rerum comprobans\(^1\) illi alteri sententiae, nihil esse quod percipi possit, vehementer adsentior.” “Habeo,” inquam, “sententiam tuam nec eam admodum aspernor; sed tibi quid tandem videtur, Hortensi?” Tum ille ridens: “Tollendum!” “Teneo te,” inquam, “nam ista Academiae est propria sententia.” Ita sermone confecto Catulus remansit, nos ad naviculas nostras descendimus.

\(^1\) non probans \textit{Mdv.}; improbans \textit{Davies}.

\(^a\) Possibly the Latin should be corrected to ‘disagreeing.’
it is an opinion and will know that there is nothing that can be comprehended and perceived: and therefore although agreeing with their rule of *epochē* as to everything, I assent emphatically to that second view, that nothing exists that can be perceived.” “I have your view,” said I, “and I do not think it quite negligible; but pray, Hortensius, what do you think?” “Away with it!” he replied with a laugh. “I take you,” said I, “for that is the true Academic verdict.” The conversation thus concluded, Catulus stayed behind, while we went down to our boats.

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A *double entente*, (1) ‘make a clean sweep’ of assent, and (2) ‘weigh anchor.’
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